


JPRS-NEA-94-050
15 September 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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Near East & South Asia

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Regional Affairs

Banker Sees No Economic Boom In Gulf

94AE0161A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 30 Jul 94
p 10

[Text] The vice president of the Arab Banking Corporation [ABC] has stated that the horizons of the oil market in relation to Gulf economics appear somewhat gloomy in the short term, reflecting the stagnation of the international economy.

In an analysis of the trends of the international oil market and their repercussions on Gulf economics produced by the ABC, he added that horizons will be brighter in the medium term and up to the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the next century. However, he doubts that the Gulf region will witness another economic boom similar to the one it experienced at the end of the 1970s.

Paul Papadopoulos indicated that in the medium term he expects that the international demand for energy in general and for crude oil and gas in particular will stabilize. It is assumed that crude oil and gas will remain the most utilized source of energy up to the next century.

However, he pointed to the possibility of the existence of exceptions outside the Gulf group. Russian production could, perhaps, finally improve because of the incentives that might be granted for investments in the oil and gas sectors and because of improvements in oil prices. However, the impact of this increase on the international market will be limited because the boom that the Russian economy will experience will direct most of this increase to local consumption.

Oil production in the countries of Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, could also undergo important developments, but their impact on the total offerings in the international market will probably be limited. Finally there is always the possibility of permitting Iraq, before the end of this century, to resume its oil exports at a rate close to its rate at the beginning of 1990. However, this increase in offerings would probably synchronize with an increase in demand for oil.

He said that what is required is a collective response to the needs of the market by way of increasing production when necessary without flooding the market with surplus oil. Consequently, with medium-term market improvement, it would be incumbent on the oil exporting Gulf states to increase production to meet demand. The aim should not be the attainment of a certain price, but the realization of revenues that could be estimated in the light of carefully calculated production averages. Such a policy would contribute to the spread of an atmosphere of economic stability in the Gulf states. Such a situation would enable the public and private sectors to make sufficient investments, not only in the fundamental and standard oil and gas projects, but also in nonpetroleum projects in the framework of the current aim to create a diversified economic base in the long term.

In spite of the boom in price averages since last February, the vice president of the ABC does not expect a noticeable improvement in the market or a continuous boom until the end of 1995. He said that while, as expected, economic conditions have improved in North America in what remains of 1994, economic activity in most European countries and Japan will not improve and regain its well-being completely until the middle of 1995.

He added that it would not be correct to assume that the world economy will return to its natural state in the beginning of 1996. Rather, there are structural changes currently being implemented that would lead one to believe that, while the growth of the world economy in the past depended on the performance of the major industrial states, the inactivity of this group of countries could result in disappointing results even when the growing cycle of the major economies in the world has been completed.

He indicated that the ageing of West European and Japanese societies and the reaching middle age of what is called the post World War II generation in the United States comprises one of the factors influencing world markets, which in its turn, should be thoroughly analyzed. Moreover, the relative rise in unemployment rates in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development could continue beyond the time when their economies would regain their well-being because of industrial changes and the policy of guiding the activities of establishments. These phenomena that are being experienced by the main economies of the world could cast their shadow on opportunities for economic development in the long term, and would reduce, in its turn, the demand for energy.

He pointed out that the sharp increase in mean oil prices in the late 1970s dictated the need for research to economize in the consumption of energy. Perhaps, but for that increase, this research would not have been conducted and would not have achieved the results that are being achieved now. Research is still being conducted to develop machines and appliances that do not directly depend on oil or gas as a source of power, aiming primarily at utilizing electricity as a primary source of energy. In the future, these developments could lead to greater competence in the consumption of energy and fuel, especially in the transportation sector.

He stated that international environmental concerns will also weaken the demand for traditional sources of energy. However, it would be preferable that there be coordination between the requirements for economic development and labor on the one hand and environmental concerns on the other, especially between developing countries. Moreover, the countries of the European Union could impose additional taxes on energy. He explained that the expected economic growth in the main emergent markets, especially in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, will strengthen demand. Here, it should be mentioned that the political direction of most economies of East European countries as well as Russia might be reversed by the beginning of 1995. Moreover, various negative influences,

even if they were to lead to reduction in opportunities for economic growth to below their rates if those influences were absent, the world economy will probably grow at a faster rate than at the beginning of the 1990s.

He added that the Gulf area still has the lion's share of the world's potential and proven reserves of oil and gas. Those reserves are not only the largest in the world in volume, but are also considered to be the easiest to extract, costing a minute proportion of the cost of extracting the other sources of hydrocarbons. If proven reserves outside the Gulf area were to fall, leaving only their basins, then drilling operations in them would require great sums. In some cases, competition to extract the oil has led, to a great extent, to an shortening of the life span of those reserves. Moreover, many of the basins in which no drilling has occurred yet are spread over various corners of the world. Probably, making use of them will remain limited.

He expects that the increase in demand at the end of the 1990s will be accompanied by an increase in world dependence on the Gulf area as a principal source of energy. The response of the Gulf countries to this possibility, and the effect of this possibility on their economies, will depend on the policies that the countries follow in the coming years.

He said that the present weakness in the international oil markets and the sharp fall in oil prices have contributed to weakening the role of OPEC as a principal force in the market. Moreover, the future of the Organization has become doubtful. The four major oil exporting countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council—Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—are now members of OPEC.

He indicated that in the event of the dissolution of the Organization, the Gulf oil states might gather more attention in the international oil market by merit of what unites them in common interest, harmony, and resolute unity, as compared to present relations in the OPEC framework. This group of countries might be facing a weakness in demand at the present juncture, and perhaps, in the short term, but they will be able to look forward to brighter horizons in the medium range. The group's task is to increase its oil revenues to the maximum, without harming the interests of the oil exporting countries in the long range.

Papadopoulos remarked that there are some differences in the aims of the oil sector in the Gulf Cooperation Council states and in the other OPEC countries. The principal oil exporting states that are members of the Council have relatively small populations, while enjoying tremendous oil reserves and long production cycles. The aim of those states has been and continues to be the maintenance of the stability of the market from the point of view of production rates and prices, rather than achieving maximum revenues by sharply cutting production.

He stated that the ideal policy for oil exporting Gulf Cooperation Council states has to be the continuation of a measure of production limits and the subjection of production rates to demand indicators in the short term. As for the other exporting countries, they will continue with

their efforts to increase their share of the market at the expense of the Gulf states in the short term. However, the ability of those countries to increase their share of the market in the long term will be limited because most of them have failed to hold on to production gains. He even expects that many of the oil exporting non-Gulf countries will see a sharp shrinkage in their share of the oil market as compared to the shares of the Gulf states at the end of the 1990s.

Palestinian Affairs

Al-Nashashibi on Israeli Economic Ties

94AA0105B London FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH
in Arabic July 94 p 17-19

[Interview with PLO economist, Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi, by Yasir al-Zu'atarah; place and date not given: "I am for Strengthening Ties With Arab Nations; There is a Movement That Wants Ties With Israel"—first two paragraphs are FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH introduction]

[Text] Mr. al-Nashashibi is one of the independent members on the PLO's Executive Committee. He is a well-known economist and heads the PLO's Economics Office. In the new authority, he has been tapped for the post of financial affairs.

Our interview with al-Nashashibi concerned more than one subject, despite his attempt to concentrate on the economic side of the Oslo catastrophe, since he is a specialist. The interview deals with the hopes that he expresses, which are contrary to the stipulations of the Oslo Agreement and ensuing events, since he hopes that the Palestinian economy will be tied to the Arab nations and not to the Zionist entity, when there are no guarantees that that will occur.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Many have read into the Oslo-Cairo Agreement an Israeli-Palestinian alliance. Some see in it an economic agreement with a political cover, while others see a victory for the Israeli Labor Party movement within the PLO command. All of the data confirms that we are facing an Israeli protectorate that wants us to be a bridge for the Zionists to cross over into the Arab nations. From the point of departure of your living with reality from Madrid to the present time, how do you see events in the territories? What might be done later on?

[Al-Nashashibi] The agreement is not as you have described. It is an agreement that does not comply with the minimum Palestinian demands, but it is not in this form. The important thing is that it has become a fact. However, in my belief, it does not upset our people's ability to change the situation, since we can overcome all the gaps and shortcomings in this agreement. There are gaps as you said, but when we return and assume responsibility, even if limited, we can change the situation for the better. The agreement is a step along a long road and, in my estimation, the attitude of all our people—at this stage—will help to change the situation for the best interests of our people

and for a new beginning. We can say that our return will help to change the situation. If we cannot do that, I believe that it will be a setback, God forbid.

[Al-Zu'atarah] However, the initiative's margin is very small, in view of the fact that self-rule is subject to Israeli authority, loopholes, interpretations, and limits, all of which are under Israeli domination. Even if we assume the opposite of that, and the Israelis think the agreement is not in their interests, in accordance with what they have planned and arranged, then—consequently—they can abandon it or change the situation in the territories, as they have stated.

[Al-Nashashibi] It is not that easy. The difference is that Israel will lessen the pressure of its hegemony over the territories. With redeployment and the presence of the authority, however limited, on the ground, the situation is capable of change. It is our people who will constantly suffer from it, without an authority capable of change. It is unlikely to return after 10 years to the situation that existed before. This is an experiment we are going through. If we can begin the process of change in the territories now, that is considerably better than if we left the situation to continue as it was.

[Al-Zu'atarah] What can be changed in the territories in light of what the situation is now? Nearly everything with regard to the framework of self-rule is in the Israelis' hands. What can be changed?

[Al-Nashashibi] Two things are changed: the Israelis' direct hegemony and the controlled economic relationship, despite the fact that the economic agreement that has been concluded is not capable of achieving an economic momentum to build an independent, national Palestinian economy without foreign interference, in accordance with the UN Economic Charter for Peoples and Nations. However, we believe that with experience, and the removal of certain influences, we can change some things in this agreement. The problem we face is neglecting matters and not being capable of change. This is a factor that helps Israel create more burdensome disadvantages for our people. If we are able, and this is a test for us, to initiate a change in the situation on the ground, we can say that we have saved some things. However, the warning at this stage is to continue the various methods of the struggle, for the purpose of helping to create a situation at home capable of imposing change. Israel can't continue in this situation; it can't.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But in your comment on the Palestinian-Israeli Economic Agreement, you said that it was incompatible with the goal of building an independent Palestinian economy, with its words about mutual Israeli-Palestinian relations and continual cooperation. In light of what we know concerning the course of negotiations, can it be applied to the benefit of Palestinians?

[Al-Nashashibi] I think that if we decide that compliance with the negotiations was not at the desired level, then that would mean that compliance in the execution stage must be better.

[Al-Zu'atarah] However, there are written, concise, and permanent agreements that are being referred for interpretation to joint committees. You yourself said that if there were joint committees, interpretation would be to Israel's advantage. What can we rely on?

[Al-Nashashibi] We can depend on what we can draw from our people's struggle and their search for change. As for pursuing the agreement as it is, this is not in our interests.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Does that mean that our people's destiny is now at risk?

[Al-Nashashibi] Not at all. The struggle is a risk; continuing the struggle is not a risk. Continuing the struggle is necessary for change and is not a risk.

[Al-Zu'atarah] We have depended a great deal on the struggle of negotiations, and the result has always been to our disadvantage.

[Al-Nashashibi] I don't agree with the statement that negotiations were our means to continue the struggle. No.

[Al-Zu'atarah] What were they, then?

[Al-Nashashibi] The victory there was the fact that Israel was conducting negotiations, but all the developments from the time the agreement was signed up to this point contradict the fact that our people will pursue their struggle. It would be preferable to be able to regain the rights that the agreement was unable to regain.

[Al-Zu'atarah] The problem is not only in the negotiating performance, but also in the balance of power in the territories.

[Al-Nashashibi] No, no, no. If I were to concede that, it would mean that this stage is not good for negotiating, and that we cannot attain anything.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Isn't that also the opinion of a large part of our people?

[Al-Nashashibi] What does that require?

[Al-Zu'atarah] Continuation of the resistance as an option that rejects the balance of power, which will not remain constant.

[Al-Nashashibi] Continuing the resistance is truly one of the options, but on condition that we begin the change. As for continuing the negotiations without a new power capable every day of achieving something, I don't think so. As for the balance of power from this date for 10 years, I am afraid that that is not in the interests of the Palestinian struggle, unless we can achieve something on the spot.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Is the people's struggle counted as one year or 10?

[Al-Nashashibi] It is not 10; this is the 70th year of this struggle, if not more.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But continuing the resistance will create new conditions in the territories, which will force the enemy to give up. As for our putting all our eggs in the basket of negotiations, under the aegis of an imperfect

balance of power, that would mean that the result would be to the occupation's total advantage. This is the case in the territories now.

[Al-Nashashibi] No, no, no. I think that what will be happening soon in the territories, with pursuing the resistance, will not be in their interests. What we need to do now is accomplish one thing after another in light of continuing the resistance. There is no big difference. As you said, there is only the difference of balance of power. The difference of balance of power applies to the rest of the Arab processes.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Do you think that the Palestinian authority accepts the resistance?

[Al-Nashashibi] Yes, unless it falls.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But, what about dissolving Fatah's military formations? Is this a clear intention to continue the resistance?

[Al-Nashashibi] Yes, despite what is said about dissolving. The dissolution is beyond me. I don't know that it would be possible to dissolve formations like these. I don't think...Fatah, Fatah's Hawks...the basic forces in Fatah are determined to continue the resistance with all their power. I don't think that it would be easy to take such a step as that.

[Al-Zu'atarah] What is your position if the opposite occurred?

[Al-Nashashibi] Like what?

[Al-Zu'atarah] Meaning, if the authority stopped the resistance.

[Al-Nashashibi] The authority will not stop the resistance. When the authority stops the resistance in such a way as to impede the struggle, then that would be another position entirely.

[Al-Zu'atarah] At the end of your comment on the Palestinian-Israeli Economic Agreement, you said that it would keep the Palestinian economy under Israeli domination. You demanded that it be totally rejected. That has not been achieved. Despite that, your position with regard to this matter appears to continue.

[Al-Nashashibi] Our present position helps us to regain all the rights that Israel and the occupation forces stole from us, during the 27 years of taxes that they amassed and sent to the Israeli treasury, and which were not spent on our people in the occupied territories.

We are now trying to regain all our rights with regard to income tax, value-added tax, customs, fees, taxes on international commerce. We are trying to regain all of this, even though it all went to the Israeli treasury. With the exception of what they call income tax, none of it was spent on our people.

[Al-Zu'atarah] There is talk about a tripartite economic federation between Israel, Jordan, and the self-rule authority. In your opinion, can such a proposal be

achieved or become a fact, since Jordan is open to the self-rule economy, while the latter is—in practice—tied to Israel?

[Al-Nashashibi] This agreement will not be, because it does not fulfill the minimum needs of the Jordanian and Palestinian parties. What I personally want is economic integration between the Palestinian territories and Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. This integration would give us the necessary power, capability, and market to circulate our products, so that we can build our future with an eastern, not western, look.

[Al-Zu'atarah] However, the spirit of the Oslo Agreement, and even its provisions, talk about a western direction (in Israel's direction) and not eastern. You yourself said that the course of application has taught us that the negotiations' results would not go beyond the provisions.

[Al-Nashashibi] No, I said that when matters are neglected and we accept that, then the situation is as you say. But, when we refuse to apply the agreement, the situation will change.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Do you believe that refusing to apply the agreement's provisions will be that easy?

[Al-Nashashibi] It will not be easy, but it is not impossible. Experience has taught us that these agreements are not applied, because they are in the interests of one party. My conviction is that the agreement cannot be applied because it will be rejected by our people.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Our people have rejected a great deal; no one has paid attention to their rejection. The problem is that there is a movement inside the PLO Command that is called the Hani al-Hasan movement, an Israeli Labor Party trend that tends toward ties with Israel. That means that the proposal of those who talk about an eastward direction is not only in conflict with the agreement's provisions, but is also in conflict with the directions of an important part within the Palestinian leadership in control of the authority.

[Al-Nashashibi] I don't believe the Supreme Command as a whole is as you say. There is only a trend.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But this movement is the one that has shaped the Oslo Agreement and what has ensued.

[Al-Nashashibi] Despite this, it could be changed. Persistent work will change many provisions.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Are we still talking about promises and wishes?

[Al-Nashashibi] Circumstances and provisions do not represent the minimum to which we aspire. However, if continuing the struggle is accompanied by achieving something on the spot, that will be progress.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Apparently, Jordan has become convinced that the self-rule direction is toward the west (Israel) and nowhere else. Therefore, they hurried to settle their affairs with Israel after they saw your position.

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[Al-Nashashibi] If this conclusion is true, it is unfortunate. In any case, there is a lessening with regard to the two sides.

[Al-Zu'atarah] This is the Syrians' belief also. Even the Egyptians have not been happy about the economic appendix to the Oslo Agreement. Apparently, therefore, Palestine has been transformed from the point of conflict with the Zionist scheme to a bridge crossing over to the Arab region.

[Al-Nashashibi] These words are inaccurate. We are not the reason for the absence of Arab coordination. Arab coordination had not been attained prior to the agreement, or prior to going to Madrid, which they approved, abandoning the unified Arab position.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But the PLO opened the door. If it had not gone to Madrid, no one would have gone.

[Al-Nashashibi] That is not true; the conference would have been held without us.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Let's go back to the economic agreement. The Zionist minister of planning says that there is an agreement for the Palestinians to market Israeli goods. Another official says that whether the source of the merchandise is Palestinian or Israeli will not be known. What do you say?

[Al-Nashashibi] We will not market Israeli goods, and there is nothing requiring us to do so. Personally, I will demand that our products be stamped with our seal.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But what about joint companies between Palestinian and Israeli investors?

[Al-Nashashibi] We have completely rejected that in Executive Committee meetings.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But, what about the provisions pertaining to that in the agreement?

[Al-Nashashibi] The agreement's provisions neither forbid nor obligate. This is not a proper way to build an independent economy. I am not responsible for certain positions collapsing on others.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But don't these others have important positions in the PLO and the authority?

[Al-Nashashibi] Like whom?

[Al-Zu'atarah] Nabil [Sha'th] and Abu-'Ala', for example.

[Al-Nashashibi] Abu-'Ala' does not have an official post, and the official direction is still not to establish companies like those.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Throughout the past two decades of the PLO, there has been constant talk about financial corruption. Could a similar situation of suspicion regarding the fiscal performance of the self-rule authority continue? Where do PLO funds go?

[Al-Nashashibi] The chief of the National Fund is the one to ask about PLO funds. He submits a report concerning them to the National Council.

[Al-Zu'atarah] What about Fatah funds?

[Al-Nashashibi] I am not an official in Fatah, and I know nothing about this.

[Al-Zu'atarah] A short time ago, a famous French journalist, Eric Rouleaux [name as transliterated] talked about shadowy amounts of money. What about those funds?

[Al-Nashashibi] I know nothing about that. These are issues that concern Fatah.

[Al-Zu'atarah] But, isn't Fatah the authority?

[Al-Nashashibi] No.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Why not? They hold more than 70 percent of it.

[Al-Nashashibi] Even if that is the case, this is a political organization and it has its private affairs.

[Al-Zu'atarah] However, Fatah did not get these funds because it is Fatah, but rather, because it is the PLO or its backbone. So, how is the financial corruption stopped?

[Al-Nashashibi] There will be control, and there will be a budget to be decided upon by the legislative authority. A detailed report will be submitted.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Do you expect elections to be held in the self-rule authority? Many are doubtful.

[Al-Nashashibi] Certainly elections will be conducted.

[Al-Zu'atarah] I mean legislative elections.

[Al-Nashashibi] Yes, legislative, even though the agreement does not specify that.

Hamas Spokesman on 'Arafat

94AA0106A London FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH in Arabic Aug 94 p 15-16

[Interview with Hamas spokesman, Ibrahim Ghawshah, by Yasir Al-Zu'atarah, in Gaza; date not given: "We Are Helping the Masses Discover the Truth; We Oppose the Agreement Peacefully, Popularly; We Continue to Fight the Occupation"—first paragraph FILASTIN AL-MUSLIMAH introduction]

[Text] Events have accelerated on the Palestinian scene following Yasir 'Arafat's decision to return at once to Gaza. Accordingly, a group of changes will occur there and, naturally, the position of the principal opposition force (the Hamas Movement) is obviously very important. Therefore, we met with Engineer Ibrahim Ghawshah, the official spokesman for the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas.

[Al-Zu'atarah] How do you evaluate Yasir 'Arafat's return to the occupied territories at this time, after he was expected to delay? What did you think of the size of his reception there?

[Ghawshah] 'Arafat visited the Gaza Strip and Jericho on 1 July 1994 and returned on 13 July 1994. This is the date that was expected by many observers. Some think that his

first visit was under Egyptian pressure for fear that the Jordanian route would be faster, and because of a direct rebuke from Peres to stop the role of beggar abroad and opposing requests of the people living at home. There is no doubt that the size of his reception was less than normal (about 30,000) in Gaza and very small in Jericho (only 3,000) from all parts of the West Bank. As for his return on 13 July, there were only tens and hundreds at his reception. This gives a clear indication that the Palestinian masses in the areas of self-rule are dissatisfied with the Oslo and Cairo Agreement.

'Arafat—Shaykh Yasin

[Al-Zu'atarah] One has noted Yasir 'Arafat's concentration on the issue of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in his speeches in Gaza and Jericho. What do you think about the messages that this concentration carries or the purpose behind them?

[Ghawshah] Some reports talked about Rabin's intention to release Shaykh Ahmad Yasin upon 'Arafat's return, but it was clear later on that he had put various conditions on it, including the pledge to support the Oslo-Cairo process, abandon resistance, etc. Note that Shaykh Ahmad Yasin has made it clear that he is unwilling to accept any conditions for release.

No doubt 'Arafat wanted to win over the Palestinian masses, who highly esteem Shaykh Ahmad Yasin highly. Perhaps he wanted to offer a political service, through which he might neutralize Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and turn him away from the Movement's fixed position of refusing to participate in the self-rule authority. This would be completely impossible. In addition, this step has been totally exposed, and was for the purpose of media exploitation. However, 'Arafat could have emphasized the need to release Shaykh Ahmad Yasin as a condition for his return, when he met with the Zionists in a closed room, but he did not.

[Al-Zu'atarah] In his speech, 'Arafat concentrated on the issue of prisoners. He said that he will not bargain over any of them. How do you assess this direction and its veracity? What is your position in Hamas regarding the issue of prisoners and the pledge asked from them?

[Ghawshah] 'Arafat has not been truthful in his statements. The fact is that he has bargained over the prisoners. He abandoned more than half of them, including about 50 imprisoned sisters. He agreed to banish a group of them to Gaza and Jericho, far from the West Bank, and spread the "discord" of the pledge among them, since the Zionist jailers have confirmed that the PLO leadership has relied upon the pledge. Hamas has rejected the pledge that demands support for the Oslo-Cairo Agreement and rejection of violence and terrorism. The matter was turned over to the Central Command of the Hamas prisoners in jail, who have made considerable efforts to eliminate the paragraph supporting the Oslo-Cairo Agreement and to keep the second paragraph disavowing violence and terrorism. Hamas' Central Command in prison, which includes Salah Shihadah, Isma'il Abu-Shanab, and others,

thought that the prisoner should have a choice between making the decision not to sign or conceding, signing, and getting out, especially those who are ill, elderly, or have long sentences, excluding prominent leaders and those in management. There were approximately 500 prisoners who made the decision and, in fact, got out who are from the opposition, most of them from Hamas and the rest from the Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, and so forth.

Silence on the Visit

[Al-Zu'atarah] One has noticed that Hamas' position regarding 'Arafat's return was to remain silent. Do you believe that this policy is best, to allow the masses to find out the truth for themselves?

[Ghawshah] No one from the Hamas leadership was at 'Arafat's reception. The silence was deafening, as REUTERS described it. This position is within Hamas' political context of opposing self-rule popularly and peacefully, and providing material strength to resist the Zionist occupation no matter where. There is no doubt that Hamas understands very well the masses' hunger for an end to occupation, even if only partially. These sentiments should not be opposed. On the contrary, it is more appropriate to allow the masses—to help them—discover the truth for themselves and expose the fable of self-rule in all its dimensions. Hamas is totally convinced that some of the masses, which have been deceived, will not applaud the heroes of this drama in the end, but rather, will deal appropriately with them.

[Al-Zu'atarah] You were one of the Hamas delegation that visited Damascus recently and met with the Syrian vice president and the minister of foreign affairs. How do you assess the visit, and what is the truth of the offer to you to reside in Damascus?

[Ghawshah] The meeting, which took place on 19 June 1994 and lasted two hours, was with Vice President Khaddam. A similar one was held with Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'. The meetings were excellent and cordial. The delegation explained Hamas' position with regard to the new events on the Palestinian scene and Hamas' policy in dealing with those events. The delegation listened to the Syrian position with regard to adherence to Syrian and Arab territorial independence. The two sides agreed on the need for continued dialogue and meetings. No offers were made in these meetings.

Escalation of Operations

[Al-Zu'atarah] For the past two weeks an escalation of military action by Hamas has been noted in the West Bank. Is the escalation deliberate or part of the Hamas' jihadist line?

[Ghawshah] The onset of self-administration was accompanied by a decrease in jihadist operations, since field changes and requirements had to be studied. Operations then increased, especially in the West Bank, where the occupation was most intensive. We have observed a continual escalation, especially in Hebron and in the central area and Nabulus. These jihadist operations are within the

context of Hamas' strategic program of continuing to resist the occupation and the settlements as a principal axis that the movement is keen to perpetuate.

Political Party

[Al-Zu'atarah] Debate continues over your intention to establish a political party to be your political front at home. How far have discussions gone in this regard?

[Ghawshah] The idea of forming a political party is not a new development for Hamas, but rather it is a proposal that has been under study for some time. It is now being crystallized at home and abroad. However, the multiplicity of possibilities, changes, and hypotheses, and the unclear directions of the Palestinian self-administration in its dealings with the Palestinian Resistance, make a decision in this regard unlikely in the short term.

[Al-Zu'atarah] Do you expect elections to be conducted at home? What is your position concerning participation in them whenever they are held?

[Ghawshah] There are abundant indicators pointing to the fact that 'Arafat and Rabin are not eager to hold elections this year. Hamas' position is to refuse to participate in self-rule elections whenever they occur.

[Al-Zu'atarah] What is Hamas' position with regard to expediting negotiations on the Jordanian front, beginning with negotiations over Wadi 'Arabah and the Dead Sea and ending with the meeting of King Husayn and Rabin in Washington on 25 July 1994?

[Ghawshah] Hamas feels hopeless and bitter over these negotiations and rejects any negotiations or meetings with the Zionist enemy. Hamas considers shaking hands with Rabin to be a death blow to the intifadah and the Palestinian people. These successive collapses in the Arab wall cannot thwart the ummah [Arab-Islamic community as a whole] if it continues to hold fast to its Koran and its heritage. However, it will cause the road to be longer, the sacrifice greater, and the cost higher. Hamas believes that if every inch of Arab land is dear and beloved, then the 27,000 square kilometers of sacred Palestinian territory is the dearest and most beloved in the hearts of all Arabs and Muslims.

Algeria

Paris: Sweep of Islamists Reveal Pro-FIS Networks

94AF0273B Algiers LE POINT in French
13 Aug 94 pp 26-29

[Article by Jerome Dupuis and Jean-Loup Reverier: "France: The FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) Networks"—first paragraph is LE POINT introduction]

[Text] For the past 10 months, police sweeps of the Islamist nebula have revealed the existence of networks that combine propaganda and active support to Algerian fundamentalist fighters.

Will the disquieting warnings that the Algerian fundamentalists addressed to the French Government lead to a wave of attacks comparable to that of 1986? The multiplication of identity checks in Paris and in the provinces during the past week, proves that interior minister Charles Pasqua does not take the risk lightly. It all started with the threats uttered on 6 August by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the military branch of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]: "The French Government must renounce its aggressive policy, or it will shoulder the responsibility for whatever the AIS mujahidin (fighters of the faith) will subject it to." An address all the more provocative as it came after the assassination—on 3 August in Algiers—of five Frenchmen, including three gendarmes, by a commando of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a rival and particularly resolute branch of the FIS.

Even though nothing in the communique explicitly indicated that these Islamists intend to take their action onto French soil, Charles Pasqua's reaction was not long in coming: five Islamist publications were banned in France; a security operation was set up in Paris and several large towns; people were questioned, searches performed, and alleged Islamist leaders were rounded up at the disused Folembay (Aisne) barracks pending their deportation to a host country. In addition, at the beginning of the week, Judge Bruguiere, in charge of two FIS cases originating from Lille and Meurthe-et-Moselle, ordered the men of the Criminal Investigation Department's 6th Division to arrest four other accomplices who were already under close watch (two in Lille, and one bookstore owner and his employee in Paris). All these measures were in line with the operations initiated since November 1993 against the Algerian Islamic movement in France. In 10 months, close to 150 individuals were questioned, and 20 were placed under investigation and imprisoned; this has enabled experts to better define this radical movement.

The investigators' first finding was that the FIS and its satellite organizations, in particular its legal front, the FAF (Algerian Brotherhood in France), do not form a single, homogeneous network organized into a hierarchy. Rather, through networks organized around locally well-established personalities, associations, or mosques, they actively support the Algerian guerrilla through donations; through anti-like trafficking, they also help convey weapons, ammunition, explosives, and forged documents to Algeria. "Because sympathizers are scattered and networks cut off from one another, any estimate of FIS or GIA numbers in our country is uncertain," a magistrate deplored.

In the Algerian community in France, the majority of which aspires to live in harmony with their host country, the security branch of the police force and the Directorate of Territorial Security (DST) thus soon noticed the FAF activism. Therefore, when two French diplomats were kidnapped in Algeria, the FAF was the preferred target of the large-scale operation code-named "Chrysanthemum" that was launched on 9 November 1993.

Contacts With Petty Gangsters

In fact, the 88 individuals taken in for questioning throughout the country on that day included a few big fish, among whom Moussa Kraouche and Djaffar el Houari, the two pillars of the FAF. But only four people were placed under examination by antiterrorist judge Roger Le Loire: Abdelmar Boudjaadar, a substitute teacher at whose home, in Orleans, investigators found an electronic component that could be used to remotely trigger a bomb; Larbi Beddiaf, for possession of a .22 long rifle [as published]; Mohammed Djeflal, for possession of forged administrative documents; and Moussa Kraouche. But the FAF leader's case might soon be dismissed because of the questionable handling of documents by the police who searched his home.

Second finding: this meager legal harvest nevertheless confirmed to the French intelligence departments that pro-FIS networks were being set up. Some of these networks, especially those around Moussa Kraouche, are in constant contact with Rabah Kebir, the FIS big boss in Europe, who took refuge in Germany; others prefer to turn to the more radical fringe led by former parliament members such as Anouar Haddam who, for his part, lives in exile in the United States and was expelled from the FIS for supporting the GIA's rival theories. The documents seized during the "Chrysanthemum" operation, and the witnesses examined by the investigators also revealed the existence of a discourse violently hostile to France, which is consistently accused of supporting the Algerian Government.

"We also noticed that several of the Islamists held for questioning were associating with petty gangsters," one investigator observed. This finding was confirmed in March, at Lille. Provided with letters rogatory issued by judge Chantal Fontaine, the Criminal Investigation Department performed searches in connection with some drug trafficking. While searching the domicile of Chaid Eddour, a student of agronomy, the investigators were surprised to find 511 Algerian national identity cards and 606 certificates from the Algerian High Commissariat to the national service, all of them blank. Pursuing their investigation in Persan-Beaumont (Val-d'Oise), at the domicile of another sympathizer, Ahme ' Seba, they found an Israeli Galil assault rifle, two clips, four boxes of cartridges, moist rubber stamps, and fundamentalist literature. While antiterrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguier was placing Eddou and Seba under examination for "conspiracy in connection with a terrorist undertaking," the Lille magistrate ordered the incarceration of a third individual for drug trafficking.

The same curious mixing of genres occurred again when Abderamane Chenine was arrested on 6 August. This 24-year-old Algerian student—already wanted for his alleged complicity in a holdup committed on 2 July in Saint-Aignan, near Rouen—had just removed two pistol clips, two silencers, and cartridges from a supermarket locker in La Defense. When his domicile in Rouen was searched, the investigators found tracts from the FIS executive commission.

Where do these weapons, which usually just transit France before being conveyed to the Algerian "brothers" via Spain and Morocco, come from? The arrest of Abdel Boutrif by customs officer, on 6 May at the Beaumont (Meurthe-et-Moselle) toll booth, revealed the existence of an explosive and fuse supply channel originating in Luxembourg. In the old second-hand Opel of that smuggler, who was on his second trip, customs officers found an ill-assorted load quite revealing of the Algerian guerrilla's needs: one assault rifle, three automatic pistols, thousands of cartridges, 130 sticks of explosives, 99 fuses stolen in Luxembourg, three scanners, four night-sighting devices, 14 transceivers, and 45 boxes of medicines. Enough to equip several commandos of "brothers."

Hunches and Tips

But weapons also come from Germany, or even Central Europe, as was demonstrated when eight Islamist militants were arrested late in July, in Perpignan and Paris. The operation was the result of a well-advised identity check of four suspicious individuals, made at the Perpignan railroad station by the air and border police [PAF]. Whether due to a hunch or a tip, this initiative led to the seizure of another arsenal, both in lockers and in the individuals: Volkswagen Jetta bearing a German license plate. In addition to pump guns, automatic pistols, ammunition, and knives, the PAF men found three black overalls and ski masks. The resulting investigation led the Criminal Investigation Department to two "Retro-Mode" clothing stores in the 17th and 20th arrondissements. The link was established thanks to the carelessness of these activists: the weapons seized in the Perpignan station lockers were wrapped in "Retro-Mode" shopping bags! In the cellar of one of these shops, the investigators discovered weapons, a police transceiver, as well as another ski mask, and a disguise kit consisting of one wig, false eyelashes, and a false mustache.

Why the ski masks and overalls? Algerian Islamist fighters use them often so as to be mistaken for official security forces when they set up roadblocks or during their commando operations. This has earned them the nickname of "Ninjas" (referring to the Ninja turtles of American serials).

Do Not Underestimate the Threat

From this successful operation, the police drew interesting lessons concerning international links between Islamists. For instance, Ahmed el Hallal, an Algerian found in possession of two forged passports—one Swedish, one Tunisian—was domiciled in Zagreb, where he was heading an association, "The Fight," supporting the cause of Bosniac Muslims.

In addition, until 6 May 1994, the Volkswagen Jetta belonged to Mohammed Bayomy. This Egyptian residing in Stuttgart was already known by the German authorities to have lent a vehicle to Islamist friends who were in possession of forged French and Tunisian papers and literature on fundamentalist movements. Finally, the internationalization of Islamist networks was confirmed

by the fact that the people arrested in Perpignan belonged to various organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the Tunisian movement En Nahda, and of course the FIS.

Are we dealing in each case with perfectly independent networks? Not really; actually some cases cross-refer to others. Thus, Larbi Beddiaf, already taken in for questioning in November 1993, then incarcerated by judge Bruguiere in connection with the Lille case, appeared again indirectly in the Perpignan case through a mutual friend of his and El Hallal. The same is true again of the 7.65- and 9-mm Sellier & Bellot cartridges, which were seized both in Perpignan and in Abdel Boutrif's car at the French-Luxembourg border.

Taking advantage of the large Algerian community in France, fundamentalist movements have therefore set up networks there, and these engage in an intense activity of propaganda and clandestine distribution of newspapers, tracts, and cassettes via mosques and other places of prayer. So far, these networks seem to be mobilized to support the armed struggle in Algeria. "All the same," an antiterrorist expert explained, "it is out of the question that we should underestimate the threat: we saw in 1986 that a handful of fanatics can put the capital to fire and the sword."

Said Sadi on Broad Implications of Crisis

94AF0267B *Algiers LIBERTE* in French 6 Aug 94 p 5

[Article by L.S.: "If Algiers Falls, the Maghreb Will Be Set Ablaze"]

[Text] When questioned by the French daily FRANCE SOIR about the attack that cost five French lives last Wednesday, the secretary general of the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy] described the action as "serious" because "for the first time, there was an act of aggression against a state as such." He added, however, that it was foreseeable: "one would have to be unfortunately naive to think that other barriers were not going to be broken...we must not have the slightest illusion about the means that the fundamentalists will use to achieve power."

Can it be said that this is a civil war? In response to that question, Said Sadi said that "each day that passes reinforces that dynamic, and we have not yet reached the paroxysm of horror—the coming months will be even tougher. The worst is yet to come. It is a deadlock."

Asked to give his opinion of France's attitude toward the situation in Algeria, the secretary general of the RCD replied that "support for the Algerian people" as expressed by the two French ministers, Alain Juppe and Francois Leotard, is "fundamental." "It must not be thought that the conflict is only between the government in power and the Islamists. Both are ready to abandon democracy in Algeria provided that there is enough income from petroleum to benefit all the clans. The same small circle has been running the country and despoiling it for 30 years. Its failure and its corruption are the stock-in-trade of the fundamentalists."

In response to another question concerning the danger of a vicious circle—violence in Algeria, Sadi added that "the Algerian crisis is a regional, not to say global, conflict. If Algiers falls, the Maghreb will be set ablaze."

He therefore lambastes "well-known Western countries" that serve as the tools of fundamentalist terrorism by providing it with weapons.

Sadi ended his interview by paying tribute to citizens who defend themselves: "We must succeed in convincing French public opinion that our fight for freedom in Algeria must be that of all democrats."

'Terrorists' Ban Television in Chlef

94AF0207C *Algiers LIBERTE* in French 6 Aug 94 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Chlef: Terrorists Ban Television"]

[Text] Citizens in Chlef have informed us that the ENTV has been blacked out in that city for the past four days.

Terrorists destroyed the relay station in Ammi-Moussa and left TV screens blank after banning parabolic antennas about 20 days ago. First the print media were banned, and now the citizens of Chlef have been deprived of TV.

As a result, the way is clear for fundamentalist propaganda and rumors.

Batna: Timgad Said Deserted; Citizens Terrorized

94AF0267A *Algiers EL WATAN* in French 10 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Abboud Fatima Zohra: "Terrorism: Fear Over Timgad"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Since the assassination of the municipal foreman by terrorists in front of his home in the middle of the night a few months ago, the attempts to assassinate the mayor, an officer of the Gendarmerie, and a citizen, and the torching of the commune's fleet of vehicles, Timgad's residents have been living in anxiety, fear, and terror.

Located on the road between Batna and Khenchela in the very heart of the Aures Mountains (Batna Governorate) and internationally famous because of its Roman ruins protected by UNESCO, Timgad has lost its former qualities and tranquility; it has been deserted by its own children as well as by tourists and foreign archeologists.

But it was only a few years ago that Timgad was the pride of all Algerians because of its Mediterranean festival and, above all, its rich historic past. One elderly citizen feels that the climate of panic introduced by the terrorists is more frightening than that experienced during the war of national liberation because for him, the cause and the enemy back then were the same for all Algerians. Whereas now, he adds "your own son is likely to have a big surprise in store for you."

A young government employee with whom we had a discreet conversation told about his daily life in Timgad:

"It is over; you can no longer trust your own brother. But just a few years ago, you could even get away with criticizing the chief of state. Today you get your throat cut for the slightest thing, so it is better to keep quiet. We are back in the age of the Inquisition."

After a long silence, he continued: "We are forced to be home by 2000 to avoid any kind of incident because the terrorists have done an unbelievable job of psychological destruction within the population. They torched the commune's fleet of vehicles just 100 meters from the Gendarmerie station to prove their superiority and show their presence. They tried to make one citizen come out of his house, and when he refused, they torched his vehicle. He chased them away by shooting at them. At least he was armed, whereas we, on the other hand,..."

The young person we were talking to—who preferred to remain anonymous for safety reasons—also said that the mayor no longer leaves his home: he gave up his job after a terrorist wounded him in the hand while trying to kill him. It also seems that the authorities have been unable to replace the mayor because everyone they contacted has declined the offer out of fear. Everything shuts down at 2000.

The merchants lower their shutters. The citizens barricade themselves in their homes and double lock the doors. Incidentally, all the citizens without exception have replaced their wooden doors with iron ones and installed bars on their windows, all to the delight of the blacksmiths, thus confirming the proverb which states that "one man's joy is another man's sorrow."

Sales by those blacksmiths have risen extraordinarily in just a few months.

According to people we spoke to, walls have also been raised higher for increased safety and to resist possible nighttime terrorist attacks like the one experienced by the citizen mentioned above. The citizens gather as families and arm themselves with iron bars, stones, and so on with which to defend themselves. Others have simply abandoned their homes and settled in other, calmer regions.

It also seems that racketeering exists, but no one is willing to confirm it for fear of reprisals. In Ain Abderrahmane, terrorists openly engage in extortion in broad daylight. Even the only privately owned hotel no longer receives guests as it did before, but it continues to serve alcoholic beverages without being disturbed.

The national museum in Timgad, which was recently burglarized, no longer gets any visitors, and even the Roman ruins have been totally neglected and invaded by weeds. It seems that the workers refuse to maintain them because they have become a hideout for terrorists.

Ancient Timgad with its Roman remains supported the entire population in the recent past and even earned the country foreign exchange thanks to foreign tourists. Today, unfortunately, the insecurity prevailing in the region has forced everyone to flee—including the young schoolchildren who used to come here on cultural outings and certain

families from the southern part of the country that came here seeking cooler weather in the summertime and rented homes.

The weekly market on Wednesday has also lost its lively atmosphere, to the great disappointment of the residents, and street peddlers have stopped coming for fear of being victims of the protection racket. At the rate things are going, ancient Timgad may suffer the same fate as Pompeii, but by destruction of a different sort, unless someone applies the brakes. In that connection, it appears that during an unexpected visit by Batna's new governor, the head of the Timgad Administrative District was absent, a circumstance that forced his hierarchical superior to relieve him of his duties on the spot. Does that mark the first step toward applying the brakes, which is what the population wants?

Mascara: Situation Since Earthquake Reported

94AF0272C Algiers EL WATAN in French

17 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Lotfi Amara: "A Frightening Nightmare"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Mouallek Fatma, aged four months, will no longer play in the dusty yard. She will never speak in nice sentences, because the angry bitch did not leave her time to learn how to pronounce syllables. Bendjebar Bedra, 81, will no longer tell country legends; she, too, was swallowed by the earth's convulsions. Lyes, Ali, Amina, are waiting for aid to materialize so they can forget for good the frightening nightmare.

The toll of the earthquake that shook the area of the Beni-Chougrane mountains keeps getting heavier. Death took only good people living in the most absolute poverty. The precariousness of the houses accounts for the extent of the damage, considering that this was a low-magnitude earthquake.

The last count was 171 dead, 289 wounded, and 12,500 homeless. Of the deceased, 117 could be identified. Two thousand houses either were entirely destroyed, or collapsed, or were seriously damaged, and many public buildings, especially schools, were also much affected. Assistance was being organized in Mascara, where the crisis center announced that it had received 1,503 tents and 480 tons of food. According to the director of the crisis center, safety stocks will suffice for more than three days. As far as housing is concerned, a *quo'* of prefabricated housing is being sent to the disaster area.

The vacationing personnel of the production units was requisitioned to build 25 housing units per day. The famous "Chadwick" cottages that were being set up at Club des Pins were sent to Mascara. Of the 420 cottages, 300 were assigned to disaster victims...

Groups of engineering experts arrived on location to prepare the sites and the platforms on which these cottages will be built. Services and utilities will be installed by the Oran ERCO [Regional Construction Enterprise] and ECO

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[Construction Enterprise] and the Mostaganem EDCO [Construction Development Enterprise]. The prime minister promised that earthquake victims would get new housing before winter. Four hundred and fifty-eight houses were entirely destroyed. The location most severely hit by the disaster was Hacine, the earthquake epicenter, where 238 houses are in ruins.

International aid is beginning to arrive; two Saudi and Kuwaiti cargo aircraft bringing tents and medicines landed at the Tfraoui airport. The first French aid came on regular Air France flights.

On location, the ANP [People's National Assembly] continues to supply isolated mountain villages through "Heli-Hope" (hope helicopters). Military roadblocks were set up on the main roads to enable the teams sent on location to work safely, and to prevent looters from hanging around disaster areas. Hamlets hidden in the Beni-Chougrane mountains are visible only from the air, and only a few dusty trails indicate their existence. The buildings are a mere assembly of clay, stones, and corrugated iron.

Medical teams feared an epidemic of water-borne diseases, because the houses were not connected to the water-supply system. The local people would buy the precious liquid from dealers who would bring it in tank trucks. The army and civilian rescue teams remedied this by taking charge of water delivery.

Drinking water has been cruelly scarce since the beginning of summer. The drought that prevails in the area has killed part of the livestock and destroyed the crops. The wounded were all vaccinated against tetanus, and severe measures were taken to check the drinking water and prevent any epidemics. The search for survivors continues in outlying villages. Helicopters were mobilized to locate these villages, guide ground assistance teams, and quickly evacuate the wounded.

The Algerian Red Crescent [CRA] is the only organization authorized to coordinate the collection and distribution of donations, nationally and internationally. Governorate "nadhers" were advised to collect the citizens' donations and hand them over to the CRA. The disaster area was divided into four sectors, each of which is managed by one officer assisted by noncommissioned officers and firemen. Each sector received a fire-prevention tank truck, one semitrailer, one medical-care ambulance, three ordinary ambulances, including one depending of the medical district and carrying an epidemiologist, a general practitioner, and two senior health technicians.

As far as international solidarity is concerned, Algerian diplomatic and consular representatives were instructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to remain mobilized. Through radio channels targeting the Maghreb community, the Algerian embassy in France broadcast information on the disaster and estimated the immediate needs. Telephone numbers were placed at the emigrants' disposal so they could get more detailed information. The MAE [expansion not given] reported a vast and multiform

movement of solidarity among the Algerian community abroad in favor of the disaster victims.

Instigator of Tazoult Prison Escape Killed

94AF0273A Algiers *EL WATAN* in French
22 Aug 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ghania Oukazi: "Escape out of Lambese; Mastermind Killed in Batna"—first paragraph is *EL WATAN* introduction]

[Text] Messaoud Messaoudi, one of the main instigators of the famous escape from Tazoult, was killed by security forces in Batna on 19 August. Mostly he was one of the many Algerians who proclaimed themselves "emirs" so they could act ruthlessly throughout the country, using the most barbarous means against defenseless citizens.

Last Friday, the police arrested young Zaghina Abdelazziz, 22, unemployed, who was carrying a letter from Messaoud Messaoudi to Yacine Marif, coordinator of terrorist groups in the Batna area. Questioned by the security forces, Marif confessed that the letter had been given to him by three terrorists who had taken refuge in a building of a Batna housing development.

The police immediately went there and, after an exchange of fire, two terrorists were killed on the spot while the third died of his wounds after being taken to the Batna University Hospital.

They included Messaoud Messaoudi, 42, domiciled at Zana El-Beida. He was the founder of the first terrorist cell in the area; before that, at the start of the communal elections, he was president of the People's Communal Assembly (APC), after which he was elected head of the People's Governorate Assembly (APW).

One of his first attacks was at Merouana, in the Batna governorate. Messaoudi was the author of some 30 assassinations, including those of three women and six mujahidin.

For some time already, he had joined the armed branch of the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], i.e., the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), where he was assistant to Nourdine Mezrague, also known as Sheik Madani, who is assumed to be the AIS leader in the east.

Mezrague is allegedly one of the authors of the assassination of seven Italians at the port of Djendjen last July.

Messaoud Messaoudi was also one of the main allies of Said Helali, son of a harki [North African soldier who sided with the French], a founding member of the Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF), and an influential member of the banned FIS, who has now fled to Europe.

In addition, Messaoudi was behind arms deals involving over 900 weapons (hunting rifles and automatic pistols). As is known, part of this network was dismantled in 1992, in Setif, by the national gendarmerie. Messaoudi was also involved in several common-law criminal cases. His criminal record includes a sentence for rape of a minor at

Ain-Djasser, and another one for forgery and the use of forgeries at Batna. In the latter case, he faked a school-attendance certificate so he could get himself recruited as an imam. Note also that, in the town of Batna, he owns a Moorish bathhouse that is still in operation.

As for his associates who were killed during the engagement, one of them was Deradji Belaribi, 37, leader of terrorist groups active in the Batna, M'sila, and Setif areas. As for Nourredine Hamouta, he died of his wounds. He was 32 and was one of the escapees from Tazoult where he was serving a 20-year sentence.

Marrakech: Assassins' Names; Arms Dealer Arrested

94AF0274B Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Mouna El Banna: "Arrests After Attack at Marrakech Hotel"]

[Text] Rabat—Four days after an armed attack 24 August that left two Spanish tourists dead at the Atlas-Asni Hotel in Marrakech, Morocco's Interior Ministry confirmed the arrest, on the night of 27-28 August, of two members of the commando team. Their names are Stephane Ait Idir, 22, a French citizen of Algerian origin, and Redouane Hammadi, 24, a Moroccan born in Paris. The first was arrested at the train station in Fes and the second at Taourirt, on the Oujda road not far from Fes. The third commando was "identified but succeeded in leaving Morocco for a foreign destination."

The arrest of the two murder suspects came two days after that of two other individuals, also apprehended in Fes, who are accused of belonging to an "armed group" engaged in "attacks against various banking establishments, Moroccan security agents, and the civilian population." Contrary to what was earlier believed, the two suspects were not the Belaafia brothers but Kamal Benakcha, 26, an Algerian who had acquired French citizenship and was living in Orleans, and Abdesslam Guerouaz, 26, born in Casablanca but living in Paris.

On the date of their arrest, they were accompanied by a third individual, Abderrahmane Bounajdi, a Franco-Moroccan who escaped the clutches of police. An arms cache was discovered at his parents' house, in Aknoul locality near Taza, in northern Morocco. The Moroccan Interior Ministry asserts that "members of the groups apprehended" were responsible for attacks against the McDonald's restaurant in Casablanca (11 September 1993), the Moroccan Savings and Loan Bank (26 September 1993) in Oujda, and Casablanca's Makro shopping center (15 August).

However, the communique does not say whether or not there is a link between the two groups—the one that perpetrated the attack in Marrakech and the one whose members were arrested in Fes [two days earlier]. Likewise, authorities failed to indicate whether these groups have ties to Islamist networks.

The Algerian press has often attacked the Moroccan regime on this point, accusing it of laxity, a charge Morocco has always rejected, citing [in its defense] the arrest of Abdelhak Layada, former leader of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who was apprehended in June 1993 in Morocco and deported to Algeria. Several traffickers smuggling arms into Algeria through Morocco have also been arrested. Moroccan press organs, reflecting the views of the general public in that country, take the editorial position that Algeria has only itself to blame for its current woes. "Both the causes of the crisis and the means of resolving it are to be found in Algeria," says the daily AL-BAYANE (communist organ). "Morocco cannot afford to support 'solidarity' to the point of becoming its victim," warns the journal.

The editor in chief of L'OPINION (organ of the Istiqlal opposition party) asked in his Sunday editorial whether "Algeria's leaders, again facing a most difficult situation, both internally and internationally," are not "tempted to pursue a policy of avoiding the issue, a policy that could lead them to provoke an open conflict with Morocco to try to mobilize Algerians against a 'foreign threat.'"

Rabat's decision, announced on Saturday, to require entry visas for Algerians and persons of Algerian origin has angered Algeria and further increased tensions between the two countries. As a "reciprocity measure," Algiers immediately imposed an entry visa requirement on Moroccans and temporarily closed the land border with Morocco.

Discussion of Armed Group Objectives; Organization

94AF0273C Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25-31 Aug 94 pp 16-21

[Interview with Severine Labat, by Hamid Barrada; place and date not given: "Algeria: While War Is Raging and We All Get Lost Among Islamist Maquis, One Expert Reviews the Situation. FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), GIA (Armed Islamic Group), AIS (Islamic Salvation Army): Where Are They? What Do They Want?—first three paragraphs are JEUNE AFRIQUE introduction]

[Text] All it took was for a television channel to request her comments, and everybody rushed to Severine Labat. The day after the Ain Allah attack, which resulted in the death of five Frenchmen on 3 August, the media were all fighting over her. This craze owes nothing to the fact that Paris is deserted in August. When it comes to Algeria and its bloody torments, we have at last found someone who knows what it is all about and is not content with the vague pronouncements that so many experts and Algeriologists use to conceal the deficiencies and imprecision of their knowledge.

Severine Labat does know Algerian Islamism. Aged 27, beneficiary of a CERI (International Relations Study Center) grant, she has been working on the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) for three years, and has therefore had the opportunity to stay on location for longer periods. The

men in the Islamic sphere of influence, its various trends, its development since the start of armed rebellion, have no secrets for her. The results of her investigations will provide material for a doctoral thesis—and a book to be published next winter by Editions du Seuil. Judging from her previous contributions to "Exils et Royaumes" (National Political Sciences Foundation Press) and "Le drame algerien" (La Decouverte/Reporters sans frontieres), Severine Labat's book will come just in time.

Before returning to her beloved studies, the academic gave us very useful information on the burning question of the hour.

[Barrada] The GIA claimed responsibility for the Ain Allah operation, which caused the death of five Frenchmen. Is there no doubt whatsoever concerning the genuineness of such a claim?

[Labat] To my knowledge, no communique claiming responsibility for a foreigner's assassination was ever refuted. We may therefore believe that the communique published by EL HAYAT is genuine.

At times, false tracts issued by Algerian security departments have been disseminated. Denials then followed. To quote an example, Kasdi Merbah's assassination, perpetrated in all likelihood by some "Departments," was nevertheless attributed to the GIA by the government. It was the foreign GIA, i.e., militants established abroad, who claimed responsibility for it. Later on, the domestic GIA issued a denial. But we cannot rule out collusion, or even manipulation of the GIA by the Departments. One thing is certain: foreigners have become stakes in the struggle between army and Islamists in Algeria.

[Barrada] Why foreigners?

[Labat] The GIA pursues two objectives: one through the media—to reach public opinion; the other a part of all-out war—they will do anything to destabilize the regime. From both points of view, the strategy consisting in attacking first the police, then the intellectuals, failed because of the news blackout imposed by the army and the fact that this type of assassination has become commonplace. The GIA then felt the need to internationalize the Algerian question.

[Barrada] And they succeeded.

[Labat] In part. To the extent that most foreign governments whose nationals were assassinated are now tempering their support to the Algerian regime. France alone tightened its position by increasing its support to the current regime.

[Barrada] Should we believe the FIS or its armed branch, the AIS, when they state that they spare foreigners?

[Labat] During the stage when the armed movement was structured into two trends—on the one hand the GIA and on the other hand a pole more or less linked to the FIS—the FIS indicated on several occasions its hostility to this type of attacks, and even asked the GIA to stop attacking foreigners. In this respect, besides, FIS leaders find themselves in a somewhat false position toward those

of their militants who are falling prey to repression. As a result, although they are opposed to this strategy, they must stick with their rank-and-file. Hence imprecise statements: they condemn without truly condemning; they state that they have nothing to do with these assassinations, but are careful not to denounce them formally.

[Barrada] Not all foreigners are hit: the Germans, the Americans, the British seem to be spared.

[Labat] That is true. Although one English computer specialist was killed in 1993, and one German family were held prisoners. As for the Americans, if they have had no victims to deplore, it may be that they protect themselves better than the others, or that they benefit from a preferential treatment because of their more balanced attitude toward Algeria. At any rate, the Islamists know that they cannot live in autarky, and perhaps they intend to cultivate ties to some governments, in particular the United States.

[Barrada] How is France's commitment perceived by Algerian public opinion?

[Labat] Curiously, everybody holds a grudge against France. Those whom we call "democrats" blame it for not doing enough, and those who support the Islamists blame it for doing too much. Its attitude arouses suspicion and "disgustage" [degoutage] as they say in Algiers; and in some districts there were demonstrations of joy when news came of the Frenchmen's assassination.

[Barrada] Could the French policy prove counterproductive?

[Labat] At any rate, it tends to emphasize the Algerian government's dependence on foreign countries.

[Barrada] France did not always hold this position?

[Labat] Since the interruption of the electoral process in January 1992, we have witnessed several stages. At first, the French Government tried to keep two irons in the fire. Later on, when the right came to power, it openly supported Algeria, before refocussing its policy when Alain Juppe, the minister of foreign affairs, stated, during the summer of 1993, that the status quo was untenable. But as the presidential election was getting nearer, that support became stronger. Today, we can all see that Paris has chosen to support the Algerian regime at all costs, at least until the 1995 election. To begin with, they do everything to prevent events in Algeria from interfering with the presidential campaign, since immigration, Islam, and the Arabs are sensitive subjects. However, it will probably be difficult to prevent the Algerian question from being at the heart of the forthcoming presidential campaign.

[Barrada] Electioneering concerns hardly explain France's commitment, as Algeria could just as well be presented—as Le Pen does—as the Arabs' problem, who should be allowed to kill one another...

[Labat] Except for the present government's, and even some leftist leaders' obsession with the surging tide of refugees from Algeria and its impact on the more general questions of immigration and security. Besides, that also

explains why the Algerian question has less to do with diplomacy and more with internal affairs.

[Barrada] Charles Pasqua's personal factor also has something to do with the preeminence of the Ministry of Interior over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Labat] Obviously, the minister of interior favors the security dimension of the problem, and as a result he is taking over the field.

[Barrada] Would you say that the French Government is well informed on Algeria?

[Labat] Certainly, diplomats stationed in Algeria find it difficult to travel in the country, but they know everything that goes on there, and the information feedback is probably very good. I believe that it is not for lack of information that the government makes its decisions, and its motivations are rather ideological and partisan.

[Barrada] Sometimes we get the impression that French officials are content with repeating the postulates of Algerian propaganda.

[Labat] It is true that the polarized schema—either us or Islamic chaos—that the Algerian regime wants to impose is repeated by the French Government to justify its Algerian policy. A sort of complicity links the two governments concerning how to qualify the situation in Algeria, and it burdens any form of democratic expression. [sentence as published]

[Barrada] French public opinion seems to be shaped by secular "democrats" and by the French-language press.

[Labat] It is certain that the so-called "democrats" who sought refuge in France have had a real impact through the media, and some influence on public opinion here, because they reproduced the Manichaean schema of good democrats against bad Islamists. As a result, people forgot that some of these "democrats" had put up with the current regime for a long time. Their position is passably ambiguous: they lived in the shadow of that regime and even called for the army's intervention after the legislative elections of December 1991. Now, they like to present themselves as victims of the regime and of the Islamists. That they are the Islamists' victims cannot be denied. But the regime's? That will be the case one day if the military and the Islamists agree to govern together and exclude the others.

[Barrada] It is hard to imagine that the monolithic attitude that prevails in France with respect to Islamism might break up. Yet, it will have to if a debate within French public opinion is to take place....

[Labat] It is very difficult to the extent that events in Algeria feed on the fertile soil of the complex and schizophrenic relations between France and Algeria. A whole historical and cultural substrate also accounts for France's tenseness and its lack of understanding for what is happening in Algeria. It is clear, at any rate, that when it comes to Algeria French opinion is passably under-informed.

[Barrada] But why is it that the Islamists do nothing to explain their position and their struggle to the French and, more generally, to international public opinion?

[Labat] Because a priori they profess an ideology that is unlikely to find much of an echo in Western society. Leftist revolutionaries, communist guerrillas could easily seduce the French intelligentsia. But that is obviously not the case for the Islamist ideology, which is reputed to be wholly foreign, even hostile. So that any policy of communication is doomed to failure.

[Barrada] Still, Hassan Tourabi tries to persuade and manages to do so. Could it be that problems in communicating are due to the fact that Algerian Islamism is less sophisticated and rather rudimentary?

[Labat] I do not think so. Do not forget that Tourabi is a Sudanese and that Sudan does not mean much to the French. Moreover, he has style and he has studied at the Sorbonne. When he talks, he does not awaken painful memories...

This being said, Algerian Islamists have trouble carrying out a policy of communication, and they fail at it also because they lack experience. The FIS, created in 1989, is carried by younger men, who still have little experience of dialectic.

[Barrada] There have been rumors of discreet contacts between an envoy and Rabah Kebir...

[Labat] The FIS delegation spokesman, in his German exile, has met at the same time with two envoys, one American, the other French. The Frenchman is said to have offered France's mediation between the Algerian regime and the Islamists.

[Barrada] Is there a risk of terrorism in France?

[Labat] Whatever that may be, it is increased by the tension between the Islamists and the French Government. FIS leaders in Europe have consistently been considerate of European governments, so as not to have to fight on several fronts. Although the conflict started two and a half years ago, we have fortunately not had to deplore any act of terrorism in France. Today, we are witnessing an accelerated deterioration of the Algerian situation, and increased tenseness on the part of French authorities. We cannot rule out such a risk, unless the Islamists and the French government manage to find an honorable way out.

[Barrada] What about recent secessions within Islamist organizations?

[Labat] A brief history will provide a better understanding. The FIS, which always advocated an electoral strategy, had in its ranks, an also outside, militants who advocated violence to overthrow the regime. For them, participation in an institutional process was a fool's bargain and the Islamist movement would end up paying for it, through repression that is. The FIS, which therefore did not expect the "trial by fire" of January 1992, saw his militants go underground to avoid the camps. Until recently, the FIS

had not positively taken position on the recourse to violence. But when armed groups were formed outside its fold, it found itself overtaken and attempted to gain some control over the armed movement by setting itself up as a military organization. When the leaders and local political officials got out of the camps, they decided to provide a framework for the armed movement, which until then was in a state of anarchy. This is how the AIS was created. All those who agreed to be ruled by the FIS gathered there. Note that, even though it chose a military strategy, the AIS continues to advocate a political or negotiated solution to the crisis. Those who oppose this point of view join the Armed Islamic Group or Groups (GIA), heterogeneous groups whose common denominator is the determination to wage all-out war against the regime.

[Barrada] The GIA sometimes appears to be a "catch-all" party...

[Labat] It had the power to attract the people, especially young people fleeing repression. Hence its catch-all aspect. It recruited among those with Islamist leanings as well as among delinquents or the "Afghans." That is its strength but also its weakness, insofar as it was more than others open to infiltration and manipulation by the security departments.

[Barrada] Is it possible to draw up a map of the rebellion?

[Labat] Very schematically, the East and West are supposed to obey the AIS, while the Center wavers more. Nevertheless, there are GIA pockets in the West (in Tيارت and Sidi-bel-Abbes) and in the East (Jijel, and around Constantine. The central region (Algerois) is the one most eagerly disputed because it is a very strong stake in the power struggle: whoever holds the Center holds Algeria. Because the GIA's is a short-term strategy, while the AIS's is an intermediate or long-term strategy, we get the mistaken impression that the GIA has the upper hand.

[Barrada] Who are the AIS leaders?

[Labat] Abdelkader Chebouti who, at 45, looks like an eponymous ancestor. Sentenced to death in 1987, he was pardoned by Chadli in 1979. [dates as published] Opposed to the FIS electoral strategy, he made news again only after the coup of January 1992. A former comrade-in-arms of Mustapha Bouyali back in the eighties, he appears to be mostly a symbol. Ill, he no longer leads any operation. Said Mekhloufi, a former member of the Majlis Echoura [FIS advisory council], was expelled from the FIS during the summer of 1991 because he opposed the electoral line. A former second lieutenant in the Algerian army, he has studied political science.

[Barrada] It was noted that Rabah Kebir talked about the renegades in very moderate terms and still calls them "brothers."

[Labat] No wonder, Algerian Islamists do not like to wash their dirty linen in public.

[Barrada] Aren't the AIS and GIA going to engage in a fratricide war that would play into the hands of the regime?

[Labat] For the time being, it is the government that publicizes their quarrels through the media. We should therefore make a distinction between real dissent, which will exist in any underground movement—the FLN [National Liberation Front] had its share of it during and after the war—and the regime's disinformation operations. Also, we should not forget that, lacking information on armed groups, the media make the most of what little surfaces.

[Barrada] Is the GIA still recruiting more than the AIS?

[Labat] The GIA benefits from the repression. When an attack is committed and the police draw a blank in their search for the authors, they tend to arrest all the young men old enough to fight and execute them summarily and collectively, without due process. Those who escape go swell the ranks of the GIA who, in their eyes, represents the more radical opposition.

[Barrada] How do you explain that there is little evidence of collective retaliation against the civilian population?

[Labat] Because, once again, the Islamist cause is not reputed a "good cause." In the West, the famous "No freedom for the enemies of freedom" saves us a whole debate on Islamism. We refuse to protect the human rights of the very people whom we rightly or wrongly believe to be against human rights. Hence the immense silence that prevails in France on the atrocities of the Algerian regime.

The Anglo-Saxons (I am thinking of Amnesty International) had a stronger impact. Although it is difficult for Algerian lawyers to publicize information on human rights violations, we know that torture is widespread and systematic, and that the methods used are hideous. We also know of several civilians who were summarily executed in public. At Blida, last March, on the eve of a speech by Salim Saadi, then minister of interior, we learned that a raid of the security forces had left several tens of dead bodies. At Jijel, after an engagement, the same police forces fired into the crowd. Such ignominious acts have unfortunately become the daily lot of the Algerian people. In addition, the air force uses napalm as well as forest fires to dislodge the maquis. That is what happened around Jijel and in the Aures mountains after the escape from Lambeze.

[Barrada] The opposite camp is not outdone when it comes to barbarity.

[Labat] Barbarity is of course shared by both sides. And if the regime's violence is increased tenfold, it is merely because it uses State resources.

[Barrada] Can we estimate the toll?

[Labat] It became much heavier recently. There are about 300 dead every week, and 10,000 or more since the interruption of the election process. By the end of the year, there will be 15,000.

[Barrada] Exactly what do we know about desertions?

[Labat] There were many desertions among officers and noncommissioned officers, who joined the maquis, although we do not know whether they joined the Islamists' maquis or their own. The destruction of his own helicopter by an officer, in July, remained an isolated act. There were no massive desertions. They would reflect true discontent within the army, and everything would become possible.

[Barrada] What form would such a development assume?

[Labat] Lower ranking officers might estimate that they are losing too many men and that they are assigned the most ungrateful tasks, without adequate material or symbolic compensation. They would then take it out on the military hierarchy which, for its part, does not take any risks and enjoys the privileges of its position.

[Barrada] You think that the army as a whole does not yet have the feeling that it is waging a dirty war...

[Labat] Exactly. And that is why its unity has not broken down yet. While it is not necessarily of one mind, the consensus among it is nevertheless preserved.

[Barrada] No matter what they say, the army does not seem disposed to start a dialogue with the Islamists?

[Labat] Two trends are discernible within the military hierarchy. The first one would favor some form of dialogue with Islamism; the second one advocates all-out repression. This divergence, however, should be viewed as relative insofar as neither side is willing to yield one bit of the power which they wield without sharing it. Actually, there is a consensus to preserve the army's privileges.

[Barrada] Was there ever any attempt at a dialogue?

[Labat] No. Especially not on the part of a regime that always looked at politics from the point of view of manipulation and conspiracy, although that meant presenting completely distorted versions of its coups through the media, something that is not conducive to a debate with its opponents. As for the FIS, it lacks the will to dialogue, even though contacts took place, in prison and outside. Moreover, those, on both sides, who favor dialogue must take their respective extremists into account, and find themselves bound hand and foot.

In fact, the only gesture toward dialogue was the release of Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham in February 1994. But it led nowhere. Apparently because President Liamine Zeroual was not given a free hand to go any further.

[Barrada] Could the release of Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj get things moving again?

[Labat] It would be a sign of good will since the release of political prisoners is one of the Islamists' demands.

[Barrada] You advocated a third way. But it is somewhat vague.

[Labat] It could take shape and compel acceptance if we agreed to deal openly with the three parties that came out

ahead in the December 1991 elections: the FIS, the FFS [Socialist Forces Front], and the FLN. The FLN has a significant wing that advocates reform; the FFS was always in favor of that third way; and the FIS, at least in part, is not hostile to an agreement with the other two formations. At any rate, this approach would make it possible to bring back Madani's party into the legal political game and to contain its violent trends and drives.

[Barrada] For the FIS, such a structure would be no more than a springboard to absolute power...

[Labat] Perhaps. But the FLN and FFS leaders are experienced enough not to be fooled. Besides, although the FIS is a majority in the country it is far from being hegemonic; therefore, it needs allies, including among democrats, in order to govern.

[Barrada] How could they impose democracy on the FIS?

[Labat] By practicing it themselves! At any rate, those who call themselves democrats when they win the elections and are no longer democrats when they lose them have very little chance of converting Islamism to democracy.

[Barrada] Would the army be in a better position to act as a referee in the democratic game?

[Labat] That is what Hocine Ait Ahmed asked for when he called for a genuine national conference with the army's guarantee that it would take place without incident.

[Barrada] Would Algeria's partners have a role to play?

[Labat] Algeria is an independent country and needs no one to solve its problem. A French intervention would be the best way to discredit in advance any attempted settlement.

[Barrada] Is it not too late?

[Labat] At any rate, it is the last hope before Algeria sinks into civil war, and we should desperately cling to it.

[Barrada] Could the army win?

[Labat] Until recently, it was estimated that the regime would come out as the winner, but only through a compromise with the Islamists. While this scenario remains likely in view of the breakdown of the system, other outcomes are possible. At any rate, speculation as to the future becomes difficult. It all depends on the power struggle between the opposite sides and on the different trends that exist within both camps. How will the two camps come to terms with their respective extremists—GIA, AIS on one side; and proponents of eradication or conciliation on the other side—and how will the power struggle between the Islamist camp and the army evolve?

[Barrada] You are ruling out an Islamist victory?

[Labat] Unless the army collapses, the prospect of an Islamist military victory is now unrealistic.

[Barrada] If the conflict should last, should we not fear a breakup of Algeria, with warlords ruling separate territories?

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[Labat] Regionalism is a very strong phenomenon in Algeria. It represents one of the keys to understanding the political arena. Today, it is exacerbated, especially as the underground armed groups themselves operate on the basis of regional allegiances. But I do not believe that there is a risk of balkanization or secession, because the feeling of national unity, forged during the liberation war, remains such a deciding factor.

Shortage of Scientists; Absence of Project Planning

94AF0270B Algiers EL WAT 'N in French 14 Aug 94
p 3

[Article by Tahar Hani: "Scientific Research: Unacceptable Backwardness"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The developing countries assign little importance to scientific research and researchers. In Algeria's case, that fact hardly inspires optimism. The situation is tragic.

"But if it continues indefinitely," said Bensalah, director of the Center for the Development of Advanced Technologies, in one of his speeches, "it may place our economy in a position of irreversible dependence and will result in the destruction of all the creative capabilities that emerge from time to time in this or that field."

To form a picture of the state of scientific research in our country, it is necessary to take a very brief look back at the institutional development of research. In 1962, for example, Algeria had only one university institute (Algiers University), and that university graduated 93 people in 1963. Even worse, research activities were managed until 1973 by an Algerian-French body known as the Scientific Cooperation Agency.

The same speaker said that scientific research did not receive appropriate status until 1971, when the Ministry of Higher Education was established. The National Research Council (CNR) was set up in 1973. Its main mission was to formulate guidelines for scientific research and draw up a national research plan. That same body was also responsible for overseeing selection of the various research projects and making the decisions needed for drawing up the first multiannual plan.

Establishment of the Commission on New Energies (CEN) dates back to 1982. The CEN was responsible to the office of the president of the Republic. Its mission was to take charge of all research concerned with renewable energy sources (nuclear, solar, geothermal, and so on) and advanced technologies (microelectronics, computer science, robotics, lasers, space applications, and so on). That entire policy eventually gave rise to a network of research centers and units. Algeria now has 18 scattered throughout the national territory.

The said commission was dissolved in 1986 for no apparent reason. The Office of the High Commissioner for Research (HCR) replaced all the other structures in 1986.

The new structure's objectives were planning and evaluation of the scientific and technical research programs that had been under way since the 1970's. At the same time, decrees affecting research were adopted, and secretaries of state for research were appointed in several ministries.

How is scientific research planned in our country? Seventeen main lines of national inquiry are covered by overall research programming and planning. Among others, there is research concerned with technologies and raw materials. This is often conducted in the universities. And 60 percent of the 1,565 registered research projects are also being carried out in universities and institutes. Only 11 percent of the projects are concerned with research in the basic sciences, and 4 percent are concerned with research in the fields of economics, law, and social science.

As regards pharmaceutical research, a program has indeed been discussed and formulated, but the fact is that it has never been implemented. The programs in question have never been put out for bid, and they have not received any financing.

The research programming system as adopted to date is based on the "bottom-up" method. That is, research projects are proposed by the institutes but backed by the supervising ministries. Such a method does not seem to have had the backing of the researchers themselves, who feel that it does not address the concern for economic development. Added to that is the absence of a standard definition of the concept of "project."

As regards project financing, it can be said that total annual spending on research and development averaged 0.2 percent of GDP (gross domestic product) in 1994, or 1,642,332 million dinars [DA], including DA212,908 million of our own money, compared, for example, to 0.6 percent in Ivory Coast, 1.2 percent in Senegal, and about 3 percent in the OECD countries. Moreover, payment credits are not being completely used—the average is only from 20 to 30 percent. That defect is due to the inadequate management of research, which is characterized by delayed notification of the availability of credit payments. There is also the lack of program-based financing and the predominance of budgeting by research organization, a situation that has not favored the adoption of a research policy based on the priorities established in the annual plan.

In the case of human resources, some 4,000 researchers are working full-time—that is, 164 individuals per 1 million inhabitants. That figure is very markedly below the world-wide average. The objectives set by the United Nations in 1981—230 researchers per 1 million inhabitants—are far from being met. Tunisia has 560, Egypt 500, Ghana 240, Asia 400, Latin America 580, Europe 1,500, and North America 2,000. Japan is in first place with 4,500 researchers.

The small number of Algerian researchers is explained by the fact that over 70 percent of the individuals potentially qualified to conduct research activities are completely uninvolved. Added to that is the exodus of researchers who

have never found pleasant surroundings and appropriate resources for doing their work. So far, no policy has succeeded in repatriating Algerian researchers residing abroad. So far, they have not been offered the necessary facilities that would induce them to abandon their exile and come invest their knowledge in their own country.

Association for Scientific Cooperation Established

94AF0270A Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Aug 94
p 4

[Article by Tahar Hani: "Algerian Scientists: Birth of an Association"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] **The purpose of the scientific forum being held at the Aurassi is to set up a permanent structure capable of bringing researchers together and enabling them to work together.**

To that end, draft bylaws establishing an Algerian association for scientific cooperation have been adopted.

The purposes of the association are varied. It is aimed first of all at using the Algerian scientific expertise existing abroad, then at promoting multifaceted dialogue among Algerian scientists, and, lastly, at producing an inventory of our country's scientific and technical potentialities.

Other objectives are also expected from the association: an inventory of the mechanisms for exchanges and cooperation in the areas of documentation and records and so on. In addition, workshops (three in all) were held for two days. The first was concerned with research and postgraduate work, and one could say that it was the most important. It brought together a large number of expatriate researchers and researchers living in Algeria and made it possible both to take stock of the state of research in Algeria and to propose solutions. Most of the speakers stressed the political will that must inspire the authorities with respect to research. "It is fine to invite people to talk about research and its problems," explained one scientist from Tizi-Ouzou University, "but what is the point of all these debates and suggestions when the actual political will to revitalize this sector is lacking?"

In what sometimes came close to heated debate, a good many participants presented conflicting proposals.

"How can we talk about research when the most basic resources are almost nonexistent?" others remarked. In the end, formulas for cooperation and mutual assistance within the community of researchers (those abroad and those in Algeria) were considered and presented. Some participants even promised to send and supply books of documentation for other researchers who need them. "May this initiative spread to all the other areas," said one woman researcher whose field is physics. Making research a national priority is the desire of the researchers. But that presupposes strong conviction, notably among political decisionmakers. And to reach that point, a certain number of principles must exist. For example, institutional measures must be adopted to give scientific research activities

a social status. The relevant law must spotlight all the steps to be taken and must also decide on measures that will make technological development possible.

Scientific and technical research must be integrated into an overall economic and social policy, and at the same time, of course, measures related to the financing of research projects must also be improved.

Another measure is intensification of the research/training/production process. The interaction among those three areas must absolutely engender a constant adjustment of research objectives.

Research must be budgeted for, and it must appear as a separate line item in the annual budget.

As regards program planning, tenders must be invited from the universities and research organizations. Those programs could focus on the development of raw materials (hydrocarbons, building materials, industry, and so on). The intersectoral commissions must also be reactivated and the funds for 1995 decided on.

In addition, there is reason to implement the national research programs that already exist and to continue drawing up the remaining projects—that is, those concerned with environment, education, training, the economy, and so on. It will also be necessary to draw up coordinated research programs in such added-value fields as the food industry, space, hydrology, and so on.

Egypt

Agricultural Research Network Explained

94LD0080A Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 24 Jul 94
pp 65-67

[Article by Amir Talab and Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Al: "The Egyptian National Agricultural Library and Agricultural Research Center"]

[Text] The most important achievement that history will credit to President Mubarak is that although he came to office in a critical period when all economic indicators were evoking despair, he began by hard, dedicated labor to order priorities from the most to the less important. Comprehensive reform was his first concern from the time he assumed office.

When the president announced that "whoever has no food has no freedom and independence," he intended at the same time to entrust Egypt's agricultural sector with an enormous vital responsibility. Thus came the first spark and the launching of interest in the Egyptian agricultural sector. No unbiased person can deny that the Egyptian agricultural sector under Dr. Yusuf Wali's leadership has been up to the responsibility, for outstanding leaps have been accomplished at all levels of agricultural production.

The Egyptian National Agricultural Library is one of the modern scientific achievements that the Agriculture Ministry has achieved during this decade to serve the agricultural and other associated sectors. It also serves researchers

in research centers and universities, as well as decision-makers. It provides all with needed information as quickly as possible in appropriate form. The library keeps up with the most modern international designs in library science. It relies on using computers for information storage and retrieval, in addition to providing communications with domestic, regional, and international scientific organizations and agencies.

A communications network will be established linking the National Library and the libraries of research center institutes, stations, universities, and colleges of agriculture, science, and veterinary medicine. The network will provide them with information and strengthen their pool of books and periodicals within the limits of available plans.

This library is considered one of the most important goals of the national project for agricultural research and has been allocated about \$2.75 million of the project's total budget. The Egyptian contribution to this amount was 125,000 Egyptian pounds.

Library's Goals

The plan for establishing the National Library aims at keeping pace with the information revolution that has swept the world. It aims to do this by creating integrated systems to obtain and assemble information, so that the library will have an integrated information base drawn from domestic and international information bases.

In its plan the library aims at acquiring numerous books on agricultural sciences and related fields. It actually began to assemble its acquisitions in 1988; by mid-1994 they numbered 16,000 reference works. A representative, not exhaustive list of fields includes: field crops, orchards, textiles, agriculture, grain technology, plant protection, plant chemistry, geology and hydrology, environmental sciences and ecology, agricultural engineering, animal and veterinary sciences, agricultural guidance, rural development, home economics, agricultural economics, agricultural statistics, marketing, food and nutrition, food technology, and agricultural industries.

Another purpose of the library is to subscribe to Egyptian, Arab, and foreign newspapers and magazines of interest to researchers and add them to its acquisitions. As of 1994 it had acquired 1,000 agricultural periodicals. Back issues from 1983 to 1992 have been acquired in the form of microfilm or microfiche.

The library intends to obtain 12 integrated agricultural data bases stored on CD-ROM before the end of 1993.

It intends to draw up a program to preserve and process historical documents so that there will be a full archive of all agricultural articles related to agriculture in Egypt, the Arab world, and internationally.

It intends to build an automated integrated system that uses the most modern technological methods. This will be done by linking the National Library with a communications network that uses computers and modems. The project will take place in phases: first the National Library

will be linked to the libraries of research institutes and agricultural research stations and to regional libraries. Then the National Library will be linked to local information centers and university libraries. Finally, the National Library will be linked to international agricultural libraries in the Arab world and abroad.

The library aims to offer internal and external lending services. It will answer inquiries, provide ongoing updates, and selectively disseminate information either through the library's acquisitions or through Egyptian and foreign information bases.

The library aims to train its users in how to use the most modern methods of information retrieval—personal computers, laser discs, or computerized catalogs. Simplified training courses will be held to teach methods for using the library. A training center for librarians will be established to give training in advanced tools for library work.

Administrative Departments of the National Library

1. Computer and information systems administration, including:
 - a) Library automation department.
 - b) Department of the communications network between the National Library and other local or international libraries.
 - c) Data base assembly and management department.
2. Library services administration, including:
 - a) Book and periodical procurement department.
 - b) Indexing, classification, and cataloguing department.
 - c) Bibliography and scientific abstract preparation department.
 - d) Translation department.
3. Library user service administration:
 - a) Lending department.
 - b) Reference services and collections preservation department.
 - c) External collections department.
4. Financial and administrative affairs, including:
 - a) Financial affairs.
 - b) Administrative affairs.

Rare Acquisitions

The library includes a wing for rare acquisitions in the field of domestic or international agriculture. In this connection, Dr. Yusuf Wali invites owners of rare items such as books, statues, or paintings to donate them to the library. The items will be displayed with the name of the donor.

Agricultural Research Center: Largest Agricultural Research Center in Third World

Agricultural experiments in Egypt began in 1898 in al-Jizah at the Royal Agricultural Society. Scientific research in the areas of chemistry, plant culture, entomology, livestock raising, and seed production began in 1904. Field experiments were carried out in four governorates between 1900 and 1909.

Agricultural research in the Agriculture Ministry has developed and grown, resulting in the establishment of the

Agricultural Research Center by presidential decree in 1971 (its executive regulation was issued in 1983). The center's goal is to develop agricultural resources in accordance with the development plan.

The Agricultural Research Center is considered one of the largest agricultural research centers in the Third World. It includes 16 institutes and seven central laboratories specializing in various branches of agricultural research. It also includes a central administration of agricultural research and experiment stations that covers 10 regional stations and 34 branch stations for research on field and orchard crops and livestock production. The area of these stations is about 29,000 feddans. There are 18 nurseries, with an area of about 578 feddans, and 15 livestock production units. There are also five general administrations, one for each of the following: field crop stations, orchard crop stations, livestock production stations, agricultural experiment affairs, and financial and administrative affairs.

The human resources employed in the Agricultural Research Center as research staff total 3,433 persons. They include 2,080 doctorate holders, 1,009 assistant researchers with master's degree, and 444 research assistants. There are also 7,736 general staff agriculturalists, 6,118 administrators, and 13,336 laboratory technicians.

The goal of the center is to develop agricultural resources in accordance with the agricultural development plan set for the agricultural sector. One can define the center's missions as follows:

1. Drawing up and implementing programs for agricultural research; undertaking research, studies, experiments, and operations necessary to promote agricultural production in a variety of agricultural specialties; producing technical systems.
2. Publishing, circulating, and widely applying the results of agricultural research by guiding farmers and offering technical advice to various government agencies, organizations, and companies active in agriculture; setting specifications for the various requisites for agricultural production.
3. Strengthening relations in agricultural technical fields with foreign countries and organizations in the field of agricultural research; exchanging grants, studies, and scientific missions with them.
4. Establishing and implementing a policy of modernizing and increasing the number of improved varieties of all kinds of agricultural crops on a periodic basis.
5. Proposing new laws needed for the implementation of agricultural policy in fields covered by the center's activity.
6. Supervising the administration of all agricultural research stations; conducting experiments in the agricultural units and with organizations and farmers.

Center's Research Plan

The logic followed in preparing the center's research plan took the following factors into account: the size of the

challenges that Egypt faces because of international changes that necessitate increasing various agricultural products, the increasingly severe limitedness of natural resources, the strategy of raising crop yield (plants, animals, and fish) per unit of land and water, and concentration on increasing production and decreasing consumption (studying food consumption models, rationalizing consumption, and decreasing the rate of product waste). The plan was based on the principle of adopting the method of research programs that integrate specialties related to a particular crop, product, or specialty. Thus the research and guidance efforts of various institutes will work together to share in a research program to raise production of the crop or product and increase the particular specialty's efficiency and contribution to realizing the goals of development. Opportunity is also provided for other research and guidance agencies to participate—the Agriculture Ministry, relevant ministries, universities, and research centers. Work teams are formed to solve particular problems that exist or emerge during implementation of the plan. These teams include all the specialties related to the problem. Their goal is defined as solving the problem within a definite time period.

Implementation of the plan rests on three fundamental principles:

First, the existing institutional structure must be developed. This structure relies on specialized research institutes, central laboratories, and research and guidance stations. The research and guidance staff should continually be strengthened in quantity and quality.

Second, the ability to transfer technology must be strengthened. Support should be given to training at all levels to support the ability to move technical systems to production sites quickly and efficiently, thereby influencing total production.

Third, cooperation with foreign agricultural research agencies and international organizations must be strengthened. Advantage should be taken of the best possible kind of technology available in the world.

As for the current research system, the center in its third five-year plan (1992/93 to 1996/97) adopted the approach of multidiscipline research teams in a particular area to implement 18 national research programs. Each program includes several branch programs, which in turn cover numerous research subjects and points. The center issues three main publications on a regular basis: MAJALLAT AL-BUHUTH AL-ZIRA'IYAH ("Agricultural Research Magazine") began publication in 1992 and publishes agricultural papers with a full summary. The magazine is exchanged with about 200 domestic and 100 foreign scientific institutions. Since 1956 the center has published AL-MUSTAKHLASAT AL-'ILMIYAH AL-ZIRA'IYAH ("Agricultural Scientific Abstracts") in a single annual volume. The publication aims to provide the latest results of international agricultural technology to experts and specialists. During the last five years the center has also issued hundreds of technical publications with the aim of

disseminating to progressive farmers and advisory personnel technical recommendations on various agricultural crops as well as information about problems of producing them.

Debate of Election Rules Presented

Public Response to Procedures Noted

94LD0079A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 8 Aug 94 p 3

[Editorial by Sa'id Sunbul: "Good Morning"]

[Text] Why do we blame people if they turn their backs on polling boxes? Why do we not blame the causes and conditions that motivate people not to exercise their voting right?

The alteration, amendment, and replacement process undergone by the Egyptian election system in the past few years has made many view the election process with suspicion and doubt! It has also made many believe that the purpose of the frequent changes in the election system is to ensure the presence of parliaments that fulfill the government's wishes!

People are excused if they submit to such feelings. The election system has recently been subjected to a record number of changes and amendments unprecedented in Egypt's history.

Prior to 1984, Egypt's election system was based on the individual district system. But as of that year, changes began and it was decided to abolish the individual election system and to adopt the party list system.

The party list system has been enacted in some countries. But the system applied in Egypt was unique and it did not give opposition parties the opportunity to have a presence in the parliament unless they gained a certain percentage of the vote. What is more surprising, it called for adding votes cast for the opposition lists to the votes given to the majority party list!

In 1986, the Supreme Constitutional Court decided that this assembly was unconstitutional because it denied independents representation in the People's Assembly. So, the government was compelled to amend the election system anew and add a seat for independents in every district. The 1987 election was held accordingly and a new assembly came into existence, combining the party list system with individual seats for independents.

But just as the Supreme Constitutional Court had decided that the first assembly, in which candidate nomination was made on the basis of lists alone, was unconstitutional, it also decided that the second assembly, which combined the list system with the individual seat system, was unconstitutional.

The government was compelled to hold new elections in 1990 on the basis of the individual seat system. Today, some people present the idea of reviving the list system. If this call is answered and it finds its way to implementation, then we will be required to amend our election system

for the fifth time in 12 years! This is what makes people wonder: In whose interest is Egypt's election process turned into an experimental field and in whose interest are all these changes and alterations made?

After all this, should we blame the Egyptian people if they turn their backs to the polling boxes?

Party Views, Strategies Outlined

94LD0079B Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
5 Aug 94 pp 20-23, 82

[Article by Nabil Rashwan: "List or Individual in Coming Elections"]

[Text] The list system or the individual system in the coming elections? The debate goes on and nobody has developed a specific vision yet, even though most parties believe that the list system is the best guarantee for the growth of party plurality and the prosperity of democracy. But there are fears that this system will be contested as unconstitutional. For this reason, other ideas are being debated in search of a system that combines list with individual election and that establishes equality. Thus, every citizen would become entitled to run for election and contestation of constitutionality would disappear.

AL-MUSAWWAR presents here all opinions that provide room for the growth of party plurality, for boosting parties' role in political life, for ensuring the representation of independents, and for avoiding the constitutional flaws that have tarnished the two previous laws that embraced the list system.

Even though the various parties that have discussed this issue have been inclined to embrace the list system, some of them have demanded a system of nonparty lists; some have demanded incomplete lists that do not require that the list include the full number of candidates to be elected in a district; some have demanded abolition of the percentage required by law in order for a list to win at republic level; and some have demanded that this percentage be reduced. Some have also demanded combining the list system with the individual candidate election system.

At a time when most political parties and intellectual tendencies agree that no thought has been given in this phase to amending the Constitution, they have agreed unanimously that it is necessary to develop the election system so it will produce the best elements; to strengthen party life and bolster its programs; and, more importantly, to avoid any constitutional flaws in the new law so it will not fall anew under the weight of independents' lawsuits.

It is well known that Egypt embraced the individual system throughout its history until 1984, when the first election was held according to the proportionate lists system and with the requirement that a party gain 8 percent of all valid votes throughout the republic. When the court nullified this law because of its violation of the principle of equality stipulated by the Constitution and because it gave no opportunity to nonpartisans, the law was amended and elections were held in 1987 to provide one independent

seat per district—there were 48 districts according to this law. But the Constitutional Court again determined that this was unconstitutional because party seats and independent seats were not equal in number and, consequently, a party candidate's and an independent candidate's chances were not equal. So, the election law shifted back to the individual system.

Now that less than a year remains for the [current] session of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council, search is underway for a new law that honestly reflects society's makeup. There are only two ways for the people to select their deputies, and nobody can claim that one is more democratic than the other. Both ways derive from the essence of democracy, and they are: individual election and list election. In most advanced countries, we find that the two ways are congruent, considering that some of them embrace the individual election system and then revert to the proportionate or absolute list system, some adopt the list system and then revert to the individual system; and some combine both. It cannot be said that the first case is tantamount to backsliding on democracy or that only the second case means the adoption of democracy.

With the current Constitution, constitutionalists assert that any of the election systems, either the individual or the list in all of its forms, or a combination of both, can be constitutional if they respect the principle of equal opportunity among citizens.

It is not necessary, as some think, to hold a referendum on the shape of the new law because the Constitutional Court has not made a decision regarding the current election law. The entire issue is an endeavor by party followers and by people with intellectual tendencies to develop the best formula to create parliamentary assemblies that enrich political life and that include the best elements and capabilities. A supreme committee is scheduled to be formed in the near future. It will include representatives of the political parties and the various tendencies to discuss the possibility of drafting a new election law for the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council—a law that meets the national dialogue conference requirements. The draft can be presented to parliament when it first meets next November so that the law can be debated and passed and in order that the law can be enacted in the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 1995.

Comparison Between Three Elections

Studies conducted on the 1984 election (by list), the 1987 election (list and individual), and the 1990 election (individual) show that the forces participating in the first election (1984) were the National [Democratic] Party [NDP], the Wafd, the Labor, the [National Progressive Unionist] Grouping [NPUG] and the Liberal Party. Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood formed an alliance in that election. A total of 3,879 candidates ran for election then. The [NDP] won 390 seats; the Wafd, 58 seats; and Labor, four assigned seats. There were a total of 458 seats, of which the opposition won 62 seats.

In the 1987 election (lists and individual), a total of 359 [number as published] candidates ran for election. The aforementioned parties, plus the Nasserists and the Communists, who ran under the name of independents, participated in this election. The Labor Party formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood under the name of the Islamic Alliance. The NDP gained 348 seats; the Wafd, 35 seats; Labor (Alliance), 60 seats; and the independents, five seats. Thus, the opposition gained 100 parliamentary seats, out of a total of 458 seats, for the first time.

In the 1990 election (individual), there were a total of 2,676 individual candidates. The NDP, the NPUG, the Democratic Unionist [DUP], the Ummah, the Greens, and the Young Egypt parties, as well as the Nasserists, and the Communists, participated in this election. The NDP gained 360 seat; the Grouping, five; and independents, 79 seats. So, the opposition gained 84 seats out of the assembly's 454 total seats.

The studies also show that a total of 5.3 million voters participated in the 1984 election, amounting to 43 percent of all registered voters. In the 1987 election, 7.2 million voters cast their votes, amounting to 50.4 percent of all registered voters. In the 1990 election, a total of 7.3 million persons voted, amounting to 45.9 percent of all registered voters.

It can be said through these figures that the number of candidates was clearly larger in the list elections, exceeding by more than 1,000 the number of candidates who ran in the individual election. Moreover, voter participation in the election ranged from 43-50 percent in election by list and amounted to 45.9 percent in the individual election.

It can also be said that in the 1984 and 1987 elections by the proportionate list system, some forces and tendencies that did not have political legitimacy were able to form alliances with the parties. Those tendencies won and entered the parliament on the lists of these parties and under the robe of this or that party.

Therefore, the present tendency to look for the election system that best befits Egypt's real situation must have specific objectives. Will the proposed system permit the involvement of some tendencies that have been banned by the constitution, because they rely on religious bases, from engaging in political action? Will small parties be allowed to turn into furnished apartments rented by any of the tendencies that enjoy political or legal legitimacy?

Numerous Opinions

AL-MUSAWWAR has interviewed all parties to the political action—political parties' initiatives, "independents," university professors, trade unions' representatives, attorneys, and counselors—to solicit their opinion on what election system best meets Egypt's social, political, economic, and cultural conditions.

Dr. Fawziyah 'Abd-al-Sattar, the People's Assembly Legislative Committee chairwoman, has listed the benefits of the list election system. She has said, "I support this

system because it selects candidates on the basis of political platforms, of ideas, and of political principles, not on the basis of personal considerations. Moreover, it frees a deputy from captivity by his district voters, allows him to devote himself to parliamentary action and to consider the public interest and general problems, without confining his role to the interests of the people of his electoral district. This condition is compatible with the deputy's status as a representative of the entire nation. Furthermore, the voter has a greater role in exercising his political rights in the list system because he selects a number of deputies, not just one deputy. Finally, the list system provides a greater opportunity for the representation of parties in parliament and it bolsters democracy."

Different Lists

Dr. 'Abd-al-Sattar has pointed out that this system is divided into two major parts: list election by majority and list election with proportionate representation. The first part consists of two types: election by simple majority, which allows a candidate gaining the largest number of votes to win, without the requirement that the votes amount to 50 percent plus one. The second type is list election by absolute majority, which means that a candidate will not win unless he gets the absolute majority of votes, i.e., at least 50 percent plus one. In this system, runoff elections are possible.

But what makes this system flawed is that it does the minority an injustice and it does not give minority votes any parliamentary representation. To deal with this condition, democratic systems have turned to proportionate representation. This system is distinguished by dividing seats allotted a district among lists according to the proportion of votes gained by every party. For example, in a district to which 10 seats are allotted, a list that gains one-half the votes is given five seats; a list that gains 25 percent of the votes is given two seats; and so forth.

List Problems

Dr. Fawziyah 'Abd-al-Sattar has pointed out that this system suffers from a number of problems, the first of which is how to divide seats among lists. As we have already said, seats are divided, first, according to the proportion of votes gained by each list and, second, list [presumably meaning district] seats are divided among candidates from party lists and independent lists. In party lists, winners can be determined according to where they place on the list, or the voter is allowed to arrange the order of candidates in the list by himself, i.e., select the list and then rearrange candidate names. This is the most democratic method.

This system can be applied along with lists of independents, whose names are supposed to be placed on lists at random. The voter then rearranges the names as he wishes, and whoever gains the largest number of votes wins.

The Legislative Committee chairwoman has presented another idea that is even more democratic, namely to let all party lists and independent lists be determined by the

will of the voter who forms from the various lists a single list comprised of party candidates from here and from there and from both party followers and independents. Whoever gains the highest number of votes wins. This approach ensures complete equality between party candidates and independents.

Concluding, Dr. 'Abd-al-Sattar said that there remains one final problem with this system, namely fractions of votes. In a district which has 100,000 certified votes and for which 10 seats are allocated, the common vote denominator is 10,000 votes. Assuming that list A gains 43,000 votes, then it gets four seats; list B gets three seats if it gains 35,000 votes; and list C gets two seats if it gains 22,000 votes. So, there remains one seat. To whom should it go? Dr. Fawziyah has said, "I believe that it should be allotted to the list with the largest fractions, namely list B."

Against List

Inversely, Dr. Sufi Abu-Talib, an former People's Assembly speaker, does not support the list election system. He has said, "From the time the list system surfaced, I have supported individual election for several reasons, most significantly to avert the suspicion of unconstitutionality of election by list, considering that the Constitutional Court has issued its decision on this system twice and that the Egyptian citizen is accustomed to the individual election system. Added to this, and more importantly, is that countries that permit election by list also permit the creation of principled parties that may agree or disagree with the existing constitution and regime. What I mean is that there is a republican party in the monarchic England, a communist party in the capitalist United States, and a royalist party in the republican France. As long as the regime permits the creation of parties that may disagree with the conditions existing in society and that seek to alter them, a group of voters who support a certain party's opinion tie themselves to that party. In our country, this assumption is out of question because all parties are tied to a number of principles spelled out in the parties law. Consequently, the difference between these parties is marginal. In practice, for example, should one give the public sector priority and then let leftovers go to the private sector, should one give priority to the private sector and let leftovers go to the public sector, or should one combine both? So, differences between parties have disappeared because all are committed to the principles of the Islamic shari'ah, to the principles of the July and May revolutions, and to national unity and social peace. So, the difference between parties is limited. Consequently, the candidate, not the party to which the candidate belongs, becomes the important thing."

Clarifying the point, Dr. Abu-Talib added, "If parties become numerous in the future, it is possible that there will be an opportunity to talk about list election. Even countries where list election is permissible always allocate a part for election by list and a part for individual election. Generally, countries that enact the system of list election

also apply the selective list system, meaning that one can select from this or that list at one's will."

List Is Constitutional

Responding to a question on whether the current Egyptian constitution prohibits election by all kinds of list systems and on whether such elections can be contested as unconstitutional if they are held, which has already happened, Dr. Ramzi al-Sha'ir, al-Zaqaziq University president, has said, "It is well known that the Constitution establishes general principles and doesn't wade into details. When the Constitution speaks of the election method, it doesn't speak of the individual election system, the list system, or other systems. It just speaks of free and direct elections. As to the method used, that is another issue."

Dr. al-Sha'ir said, "The Constitutional Court decision has made a distinction between two issues: the various election methods and the achievement of equality between independents and nonindependents. Two decisions came down together from the Supreme Constitutional Court and dealt with just one idea, namely the achievement of equality. The decisions didn't speak of list or of individual election but of methods different from the methods previously tried. There is the method of incomplete lists and the method of special lists for independents and there are numerous other well-known methods of list election."

Dr. Ramzi al-Sha'ir has asserted, "Under the umbrella of the decision made by the Constitutional Court, we can embrace the individual system or the list system. Generally, there isn't an election system over which there is consensus and there is no system that is all benefits and another system that is all flaws. Each system has its benefits and its flaws. The relative benefits and flaws are determined by the environment in which the system arises and by the environment in which the system is applied. The constitutional system isn't an imported system, but a system that is compatible with the environment, meaning that the Constitution is a reflection of society's economic, political, and ethical conditions. Therefore, I can say that under provisions of the current Constitution, we can adopt the election system we want."

Parties Agree

As for political parties, most of them believe that the system of election by list is the best, as long as it comes into existence with constitutional provisions and without requirements that make it difficult for small parties to enter the parliament. NPUG Chairman Khalid Muhyi-al-Din has said, "We are for unconditional party lists that permit us to form alliances with other parties so as to enter the parliament."

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din has demanded the abolition of any requirements that curtail the parties' movement and that allow independents to run for election. He stressed that no percentage should be set for winning an election so that parties will be able to enter the parliament.

But Lutfi Wakid, deputy chairman of the NPUG's Parliamentary Committee, holds a different opinion. Wakid

supports individual election because it is the acknowledged method to which the Egyptian people have become accustomed, which they understand, and which better enables the voter to select his own candidates.

Wakid added that the NPUG General Secretariat has not met to date to determine its position vis-a-vis the election method; that all opinions presented within the Party are personal opinions; and that no date has yet been set to critique these opinions, because there is no rush, considering that the entire matter will be presented to the parliament, which will meet next November. However, Wakid has asserted that Egypt needs many years before it can hold elections according to the list system and can evaluate party platforms.

Wakid noted that the issue does not concern democracy, because in England—the most deep-rooted democracy—elections are held according to the individual system. Regarding his opinion of illegal election systems through which illegitimate forces can infiltrate and enter parliament, Wakid said, "The individual system prevents any illegitimate forces from entering the parliament because they are confronted by real forces existing in the arena. But illegitimate forces can infiltrate through the list system by way of fragile paper parties that welcome their inclusion in their lists so these parties can gain a seat or two through these illegitimate forces. This is what we fear, and it is something against which we must take careful precautions."

Unconditional List

Labor Party Chairman Engineer Ibrahim Shukri believes that election guarantees are the most important thing and that they must be clear, specific, and stable in order to control the election process. He added that this aspect comes before preferences connected with election methods. Shukri has stressed that it is necessary that the voter's identity be verified, that he cast his vote before a committee, and that he sign opposite his name or, if he is illiterate, that he use his thumb print. He further added that the major gap through which forgery is committed in the election process results from the use of voter cards by people other than their owners. It is also essential that the voter's personal identity card, not his voter's card, be the basis according to which he casts his vote. The Labor Party chairman added, "According to this prelude, I say that the individual election method is much better than the absolute list method, but it isn't the best method. My opinion is that the unconditional proportionate list is the best election method. This means that candidacy must not be tied to party affiliation or to a certain type of list. There can be an unconditional and there can be a list for independents or for those who have a platform that isn't represented by anybody. This is, in fact, the sole true and natural source of the presence of parties. If a group of members wins for the first time through unconditional lists, then this group can form a parliamentary bloc that reflects the tendency they represent."

Ibrahim Shukri asserted, "We support the unconditional list and consider it the best way to improve party action

and to produce new leaders. We also consider the method that gives independents the right to wage elections within a list of independent candidates a good method. Through this method, candidates who gain the largest number of votes win. We are studying this method now so both party followers and independents can enter parliament."

Independents Reject

With announcement of the plan to adopt the system of election by list, independents in the current assembly have held repeated meetings in which they have demanded that President Mubarak intervene to reject the tendency to hold the next People's Assembly election by the proportionate list system. They have also decided to send President Mubarak a memorandum in which they will clarify their viewpoint on the need to maintain the individual system and will fully point out the flaws of the list system.

Fikri al-Jazzar, the dean of independents, has said, "Election by list is unconstitutional. The individual system is the best because it establishes a bond and a link between voter and candidate." Al-Jazzar rejected the idea of a list of independents, saying that it does not ensure the candidate's independence and it leads to disputes when the order of names is arranged.

This independent deputy pointed out that independents represent the largest percentage of the Egyptian people and that adoption of the list election system will "again confront us with numerous problems connected with calculating vote differences, not to mention the problems of the Ministry of Interior computer, which is fed faulty information."

Fikri al-Jazzar noted that the list system is not appropriate, because party platforms are, in accordance with the Parties Committee's decision, close to each other and because the voter cannot elect the party to represent him with utter neutrality.

Individual Is Better

Independent Deputy Muhammad al-Sindayuni has rejected the list election system, viewing it as a rejection of democracy. He noted that, if we compare the individual and list election systems, we find that list flaws are much greater than the individual system's flaws. This is because the high illiteracy rate makes it impossible for the voter to make a distinction between lists on the basis of the parties' platforms. This independent deputy has urged that the individual system be maintained, along with the presence of the parties in the parliament, until we finish dealing with the illiteracy problem in the coming period. He added that independents cannot be represented with the list system.

Former Information Minister Kamal Abu-al-Majd has said that there are two aspects to the election issue: one legal and one political. He added that both the individual and the list systems are constitutional. He further said that the list system is the best for emerging parties, provided that two fundamental conditions are met: a political condition whereby no high percentage [of votes] is required for

representation in parliament and a legal condition whereby independents are given a place in the election system.

Dr. Hamdi al-Sayyid, the Doctors Union chairman, has demanded good elections, asserting that his experience with list elections, which he supports strongly, has proved that they are the best, considering that the 1984 and 1987 elections produced the highest opposition percentage in the People's Assembly. The Doctors Union chairman has further said, "It is necessary to take several things into consideration when the tendency to apply the list system exists, most significantly the presence of democratic party action. What I mean is that party lists should be formed democratically and the freedom to form political parties must be available."

Liberal Party Chairman Dr. Mustafa Kamil Murad has said that he supports the list system, "provided that all of Egypt is considered a single electoral district, that no percentages are set to determine party representation, and that independents be represented in a list. Moreover, it is essential that parties be allowed to form alliances within a single list with which to wage elections."

Dr. Edward Ghali al-Dhahabi, an international law professor, has wondered, "Are we serious about building democracy in Egypt?" He answers: "If we are, then the only way toward this end is list election which reinforce democracy and is considered the best method to bring forth the best national elements." Dr. al-Dhahabi asserted that the current Constitution permits this election system, that there are numerous methods, and that we must look for the method that gives both parties and independents the right to enter elections in accordance with the principle of equality.

Large and Small Districts

Counselor Sami Mahran, the People's Assembly secretary general, has submitted another proposal to be debated and examined and to be adopted or amended in the next election. His proposal combines individual election and list election, with proportionate representation. This system can be clarified by saying that a single governorate will be divided into several large areas, such as north, south, and so forth. Each area will be tantamount to a major district and will then be divided into smaller districts. Elections will be held in both major and smaller districts simultaneously, and seats will be divided between the two equally. In a small district, individual elections will be held on the basis of simple majority. In a major district, elections will be held by list and on the basis of proportionate representation. This method ensures equality and equal chances for lists and independents.

Dr. Sami Mahran has said that this system is applied in Germany. There, 32 deputies, representing one-half the Bundestag members who total 656 [numbers as published] and who can be increased with candidates elected from districts according to the individual system, are elected. In individual elections, a candidate who gains the largest number of votes is the winner. In case equal votes are cast

for two candidates, one candidate wins by lot. Other members of the German parliament are selected on the basis of party lists and of the principle of proportionate representation.

Therefore, the German election law states that each voter has two votes. He casts the first for the candidate of the small district (individual) and the second for a party list in the major district. Election at both levels is held simultaneously.

According to this system, list seats are divided proportionately, meaning that each list gets a number of seats compatible with the number of votes it gains. German law makes it necessary that a party gain at least 5 percent of the certified votes cast throughout the country or that it gain three seats in individual elections before it can get a share of the seats divided on the basis of proportionate representation.

The German election system adopts the closed list, meaning that a voter can only vote for an entire list, without making any changes on it by addition, omission, or rearrangement of names on the list.

Seat Distribution

Clarifying how parliamentary seats are distributed, the People's Assembly secretary general said, "According to the party list system, seats are allotted to states and provinces. A number of seats is allotted to every state or province, and this number is proportionate with the state or province population. Votes gained by each list are calculated throughout the state or province, excluding voters who have cast their first votes for an independent candidate or a party candidate whose party list has not been recognized in the state.

"The number of seats won by independent candidates at the district level is subtracted from the total number of seats allotted each state. Seats gained by winning candidates who represent ineligible parties that haven't won the 5-percent proportion or whose candidates haven't won in three districts at least are also subtracted.

"The number of remaining seats is then multiplied by the number of votes gained by a party's list and divided by the total number of votes gained by the lists of eligible parties. Each list is given a number of seats equal to the whole number emanating from the above calculation. The remaining seats are then divided among parties on the basis of the remaining fractions, with the largest fraction awarded a seat, then the next largest fraction, and so forth. In case fractions are equal, the decision is made by lot. But if as a result of the division of seats, a party list that gains more than 50 percent of the total votes gained by eligible party lists doesn't get 50 percent of the total seats allotted the state, then this list has priority when remaining seats are divided among the fractions.

"The number of seats won by each list throughout the state is, in accordance with these calculation processes, subtracted from the number of seats won by a party in the various districts of the state (first vote) so as to determine

the number of seats to be filled by the list. These seats are filled according to the order of candidate names on the list, excluding candidates who have won at the district level.

"If a list wins a number of seats that exceeds the number of candidates it contains, the excess seats remain vacant and the party keeps the seats it has won in district elections, even if they exceed the number of seats its list has won at the state level. In this case, the total number of parliamentary seats has to be increased proportionately with these increases."

Possibility of MB-Wafd Alliance

94LD0079C Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
5 Aug 94 pp 22-23

[Article by Majdi al-Daqqaq: "Will Wafd Party Repeat Game of Alliance With Brotherhood"]

[Text] At a time when Egyptian parties wait for the ongoing debate on whether to adopt the list system or the individual system in preparation for the next legislative election to be settled, there are whispers on the political scene about the presence of secret contacts between the Wafd Party and the "banned" Muslim Brotherhood [MB] to revive the old alliance, which was established between the venerable Liberal Party and the MB prior to the 1984 election.

The secret whispers have relied on what is going on behind the scenes in the Wafd, namely that there is an internal tendency that seeks to revive this alliance because the party, which has been absent from the political scene as a result of its boycott of the latest election and its later rejection of the national dialogue, feels that it has become isolated and that, therefore, it needs to seek new allies for a new phase. At the same time, the whispers have relied on the Labor Party's participation in the national dialogue. This participation has angered the MB, who believes that the Labor Party has abandoned it and has considered looking for a replacement.

Details of the whispers are that a "representative of Wafd Chairman Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din has made several contacts with MB leaders to find out their opinion on the possibility of coordination between the Party and the MB." The details also say that Fu'ad Badrawi, Siraj-al-Din's grandson, is the person who made these contracts and that there is a wing in the party, represented by Dr. Nu'man Jum'ah, 'Ali Salamah, and Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, that supports this tendency." The details further say that 'Abd-al-'Aziz coordinated with the MB in the latest Lawyers Union incidents and that his hunger strike benefited the MB and came at the expense of his party.

The details point out that there is another wing that rejects the mere idea of alliance with the MB and that this wing is represented by Yasin Siraj-al-Din and some remnants of Wafd vanguards. A repeat of the 1919 experiment is out of the question now because the Wafd Party will lose, as it lost in the past, a large portion of its national and liberal assets as a democratic party that acts on nonreligious

bases, in addition to losing its ability to wage any election or manage any political action by itself. At the same time, this wing does not reject coordination and dialogue with any democratic political movement in the arena or agreement with such a movement on clear bases contained in a declared platform.

Yasin Siraj-al-Din believes that the Party has its own philosophy. He has asserted that the main wing in the Party believes that the Party can wage any election, if it so decides, on its own and in reliance on its masses and supporters. He has said, "We are a political party and the MB is a religious party. We are all Egyptians, regardless of whether we are Muslims or Christians. The country belongs to all of us and religion belongs to God."

Muhammad 'Alwan, an attorney and a party leader, has utterly denied that there has been any contacts for this purpose. He has said that meetings held between the Wafd leaders and MB leaders are not official meetings but personal meetings between friends and that they are far from any political framework. 'Alwan, who was one of those who engineered the 1984 alliance, has said that the 1984 circumstances were different from today's circumstances and that a lot has changed. He added that the Wafd rejects dual affiliation.

Fu'ad Badrawi, the Wafd assistant secretary general, has said, "I consider this talk 'premature.' To date, it hasn't been determined what form the election will take. Moreover, the Wafd, as a party, hasn't decided whether it will take part in the election or not." Badrawi stressed that "circumstances and the real situation are what will determine the Party's decision. The Party may not take part in the election altogether. Generally, the Party has no premeditated position and no rigid decision." Badrawi completely denied that he has made such contacts.

'Ali Salamah, an assistant secretary general, has said, "I consider the talk about a new Wafd-MB alliance pure rumors." He asserted, "According to my information, there are no secret or open contacts between the party and the MB. What ties us to the MB is national fraternity, which is the same as what ties us to the other parties, be they opposition or nonopposition parties. My personal conviction is that the phase the country is undergoing requires that Egyptian political forces unite in the form of a national front formed of all the parties and similar to the national front formed under the leadership of Mustafa al-Nahhas in 1935."

Dr. Ibrahim Disuqi, an assistant secretary general, expressed his surprise at these rumors, wondering about their source and their goal, pointing out that the Wafd calls for dialogue and coordination with political parties and labor union forces without specification, and saying that there is no special call for cooperation with the MB solely but rather with all the political forces.

Retired Major General 'Abd-al-Mun'im Husayn, the party treasurer and chairman of the Wafd Committee in al-Buwayrah, has denied knowledge of the presence of such contacts, pointing out that the matter is tied clearly in one

way or another to the shape and form of the next election. "From my perspective, says 'Abd-al-Mun'im Husayn, we have no objection to coordination between the Party and the opposition political forces vis-a-vis the NDP [National Democratic Party] in any future election. The Party is entitled to take any legal constitutional steps that enable it to oust the NDP from power."

In spite of the "dramatic buildup" of the secret whispers concerning revival of the Wafd-MB alliance, will the party repeat the alliance game and topple its liberal and national assets?

We believe that the answer will again depend on the circumstances of the political game, not on historical and philosophical constants.

Iraq

Parliament Speaker on Negotiations With Kuwait

94AE0172A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
19 Jul 94 p 6

[Interview with Sa'di Mahdi Salih, speaker of Parliament, by Kazim Nizar al-Rikabi; place and date not given—first paragraph is AL-JUMHURIYAH introduction]

[Text] On 20 June 1980, the first parliamentary elections since the establishment of the Iraqi republic were held. On the 30th of the same month, the elected parliament held its first sessions. Between those two dates and the present day, nearly a decade and a half have passed. We wanted to follow up on the progress of this democratic experiment in an interview with Parliamentary Speaker Mr. Sa'di Mahdi Salih. We asked frank questions and he gave frank answers. The interview follows:

[Al-Rikabi] How do you assess the role of the Parliament in the revival of democratic life in Iraq all these years after its establishment?

[Salih] The Parliament, as a democratic institution, grew out of the elections held on 20 June 1980, and which resulted in the establishment of the first parliament since the revolution of 14 July 1958, because that revolution dissolved the parliament and political parties. It promised to set up a new political life built on sound democratic bases, but that did not occur. The situation lasted from 1958 until 1980—no short time.

The 17-30 July 1968 Revolution tried to consolidate and develop democratic institutions in Iraq, before the growth of the Parliament, by establishing syndicates and unions, and the Progressive Patriotic Front, allowing political parties to play their public role through their press and other media. The Parliament was the culmination of all these steps, and expressed the will of all Iraqis to build a developed, civilized society, and to achieve an advanced political life. And so the Parliament was part of this concept, and this trend. The Parliament, primarily as a legislative institution, and in general as a patriotic institution, has been able to do the best possible job. It would take

too much time and space to enumerate the achievements of the Parliament. The Parliament has not only passed laws; it has played an effective part in the country's political life. At home, it has worked with other national institutions to create general national awareness, to mobilize the masses, especially during the war with Iran, the mother of battles, and the 30-fold aggression against Iraq. Abroad, it has played a similar role in pleading Iraq's case and representing its positions by attending Arab and international parliamentary conferences, plus other activities, visits, and bilateral forums with the parliaments of the world.

[Al-Rikabi] You are of course informed about political activity around the world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, there was a wave of talk, internationally, about what is called the "democratic revolution" in the world, and the exploitation of this expression by the large powers in order to dominate. Could you address the democratic experiment in Iraq in light of this?

[Salih] If we take the internal democracy of the West, then we may say it is a democracy that suits them, but within the boundaries of the higher national interests in those countries—meaning, there are boundaries that cannot be exceeded under any circumstances whatsoever. Indeed, there are restrictions on the citizens, the media, and democratic institutions, when their interests require it. This is a picture that the Iraqi and Arab citizens do not see. The picture they project is one of shining democracy, behind which a grave and terrible purpose lurks. The "democracy card" is used in various ways to achieve ends behind which the West stands. When they grow dissatisfied with a regime or person, they accuse that person or regime of being undemocratic and inhumane, and other things, which they express through their media—they really go crazy, in fact. If we were to analyze matters rationally and objectively, we'd find the truth, we'd discover that they want to realize inhumane and illegitimate goals, by hiding behind this cover, and misusing it in such a way as to get what they want without considering the hopes and aspirations, or, more precisely, the rights of the other side. This is the way of the West at the present time, and the way in which they dealt with the so-called socialist camp is the best evidence for that. In the name of democracy, in the name of human rights, in the name of providing citizens with the necessities of life, they have embroiled the peoples of these countries, and I believe that the peoples of these countries, have discovered the fraud, however belatedly. Thus all the elections being held now, whether in Poland, Bulgaria, or Hungary, are being won by communist or neo-communist parties. So we must not be deceived, or fooled by their flowery plans, because there are numerous dangers hidden in them.

Mr. Sa'di Mahdi Salih continued:

Let us look at the subject from another aspect. We ask here, how much time did they spend to get where they have gotten? Is it reasonable for them to ask us, the countries of the Third World, to implement, in one day, what it took them hundreds of years to do? That is a practical, social,

and political impossibility. Plus the fact that each society has its own concepts, customs, traditions, and circumstances that must be taken into consideration in the implementation of any democratic experiment. We, for example, by virtue of our traditions and values, do not use vituperation or defamation, of disclosing the hidden things to harm any person. Our religion enjoins us to show restraint. That does not mean ignoring an error—no, that is not what we mean. But there are some details we don't get into, or discuss openly to bring down our opponent. Instead, we focus on his professional faults that would lead to his downfall, not by exposing his personal faults. Thus our democracy has qualities lacking in the democracy of the West, and we are proud of this. Perhaps the West does not believe in it, just as the West, which carries the banner of democracy and wants to market it to us, tries to plunder our resources.

[Al-Rikabi] Mr. Speaker, could you speak of new parliamentary elections in the near future?

[Salih] Parliamentary elections are held every four years, in accordance with parliamentary law, but due to the 30-fold aggression against our country and the special circumstance of the abnormal situation in the north of Iraq. Thus, constitutionally, it has become impossible to hold elections, and so the current time period has been extended by two years. If current conditions continue, there might be another extension. If the deviant situation in the north comes to an end, we say yes, there will be free and democratic elections, without the influences used in the West, discriminating between one group of people and another. In the West, they use money, the media, and other elements—so who ends up in parliament?

The rich, the prominent—those without the knowledge, familiarity, ability, and readiness to serve the people. That is the democracy of the West; our democracy is different, you know. Iraqis know how elections are held, for the party abandons its candidate and sees all candidates as its candidate. No party in the West does this. In the West a party puts all its energies into serving its candidate, using every sort of assault, power, money, all the media. Nor does the press in Iraq debate everything, and the first person in the party and the state, the President Commander, may God preserve him, tells journalists, "Debate whatever you like—whatever will show the truth. Do not ignore it, or worry that so-and-so will be angry or irritated, or that someone else will be made uncomfortable by what you write." Furthermore, he has offered a great deal of support to the press.

[Al-Rikabi] Mr. Speaker, you mention the situation in the north. I would like to point out that the Western media is talking about the experiment in democracy in northern Iraq. How do you view this abnormal situation? What is the role of the legislative and executive councils in the autonomous region, as democratic institutions, given that situation?

[Salih] The Western media—particularly as regards conditions in the Third World—do not seek out the truth. They

turn black into white and white into black, according to their countries' interests. We must wonder, what democracy are they talking about in northern Iraq? The sound of bullets? Random killing? Struggles and massacres? Plunder and stealing? If this is the democracy they want, then congratulations to the West for that sort of democracy. *We* do not believe in that kind of democracy, and I am absolutely certain that our Kurdish people in northern Iraq were given freedom, and the gun barrels were withdrawn, and death stopped pursuing every man who speaks his mind, and they shoot anyone who seeks the protection of the West outside the borders—we are absolutely certain that if this happened, if the forces left the region—illegitimate forces, as everyone acknowledges... [sentence incomplete as published] In addition, what has happened in northern Iraq is that elections were conducted under American-British protection, elections protected by American and British warplanes, cannons, and rifles. The elections were utterly fraudulent. When this fraud and speculation was discovered, the results were not announced—they divided the seats among the two major blocs, putting the fate of this institution in the hands of the minority. They brought a small group of about five or six people and put them in this parliament because this group tips the balance for the faction that was with them. This group was known for its links and its purpose, and was also known for its conspiracies. The West applauds them and alleges that they are completely democratic, because they are conspiring for the West and carrying out its subversive policies—so it calls them democratic.

We, on the other hand, elected our legislative and executive councils in total freedom, as acknowledged by the Western media at the time—their journalists were here, they came to the region.

As to creating institutions in the shadow of occupying forces, they are ephemeral institutions that do not express the will of our nation's masses and our people in the north. It is an abnormal situation, and will end when the occupying forces leave the northern region.

[Al-Rikabi] The media has carried your call to a number of members of the Kuwaiti People's Assembly to open a dialogue on the reality of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. How would you explain what the purpose is here?

[Salih] It seems to me that the Kuwaitis misunderstood our invitation, and did not take it fully seriously. We were acting on the basis of our keenness that Arab solidarity and cooperation among our brothers should be restored. We were sincere in our call to the Kuwaiti People's Assembly, that we meet anywhere, in the presence of any third party they might choose, to discuss everything, not just a single topic.

[Al-Rikabi] You mean, a comprehensive dialogue?

[Salih] A comprehensive and unconditional dialogue to arrive at just, principled, and final solutions, because any unjust solution would be no solution at all, if any one of the parties feels oppressed, or cheated, or uncomfortable. The problem would still be there. We have many examples of

this kind of problem, where the problem was not solved justly and at its roots—the problem remained, even though the parties signed the documents in given circumstances. The problem still smoldered and flared up from time to time. We said that we were ready to meet with whomever the Kuwaiti parliament should choose, and in the presence of any party they'd choose, in order that we might enter into a dialogue, a sincere and serious discussion so that we might arrive at solutions to all the issues pending between us. But it seems that they misunderstood our message, and thought that the Iraqis were desperate or starving, or whatever—that we had brought up the issue of a dialogue as a tactical move. We did not bring up this initiative as a tactical move. It was done out of conviction and sincere intentions, but if they don't want that, they can take the blame and the consequences of the stand toward their people and the Arab nation. Here we wonder whether it is in the interests of the Arab nation for things to stay this way. Of course not. No loyal Arab would accept this, and on that basis and our faith in the importance of clearing the air among the Arabs. As a first step, we called for dialogue, expecting further steps toward Arab reconciliation and relations among the Arabs, to the benefit of our nation. We must leave aside damaging personal issues and personal positions.

[Al-Rikabi] Does the offer for dialogue still stand?

[Salih] Yes, it still stands.

[Al-Rikabi] Does it have a time limit?

[Salih] No, no time limit was specified, nor were any conditions attached. It was, despite its simplicity and clarity, a serious invitation.

[Al-Rikabi] The Kuwaiti response was to reject the invitation—has the rejection meant the end of it?

[Salih] No, the rejection has not been the end of it. The invitation still stands, and we are prepared to meet with them.

[Al-Rikabi] So it was a serious step, aimed at clearing the air among the Arabs and returning things to normal?

[Salih] Yes, that's exactly what we mean.

[Al-Rikabi] The Parliament has on many occasions announced that there are new laws to be enacted, including laws regarding the press and new political parties. What is their status as of today?

[Salih] The President brought up a program after the end of the war with Iran aimed at the evolution of political life in Iraq and the consolidation of democracy. The implementation began with the publication of a new draft constitution, and it was debated, as you know, and it was brought before the Parliament. The final step will be implementation, but current conditions in the country have prevented that thus far. The party law, which is part of the constitution, has been discussed and ratified, so all that remains is for anyone who wishes to form a party to start doing so, in accordance with the law. Journalists, especially foreign ones, ask why no parties have started up

yet? This is a matter that concerns our people first and foremost, as the law is in effect.

Speaker of the Parliament Sa'di Mahdi Salih went on to say:

The thing on citizens' minds now is not how to form political parties, but how to get a morsel of food, clothing, and medicine, given the sanctions imposed upon us. This is not a pretext to give justifications for abandoning the cause of democracy or the formation of political parties. Our position is clear and candid—it is to allow the formation of political parties, and there is a law for that, and it has been enacted, because previously there was no law permitting the formation of political parties. There was a need to enact the law, regardless of the extraordinary situation our country is experiencing.

As to the press law, we have a valid law, in effect, and so we did not see the pressing need to enact a new alternative law. In the event things return to normal, we will seriously consider new press legislation. Right now our primary concern, as I have said, is how to ease the burden of the sanctions imposed on our people. How can we rebuild our country, so damaged by aggression? That does not mean abandoning the program announced and put in force by our President Commander, may God preserve him. God willing, the proper time will come. There can be no retreat from the democratic option.

[Al-Rikabi] A few minutes before this interview, you had a meeting with parliamentary delegations from Turkey and France. How do you see, through your relations with the parliaments of the world, the role these parliaments and peoples could play in breaking the criminal blockade imposed on our people, and clarifying the facts of our case, in defending Iraq and its sovereignty?

[Salih] The sanctions on Iraq are not mere economic sanctions—it is a total and comprehensive blockade in every sense of the word. In spite of all this, the Iraqis are known for their self-confidence and steadfastness when they believe in something. They hold fast to it, and march towards the goals they are striving to achieve. Iraqis are active in all fields of endeavor, and among these is parliamentary activity. The sanctions, in the beginning, meant a total siege of the Parliament, the refusal of any request for members of Parliament to make visits outside Iraq, and noncompliance with any invitations extended to us by people or parliaments around the world. Then that started to change. This whole time, we were attending parliamentary forums—regular meetings of the International Union of Parliaments, the Arab Union of Parliaments, and even the European Parliament, whenever their were global activities. We used our attendance in all these forums to plead Iraq's case. Along with our comrades and brothers in the Foreign Ministry, and the other ministries and institutions relevant to this. We all succeeded in making progress, and to create a new conviction in the world, among parliamentarians, that the sanctions are unjustifiable. People are changing their minds in our favor, and the best proof of that is the repeated visits to Iraq, mostly by

parliamentarians. They have begun to understand when we set out our positions to them. They have a positive position when they go back to their countries or their parliaments. We have sent delegations to many countries, and some of them have been sent to important countries such as China, and others. We have also taken advantage of the holding of the World Parliament, and sent a delegation when it is held in an important country. We set out Iraq's case and hold bilateral talks, so I think the Parliament has done its duty for the country and people.

Minister of Planning Provides Development Statistics

94AE0171A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 27 Jul 94 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Minister of Planning Discusses Iraqi Economic Development; ID126 Billion for Development over 26 Years"]

[Text] The Iraqi economy has made several forward leaps since the 17-30 July 1986 revolution. Fundamental changes have affected the social and economic infrastructures thanks to the strategies adopted by the revolution leadership in order to achieve comprehensive development and significant advances in all fields. On the anniversary of the mighty revolution, Minister of Planning Dr. Samal Majid Faraj discussed our national economic development over this period of time, replete with accomplishments and with national and patriotic gains.

The minister said: Since the July 28 revolution, the state has implemented numerous scientific strategies to achieve comprehensive development under the guidance of our leader President Saddam Husayn, May God Keep Him, who orchestrated the process of planning and development.

What were our most significant economic developments during the revolution's 26 years?

Figures indicate that the GDP rose at current prices from 1.035 billion dinars [ID] in 1986 to ID122.997 billion in 1993. National income, which is an important indicator of the economy and its development, also climbed during the 1968-93 period from ID813 million to ID99.244 billion, for an increase of 12.1 percent. [figures as published]

The minister added that the GDP grew in most economic sectors and activities, albeit at different rates. Laws promulgated in the farm sector by the leadership of the revolution affected fundamental changes in the makeup of farm ownership. Agricultural GDP [as published], at current prices, grew by 27,977 percent from UD168 million in 1968 to ID45.463 billion in 1993. [figures as published] GDP in basic industries likewise grew by nearly 6,468 percent from ID95 million in 1968 to ID6.214 billion in 1993. GDP in the water and electricity sector grew in the same period from ID10.5 million to ID277 million. The building and construction sector developed significantly as its GDP grew by 12,829 percent from ID36.8 million in 1968 to ID4.758 billion in 1993. The value of GDP in the

transportation and communications sectors also rose by 29,066 percent from ID65.8 million in 1968 to ID19.191 billion in 1993.

The minister then discussed the precepts underlying the national economic surge to develop production capacity. He said that the attainment of development objectives essentially requires augmenting the production capacities of various sectors in a way that guarantees their coordination and integration. Iraq has been careful to channel its financial resources toward worthwhile investments in various fields and sectors in order to achieve high rates of social and economic development. Such care is reflected in the size of gross established capital, which expanded by 11,279 percent from ID142.9 million in 1968 to ID11.261 billion in 1993. [figures as published]

Referring to the significant expansion in familial consumer spending, the minister said that private consumer spending escalated by 16,960 percent from ID515 million to ID87.891 billion in the 1968-93 period.

The minister reviewed the growth in various fields of social development, saying that higher birth rates caused the Iraqi population to expand by 120 percent from 8.859 million people in 1968 to 19.478 million in 1993. The work force employed by the government and in the socialist and joint sectors grew to 821,000 from 277,000 in 1968. The number of Iraqis of working age (15 to 64 years old) expanded by 146 percent to 10.550 million from about 4.292 million in 1986.

The minister also highlighted developments in the education and health sectors:

The number of hospitals increased by 36 percent from 149 in 1968 to 203 in 1993. The number of beds proliferated by 92 percent from 16,327 to 31,350. The number of physicians grew by 333 percent over the same period from 2,205 to 9,540. The number of dentists similarly grew by 479 percent from 301 in 1968 to 1,743 in 1993.

The education sector enjoyed the full attention of party and revolution leaders. Kindergartens increased by 375 percent from 135 in 1968 to 641 in 1993 as the number of enrolled children grew by 585 percent from 24,530 to 99,464 [figures as published], and the number of female teachers jumped by 856 percent from 551 in 1968 to 5,270 last year.

The number of elementary schools grew by 72 percent from 5,137 in 1968 to 8,847 while the number of pupils spiraled by 230 percent from 1,017,050 to 3,358,557, and the number of teachers, male and female, grew by 203 percent from 47,058 to 142,361.

Secondary schools also proliferated by 242 percent from 840 to 2,870 during the same period. The number of secondary school teachers, male and female, jumped by 438 percent from 8,378 to 50,482. [figures as published] The number of universities grew during the same period to 13 by 1993/94; not counting the two Saddam colleges of law and medicine, six private colleges that did not exist in 1968, and the Technical Institutes Authority.

Enrollment in Iraqi universities expanded by 538 percent from 31,086 male and female students in 1968 to 198,175 in 1993, and the number of faculty members also grew by 567 percent during the 1968/69-1993/94 period from 1,879 to 12,532. The number of graduate students of both sexes increased by 4,161 percent from 125 in 1968 to 5,326 in 1993.

The minister of planning added: The positive developments attained in all fields of social and economic development since July 1968, in spite of the oppressive aggression and the unjust embargo, are no doubt the fruit of the vanguard leadership of President Saddam Husayn, May God Keep Him, who guided the course of planning and development, the formulation and sound implementation of economic and social policies, and the commitment of the country's fiscal resources to its development. This is evidenced in the ID136,000 billion [figures as published] allocated for investment in the 1968-93 period and in Iraq's tremendous capacities and resources, such as its various natural resources, especially oil of which Iraq has the second highest reserves in the world. Iraq also boasts an advanced infrastructure as well as large economic and human resource capacities thanks to the wise leadership of our leader the president and to the Iraqi people's iron will which is capable of meeting all challenges and of achieving further growth in all economic and social fields.

Israel

Former Northern Commanders Assess Golan Security

94AA0100B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jul 94
p B2

[Article by Sharon Sade]

[Text] In the shadow of Syria's attempt a few weeks ago to launch a Scud missile, and the American newspaper report last week that the Syrians have spent \$1.4 billion over the past three years on arming themselves with tanks, missiles, and planes, the government is still softening up public opinion in expectation of the coming referendum on the question of withdrawal from the Golan Heights. According to senior officers in the military, Israel has even begun to formalize drafts of a special defense aid package that she intends to request from the United States if she returns the Golan Heights. These senior officers reported that the special aid package is meant to compensate Israel in the realms of early warning and intelligence.

Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin's and Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres's, declarations concerning Israel's readiness to withdraw from the Golan as a condition for the peace agreement with Syria have divided public opinion. Former IDF [Israel Defense Forces] senior commanders differ over it, as well. Three reserve major generals: Yosi Peled, general of the northern command from 1986-1991, a private businessman today; Uri Or, general of the command from 1983-1986, now chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense committee; and Avigdor

Ben-Gal, general of the command from 1977-1981, today director-general of the Israel Water [Authority], were asked to assess what Israel's future defense concept should be, assuming the Golan Heights are returned to Syrian control.

Whereas Ben-Gal and Or addressed the issue and explained under what conditions it will be possible to ensure the security of the State without the Golan, Peled absolutely refused to adopt this hypothesis even theoretically. He maintained that withdrawal from the heights—whether today or in another few years—holds the potential for national suicide, and said that he is not prepared to gamble on that under any circumstances. Ben-Gal and Or believe that Israel will be able to compensate for the return of the Golan by setting up a technological warning system, and by gradually changing her military doctrine—from a defensive conception to an offensive one. According to Ben-Gal, peace will oblige Israel to undergo a revolution in thinking and adapt its defense philosophy to a situation similar to the one that prevailed before the Six-Day War. The new defense philosophy must take relate to the fact that Israel has no topographic or geographic safety net—by relying on the agreements that will be signed in the region.

Ben-Gal and Or believe it will be possible to compensate for the loss of the Golan Heights as an intelligence asset by utilizing electronic warning systems, mainly aerial, some of which exist in the IDF and on the international market, and, of course, in the United States. In negotiations on the accords, they both say, Israel will have to demand that the United States supply her with the most advanced technology available in the field of interpretation of aerial satellite photos, and also demand that she receive all the data, of various kinds, that satellite sensors pick up. In addition, [Israel] must insist that the United States supply her with two AWAC-style command-and-control planes. "This combination of things will give us the ability to keep track of events, and will also help to ensure that the Syrians fulfill the defense clauses that will be a basis of the peace accord," the two say.

Peled believes this is false reasoning: "Even if we set up intelligent warning systems on the Golan Heights, and we receive all the data, they forget that behind the intelligent machines stand human beings. On the basis of the information, they arrive at conclusions; on the basis of these conclusions, decisions are made, some of which could be fateful. In 1973, Israel had all the relevant information needed to know the Yom Kippur war was coming; and Kuwaitis had all the necessary means to know about the Iraqi invasion in 1990. But the decisionmakers interpreted the information incorrectly—and we all know what the results were. The same thing is liable to happen in the Golan."

"There are several security arrangements that we will have to insist be appended as supplements to the peace accord," says Ben-Gal. "First, demilitarization of the Heights: that Syria will have no army on the Golan, just a police force whose task will be to preserve public order. We will also have to demand—in addition to demilitarization of the

Heights themselves—demilitarization of an equivalent amount of territory on the Syrian side, i.e., in the region along the present border: cutting down ground-to-air missile batteries; reduction of the air force on the Syrian side; and reduction of ground forces (not on a mutual basis); and a permanent settlement concerning Lebanon, with Syria guaranteeing that there will be no hostile activity against Israel coming from Lebanon.

A further problem the three dealt with was control of the water sources on the Golan Heights. According to Ben-Gal, this problem can be solved in several ways: "The sources of the Jordan—the Dan and the Hasbani—will be under our control; another possibility is to create a region of control over the water sources, and include a third-party presence—the United Nations, United States, or other combined units; the third choice is for areas that are sensitive in the realm of water to be placed under joint Israeli-Syrian control, according to some formula or other. What is within Israeli territory now will remain Israeli. I would also not be opposed if, as part of the new water distribution framework between us and the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Syrians, the Sea of Galilee became a regional reservoir for Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian entity. But it would remain within the borders of Israel and under her control, in fulfillment of the agreements on the distribution of surplus water from the Sea of Galilee to this region. That way, the Arabs will have no interest in impeding the flow of water to the Sea of Galilee in case border disputes or confrontations break out.

Peled believes that there is no solution to the water problem. He maintains that Israel needs the sources of the Jordan, and that there is no practical alternative solution, which will be able to supply her [with water] if the sources are fully or partially returned to Syria.

Peled also differs from his two colleagues when asked whether it will be possible to rely on a foreign force to carry out the demilitarization of the Golan. Ben-Gal and Or believe it will be possible. They argue that UN or American teams will be able to oversee the demilitarization of the Golan, and note that in accordance with the separation of forces agreement of 1974, there are UN reconnaissance patrols in the Golan. The technology, they maintain, will help Israel to confirm that there is no deterioration in fulfillment of the terms of the security agreement. "This reasoning seems false to me, too," Peled responds. "We must remember that there was a similar settlement in Sinai in 1967, until 'Abd-al-Nasir came to power and threw the UN force out. They say it will be possible to station American soldiers there. But we must remember that some day an American president may come along and say that international problems do not interest him, that he wants to concentrate on internal affairs. For this reason, Israel can and must rely only on herself."

Avigdor Ben-Gal believes that in case the agreements are broken, it will be possible to rely on warning systems: "If for any reason there is a flagrant violation of the agreements—and the evidence proving it comes into our hands by means of the sophisticated technology—then, from a

technical point of view, there will be no problem in recapturing the Golan Heights within hours, if it is demilitarized and there are no fortresses or military forces within it." Peled is a bit more pessimistic. According to him, the Golan Heights have supreme strategic value, and it is impossible to rely on precedents such as the return of Sinai. "Returning Sinai did not create a threat to strategic centers in Israel, but returning the Golan will: populations centers, industrial centers, major traffic arteries, water sources—all of these lie just a short distance from the Golan."

In Peled's words, history has proved that there is no substitute for territory. Even the claim that conventional missiles change the balance of power is not true. Missiles, unlike land invasion, do not ensure conquest of territory. At most, they can ensure physical or psychological harm, or damage to morale. The Germans laid waste to London with V-1 and V-2 rockets and the Luftwaffe, but never conquered England. France, Belgium, Holland, and Norway—all the countries the Nazi land forces were able to reach—they defeated and conquered.

Unlike his colleagues, Peled also does not believe we can depend upon the stability of the Syrian regime. "We saw what happened in the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia, and we remember how the Iranian and Egyptian monarchies collapsed. The dictatorship in Syria is no insurance policy." Ben Gal believes, in contrast, that the stability of the Syrian regime will preserve the peace for years. Returning Golan to the Syrians, he adds, will only strengthen any regime there.

According to Ben-Gal's and Or's assessments, since al-Asad's rise to power in 1970 three processes have taken place: the backing that the Syrian president used to receive from the Soviet Union for his anti-Western world view, has disappeared. Al-Asad understood that in order to survive in the new world he would have to cooperate with the West, and his first step in that direction was to join the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf war. Further changes have been Syria's joining the Madrid talks, and the talks that his representatives in Washington have been carrying on with the Israeli team since then. Al-Asad's attempt to present himself as the flag bearer of the Palestinians has also lost its substance, because the PLO acts in accordance with its own interests, with Egyptian and American aid.

"Al-Asad and his heirs understand that if they are to be responsible leaders—they must board the train whose last stop is a peace accord with Israel," says Or. Ben-Gal goes even further: "It is our good fortune that the Syrian regime is not democratic. I prefer to negotiate settlements with states that do not have a democratic character, especially when we are speaking of Arabs. We see the PLO, which tries to conduct business democratically, but does not have a leader who can consistently and unequivocally do whatever he wants. Since in Syria, public opinion has no influence, it is very easy to reach a settlement with her and keep it. It is a luxury in the Near East to carry on a network of relations with totalitarian states, because we know that the person sitting opposite us can supply the goods he

promises, and clearly a satisfied regime is less of a danger to Israel. The Syrians will rush into any adventures against us, because they will not want to lose in war what they have achieved through peace."

Lebanon

Al-Tufayli: We Shall Continue To Fight Jews

94WR0247A Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French
30 Jul 94 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, former secretary general of Hizballah, by Scarlett Haddad; place and date not given]

[Text] Suspected by the Argentine Government of heading an organization known as "Ansar Allah" that is believed responsible for the Buenos Aires terrorist attack, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli has suddenly been thrust into the international limelight. Until recently, this former secretary general of Hizballah had fallen into near-obscure. Opposing Hizballah's participation in the legislative elections, he no longer had official duties with the party. So why him? The best way to get answers was to ask him directly. That is what we did, in the course of our interview, which was held somewhere in south Beirut, under strict security conditions.

[Haddad] How do you explain the fact that you are being accused in the Buenos Aires attack?

[Al-Tufayli] In my opinion, it is all tied in with the peace negotiations... The Palestinians, the Jordanians, and a number of Arab countries have established relations with the Zionist entity. But their citizenry continue to reject this peace, and that disturbs those working to promote it. The latter have also said many times that they would attack anyone standing in their way. Well, the main opponents of peace are first of all Iran and the groups in its orbit, i.e. Hizballah, Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], etc. Accusing Iran and Hizballah of the Buenos Aires attack is thus just a pretext for attacking them.

[Haddad] Could such serious allegations really be just "improvisations"? Aren't they based on concrete information?

[Al-Tufayli] Those who make these accusations themselves admit that they have no proof. But they have decided to accuse us without waiting for the results of the investigation, perhaps even without waiting for the investigation to take place. This is what proves that the accusations brought against us are political; they're not based on facts. Besides, there isn't any organization called "Ansar Allah" in Lebanon.

[Haddad] But there is! In 1987, there was an entity of that name, and it even claimed responsibility for several kidnappings of citizens of countries in the West.

[Al-Tufayli] I don't have any recollection of such an entity existing. I admit there was "Jundallah" in Tripoli, but there was never any Ansar Allah.

[Haddad] All the same, Western hostages have certainly been kidnapped by someone.

[Al-Tufayli] Yes, and it is precisely those who have negotiated with the hostage takers who know there was no Ansar Allah.

[Haddad] Might you be the person with whom they have negotiated?

[Al-Tufayli] It was certainly not I. In any case, it is very easy to invent names.

[Haddad] Why this emphasis on you personally, when for some time you have not really been in the forefront of events?

[Al-Tufayli] Ask that question of those making the accusations. It is the Americans who are beating the drums on this. According to my information, it is Hambley himself who's pushing these theories.

[Haddad] Do you think Hambley is using such arguments to justify a major Israeli operation?

[Al-Tufayli] A lot of good it will do him! Threats accomplish nothing. Let them take action: We will be there. What is clear is that "non-American" Islam is unacceptable. For our part, we consider the United States a Satan. This is why it is in the interest of the United States to concentrate all its efforts on breaking us. It may believe that we are a negligible factor in the regional equation, that the problem could be solved simply by hurling some accusations.

[Haddad] What is your own current position in Hizballah?

[Al-Tufayli] I am just an ordinary militant.

[Haddad] An ordinary militant, with so many guards?

[Al-Tufayli] I am entitled to some consideration, in my capacity as a former secretary general of the party, of which moreover I am practically the founder.

[Haddad] You have no responsibilities within the party?

[Al-Tufayli] I am not a member of the party's Consultative Council (Shura) or its political bureau.

[Haddad] Do you have responsibilities in the areas of security or intelligence?

[Al-Tufayli] No. I told you, I am an ordinary militant, and I do not participate in decision-making. This has been true since the time of the legislative elections.

[Haddad] What do you think about the Buenos Aires attack? One would expect you to applaud this kind of operation, since you are at war with Israel...

[Al-Tufayli] I said yesterday, we are against the assassination of children, women, the innocent, and the elderly. Such acts are condemned by the "shari'ah" [Muslim law]. Even in time of war and against our enemies. This is why it is so unfair to accuse Hizballah of perpetrating them.

[Haddad] Do you condemn the Argentine bomb attack?

[Al-Tufayli] All I am saying is, it is a serious error to blame Hizballah for it, since such actions are prohibited in our religion.

[Haddad] But doesn't such an act serve your interests, in the context of your struggle against Israel?

[Al-Tufayli] Nothing that sullies our good name advances our interests. We want very much to win over the general public. These kinds of acts hurt our public image and thus ultimately serve the interests of the Zionists.

[Haddad] Who is responsible for the attack, in your opinion?

[Al-Tufayli] I could say the Zionists were looking for a pretext to launch an attack against us. And perhaps they have internal squabbling between different factions... Anything is possible. Anyway, the list of enemies is long.

[Haddad] Could it be a bid to court favor with Iran, with you being the "peace offering"?

[Al-Tufayli] I am not alone in my struggle. And if I were sacrificed as part of some sort of deal, I would have nothing to regret, since I would be a martyr to my convictions. We are a large faction, and all these threats serve only to make us more united and strong in our convictions: I am sure the peace documents will be renounced, there will never be a normalization with the enemy, and the resistance will continue. Nothing can stop it. The coming days will prove the veracity of what I say.

[Haddad] The coming days?

[Al-Tufayli] Or months or years or centuries. What is the difference? Time is irrelevant in the face of such great issues, but we will be victorious in the end.

[Haddad] It is being said that even Syria is getting ready to sign a declaration of principles with Israel?

[Al-Tufayli] So what? Even if the whole world signs a peace agreement with them, we will continue to battle the Jews.

[Haddad] You are contradicting the official position of Hizballah, which promises to stop the resistance once Israeli soldiers are withdrawn from south Lebanon.

[Al-Tufayli] We are saying quite openly: We will continue the resistance, and we will assassinate any Jew that comes to Beirut. We will fight normalization with rifles, words, any means at our disposal.

[Haddad] And in saying this, you are speaking simply as a militant of the party?

[Al-Tufayli] As shaykh...

[Haddad] If Iran tomorrow should drop its opposition to the peace process, how much freedom of maneuver will you have?

[Al-Tufayli] I don't think Iran could alter its position. But whatever happens, our convictions remain the same.

[Haddad] Do you expect a new Israeli attack?

[Al-Tufayli] Anything is possible. We are at war.

[Haddad] When Israel assassinated Shaykh 'Abbas Mousaoui, Hizballah threatened to avenge itself, and there followed the attack against the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. When Israel bombed Ba'labakk and kidnapped Dirani, Hizballah again threatened to retaliate somewhere, and there was another attack in Argentina. Could these be mere coincidences?

Ron Arad

[Al-Tufayli] No one has the right to accuse any individual or any party without proof. One is presumed innocent. So when someone says he is innocent, one must believe him until the contrary is proved. Well, so far, no one has proved anything. Under these conditions, the accusations amount to an attack...

[Haddad] Do you have any information on Ron Arad?

[Al-Tufayli] Nothing in particular.

[Haddad] Perhaps that is why the Israelis are threatening you. Dirani having said things along those lines. Especially since Ron Arad was abducted while you were secretary general of the party...

[Al-Tufayli] As secretary general, I remember that at a certain point in time the Islamic Republic of Iran was searching high and low for Ron Arad in connection with the release of Palestinian detainees in Israeli jails. So were the Syrians. If he isn't with the fundamentalists or the Iranians or the Syrians, where could he be? And what would be the point of holding him for so long? Asking myself all these questions, the idea came to me that Ron Arad might have died in the course of some operation, which would explain why his body hadn't turned up. It is a hypothesis, or rather a deduction. Because I don't understand why it is—if he is still alive—that his captors are not trying to negotiate his release. There is no objective reason for people to keep silent.

[Haddad] What are your plans?

[Al-Tufayli] Nothing new. I consider myself at war with the Zionist enemy, hence I could be killed at any moment. I'm ready for anything. I am doing all I can to hurt them, and they are doubtless trying to pay me back a hundredfold.

[Haddad] Have you increased your security precautions?

[Al-Tufayli] Of course. We remain vigilant at every level.

[Haddad] Do your guards belong to Hizballah, or are they employed by you personally?

[Al-Tufayli] They are members of Hizballah; I told you, I am a party militant.

[Haddad] Have there been contacts between you and Lebanese officials since that attack?

[Al-Tufayli] No.

[Haddad] What do you think of the position the minister of foreign affairs has taken regarding the incident?

[Al-Tufayli] It is not bad, but it could be better. After all, every state tries to preserve its dignity and defend itself against such accusations.

[Haddad] Do you expect the Lebanese state to change its position?

[Al-Tufayli] Let us be honest about it: The state here is a colorless, odorless cipher. If, today, it is with the resistance, it is because the Syrians want it to be. And this is what reassures me.

[Haddad] What if the Syrians change their position?

[Al-Tufayli] Then Lebanese officials will be Israel's biggest supporters.

[Haddad] And what would happen to you then?

[Al-Tufayli] I am convinced we are in a position to defeat the Zionists.

[Haddad] After the abduction of Dirani, Shaykh Nasrallah said he planned to open an investigation within the party to determine if there was any complicity. What is the status of that investigation?

[Al-Tufayli] It is still under way. It has not yet finished its work: We have found many agents around us, but not within the party itself.

United Arab Emirates

GDP Reaches UD131.66 Billion in 1993

94AE0160A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
31 Jul 94 p 11

[Text] Non-petroleum economic sectors in the United Arab Emirates have continued to register noticeable activity and an increase in their rate of growth during 1993 in spite of the fluctuations in international oil prices and the decrease in the country's production of oil, and consequently, the slide in income generated by the oil sector.

According to the annual report for 1993 of the central bank of the Emirates, which came out yesterday, this development in non-petroleum economic sectors is consistent with state policy to diversify sources of income in order to reduce dependence on oil as the single source of income. During previous years, the state has provided the necessary aid to the non-petroleum sectors. This aid has invigorated those sectors and increased their contribution to the GDP.

The report indicates that the GDP, valued in costs of production factors and market prices, achieved a growth rate of 1.2 percent in 1993, while non-petroleum economic sectors have registered a growth rate of 4.2 percent during the same year. This increase is accounted for by the growth rates in the construction, building, real estate, transportation, storage, communications, wholesale and retail trade sectors, while the contribution of the oil sector decreased at the rate of 3.3 percent because of the decline in oil production and falling prices. As for expenditures, the absolute consumption expenditure registered a rate

increase of 6.5 percent in comparison with 1992, while expenditures on imports for goods and services registered a growth of 4.9 percent in comparison with 1992.

The gist of the report is that this growth has been achieved in the shadow of a moderate rise in prices at the rate of 4-5 percent and a population increase of 3.5 percent, accompanied by an increase in the labor force of 25,100 workers at the rate of 3.3 percent. Total employment reached 794,400 workers.

As for government expenditure in the Emirates, which is considered to be the main engine of the country's economy, the statement of the unified audit indicated a rise in general expenditures from 52.1 billion dirhams [UD] in 1992, to UD54.6 billion in the 1993 financial year.

Because of the state's concern with vital substructures and projects in electricity, water, city planning and construction of popular housing for citizens sectors, the state's development expenditures registered a big increase during 1993. Its rate amounted to 16.6 percent over the previous financial year. This decline was brought about by the drop in oil revenues.

As a result, the general budget registered a deficit that amounted to UD16.1 billion, as compared to a deficit of UD6 billion in 1992.

In the area of currency and development policies, the lowering of international interest rates, especially on the American dollar, had an impact on the continuation of state investment activity during 1993. The reduction in interest rates helped to continue easing currency and development policies. Local private [sector] liquidity registered a decline by a rate of 1.6 percent. This slide is ascribed to the decline in semi currency [as published] deposits by 7.8 percent. The UD653 million decline in net foreign principals had a constraining impact on local liquidity, while the impact of net local deposits was an expansion in the amount of UD35 billion.

As for foreign trade, preliminary statistics indicate that in spite of the decline in the value of oil exports from their levels in previous years, imports continued to register a noticeable increase during 1993, growing by a rate of 12.5 percent. This is accounted for by the increase in local demand as a result of the economic circumstances that are characterized by the expansion in various economic sectors, especially the boom in the construction, building, and real estate sectors, as well as in the volume and value of the re-export trade to the outside world. In spite of the increase in the value of exports and re-exports which amounted to UD37.9 billion as compared to UD32.1 billion in 1992, the balance of trade surplus shrank from UD23.9 billion in 1992 to UD14.5 billion in 1993 as a result of the increase in the value of imports on one side and the decrease in the value of oil exports on the other.

As for GDP development, preliminary estimates of the GDP, valued at the cost of the production factor and current prices for 1993, indicate a growth of 1.2 percent. The GDP rose from UD130.16 billion in 1992 to

UD131.66 in 1993. The growth rate in non-petroleum sectors amounted to 4.2 percent, while the contribution of the oil sector slid by 3.2 percent in 1993 as a result of the slide in quantities and prices for the same period. Thus oil revenues slid from UD53.12 billion in 1992 to UD51.35 billion in 1993. Because of that, the contribution of the oil sector to the GDP declined from 40.8 percent in 1992 to 39 percent in 1993.

Republic of Yemen

Top 10 Reasons for YSP Defeat Outlined

94AE0165A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
15 Jul 94 p 14

[Text] Aden—A senior military expert told AL-HAWADITH that 10 factors contributed to the military defeat of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) and the simultaneous fall of Aden and al-Mukalla after two months of fighting. Those factors are:

1. YSP's inability to get the Bakil tribes to act against the Sanhan and Hashid tribes.
2. YSP's failure to deploy its supporters who were scattered throughout Ta'izz, Ibb, and Sanaa and who were quick to take to their homes and proclaim solidarity with the forces of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.
3. The North's mobilization machinery went into high gear on two fronts: to marshal the regular military forces and the Southern reserves who were efficaciously deployed by Yemeni Reform Grouping leaders Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar and Shaykh al-Zandani.
4. A few thousand Arab Afghans, trained in warfare against the Red Army in the labyrinths of Afghanistan, took the side of the Sanaa forces and joined the war human wave-style, especially in the battle for the al-'Anad Base whose fall opened the road to Aden.
5. Socialist leader 'Ali Salim al-Bid exaggerated his [party's] military capability while he underestimated the forces of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. He miscalculated on three counts: Sanaa maintained open avenues of foreign procurement, especially from Warsaw and Tashkent; Russian military experts were brought in to man the air fleet whose MiG-27s and the Su-24s have operational range. In addition, Sanaa budgeted considerable appropriations for the maintenance of its tanks which spearheaded the penetration and fall of the South.
6. The South lost its best three brigades. Deployed around Sanaa, Zamar, and 'Imran, the destruction of those brigades deprived the South of a military arm that could have changed the outcome of the battle.
7. Sanaa deployed its best brigade in the strategic Abyan region. The al-'Amaliqah Brigade was essentially composed of four brigades of 17,000 troops and acted in Trojan fashion to deplete the Southerners from within, especially after keeping them busy on several fronts, allowing the armored divisions to reach the gates of Aden after grabbing one region after another.

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8. Sanaa lost 1,800 members of the Defense Ministry's Central Security Forces deployed in the heart of Aden since 20 May 1990. That development, however, did not alter the balance, especially since the Southerners did not open any fronts but engaged instead in military retreat as they awaited Arab and international recognition that never came.

9. Sanaa intelligence was able to penetrate the Southern steel nucleus [as published] which formed around Defense Minister Qasim Haytham Tahir. The Southerners, meanwhile, were unable to penetrate the Northern command

which is like a family enclave. Commanders of the brigades, of the main divisions, and of the Air Force are all from the village of Bayt al-Ahmar and are related by blood or by marriage to President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. One such commander, 'Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, is credited with masterminding and leading the drives against Aden and al-Mukalla.

10. The Southerners entered the war without being strategically or logistically prepared. By contrast, the Sanaa military command had been planning the invasion of Aden since the first reclusion by 'Ali Salim al-Bid in 1992.

India

Writer Discusses Aspects of Relations With U.S.

94AS0462A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
25, 26, 28 Jul 94

[Article in three installments by Malini Parthasarathy: "India and America"; names as published]

[25 Jul p 1]

[Text] Washington, July 24—The Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao's visit to Washington last May has certainly generated enthusiastic expectations among the business community and consequently trade and commerce officials in the Clinton Administration of promising economic opportunities in India. But it is sharply evident that the acknowledgement of the new opportunities has not served to broaden the thrust of the Clinton Administration's approach to India which remains narrowly focussed on the issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

Several administration officials in conversation here were blunt about their perception that while the Prime Minister's visit earlier this year might have reflected "a symbolic recognition" on the part of the U.S. of the achievement of the Indian economic reform programme, this had not really altered the emphasis or the priority that the administration was placing on either human rights or non-proliferation. "From our perspective," said an administration official, "we respected his (the Prime Minister's) preferences and issues were handled delicately."

Policy Commitment

"Economic opportunities are not the sum total of our interest in India," the official said. "It might be true that in the public presentation of the agenda, the economic dimension took a larger share and the prospect of the Indian market might have created a larger constituency for a relationship with India, but our policy commitment on human rights and non-proliferation remains."

The picture of Indo-U.S. relations that was sketched by officials handling policy on South Asia was sharply at variance with the more upbeat appraisals emerging from business leaders and representatives of the U.S. Congress and Senate, some of whom expressed confidence that the relationship was entering a dynamic and healthier phase. But there are several reasons why it might be premature to assume that the positive signals from American business and Congress can crowd out the less favourable ones from the administration. Nor would it be easy to dismiss the reiteration of a hard line as merely the articulation of a bureaucracy that finds itself edged out of an expanding and dynamic process. For now, the dominant player in the context of Indo-U.S. relations remains the strategic establishment in Washington, comprising the State Department, the National Security Council and the Pentagon.

"Economic Constituency"

There is no doubt that the Commerce Department which had identified India as a "big emerging market," the

Energy Department and an increasing constituency on Capitol Hill have picked up the signals from the stirrings of interest in commercial opportunity in India and these forces do represent winds of change in what was hitherto an ossified relationship. But it might be a mistake to overestimate their influence at this point in time, when the "economic constituency" for better ties with India is only now crystallising. For the so-called economic constituency to entrench itself as a factor in Indo-U.S. relations would depend on the durability of the economic reform process in India and the consequent participation by American business in the opened up Indian economy.

The second reason why the strategic establishment in Washington remains the key player in the relationship in the immediate term is the effect of continuing pressure from Pakistan. Given that the U.S. strategic policy towards its old ally is caught up in a bind as a result of the application of the Pressler Amendment, attempts are made to meet Pakistan's strategic concerns otherwise, as for instance in a sympathetic endorsement of its "human rights" concerns in Kashmir. It could be argued that India could look the other way and wait for the more favourably inclined forces to gain ascendancy in the process. But that can be so only if there are no imminent traps to watch out for such as strategic manoeuvres by Islamabad. The indications are that Pakistan intends to introduce a resolution again this September at the U.N. General Assembly on human rights in Kashmir. This is bound to accentuate the sense of vulnerability on India's part, whether justifiably so or not.

Advantage for Rights Lobby

Pakistan's tabling of resolution provides an opportunity for the human rights lobby within the administration in Washington to reactivate itself and press for a renewal of the U.S. "human rights" agenda with India. It was made clear that the current American position on Kashmir had not really changed to a less outspoken one. Instead, it was India which had "taken steps to improve the ground situation, steps that we had been advocating all along," said one official. Should the situation alter for the worse, be there another "blow up" or "another overreaction by the security forces," the U.S. position would harden, it was said.

The U.S. agenda on human rights appears to be an open ended one, suggesting a policy course that could bring fresh pressure on India. Officials have been pointedly speaking of a "plateau" having been reached in terms of India's meeting human rights concerns and have been hinting that this could stand in the way of a supportive approach to handling the difficulty of the proposed Pakistani resolution. Said one administration official: "The situation in Kashmir has been characterised as very grim... The people do not seem to be embracing the Indian Government's efforts... I do not believe that the steps that have been taken absolve India of its ongoing responsibility to protect human rights in Kashmir."

The list of do's and don'ts for India to "improve" its human rights record in Kashmir continues to expand. One

suggestion that was made very recently was that the International Committee for the Red Cross be allowed to operate out of the Kashmir Valley. It was no longer enough that they be allowed to visit there.

In this context, the belief that the "economic aspect" will take care of the rough edges of U.S. policy appears premature. A comprehensive political response remains as necessary as it did before.

[26 Jul p 1]

[Text] Washington, July 25—The Clinton Administration's lively interest in having South Asia placed under a regional regime of nonproliferation appears undented by the evidence of a wide gap between the American and the Indian positions as was reflected in the last round of talks on the subject in London earlier this year. The fact of the administration's strategic dilemmas in relation to Pakistan and the perception that Kashmir remains a potential flashpoint in the region have acted to fuel the intensity of that interest.

That administration officials have not given up hope of bringing India back to the negotiating table is evident from the fact that the non-paper that was prepared before the London talks has now been revised in order to make it more acceptable to India "if and when it gets back on the track." The revisions designed to accommodate more of the Indian perception include an acknowledgement of India's point that the former Soviet republics must be brought into the scope of the proposed multilateral conference. The general thrust of the revisions has been to give a greater priority to the global items on the agenda. However, these revisions do not appear to address the fundamental premise underlying India's reluctance to entertain the concept of a regional regime, the discriminatory nature of the regime proposed. Despite assertions from U.S. officials that the Clinton Administration is hopeful of getting China to take steps such as ending nuclear testing by 1996, it is evident that China's status at the proposed multilateral conference on nonproliferation in South Asia, whether that of guarantor or participant as India believes is necessary, remains ambiguous.

The Clinton Administration still has a sense of urgency in its effort to put in place an agreement for capping the production of fissionable material within the South Asian region. In other words, the proposal that India and Pakistan agree to a cap on their nuclear programmes remains on the table. This sense of urgency on regional "capping" persists despite the fact that global negotiations are about to commence on a worldwide cessation of the production of fissionable material. But it is clear that the anxiety to push South Asia into an agreement on capping, ahead of the rest of the world, stems from the Clinton Administration's own strategic and political compulsions in relation to Pakistan.

The application of the Pressler amendment by the Bush administration in 1990 which now stands in the way of the delivery of the F16 aircraft to Pakistan has also resulted in an angry charge from Islamabad that while Washington

was taking no steps to curb India's programme, Pakistan was being onesidedly penalised for the same. The latest suggestion to Pakistan, made during the visit of the Deputy Secretary of State to Islamabad, Mr. Strobe Talbott, earlier, that Pakistan cap its programme in return for the F16s has been turned down formally in the discussions that Pakistani and American negotiators have had recently after the visit of Pakistan's President, Mr. Farooq Leghari.

The sharp gap between the American and Indian positions in the nonproliferation debate is easily evident. While India is traditionally wary of suggestions that regions can be made "nuclear free" and is uncomfortable with the discriminatory demand that India and other middle-level powers curb their intermediate range missile programmes, even as the United States, China and other global powers keep their intercontinental ballistic missiles in their respective basements, the U.S. administration actually believes that its negotiating position has come a long way from the earlier hardline anchored to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty]. It was pointed out in discussions here that the current proposal on capping "does not suggest to India and Pakistan to go cold turkey" but instead implicitly recognises the nuclear weapons capability of both. "We are not asking India to give up its nuclear option but only to accept constraints," said one official.

Yet what deters the United States from acknowledging openly the nuclear status to India, Pakistan, or for that matter, Israel? The answer brings to the surface the fundamental strategic concern of the United States. "We are not ready," said one official, "to accept a special category of nuclear threshold States. We believe that if we do that, the regime itself will unravel." It is this concern that expresses itself in the disinclination to have India join the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] as a full-fledged missile power, undertaking the obligations of the regime even as it could have the benefit of access to technology.

Ironically, the fear expressed here that India and Pakistan are today on the edge of a nuclear war reflects a strange inversion of the logic that was the centrepiece of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Mr. Geoffrey Kemp, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, pointed out that "to suggest that the same strategic posture which was found beneficial in Europe is now dangerous elsewhere is intellectually dishonest."

Adding to the pressure of the argument emanating from Washington in favour of a regional nonproliferation regime is the fact that the strategic establishment appears to have very little faith in the scope for confidence-building measures [CBMs] to provide security in the present regional environment. Strategic analyst, Mr. Michael Krepon of the Stimson Centre here, observed that there was no "sense of ownership" of the CBMs by the military establishments either in India or Pakistan. "People have to believe in them for these to work."

That Kashmir is considered in the administration's parlance to be a potential "trigger point" for a nuclear war lends an element of imminence to the declared interest in

the human rights and nonproliferation issues and appears to provide a readymade basis for an open-ended human rights agenda. India has no other option but to guard against this continuing trend. The constituency for better relations with India that is certainly developing among the business community and on Capitol Hill cannot in the short term serve as a counter to the sharpness of any potential effort that the administration might make in pursuit of its political agenda.

[28 Jul p 1]

[Text] Washington, July 27—In a development that holds considerable potential for a better understanding between India and the U.S., some Senators and representatives of Congress are beginning to take part in a critical examination of the political and strategic moorings of the Clinton administration's approach to India.

This is one result of the "discovery of India" by the American business community. There is a deepening interest among some Senators and representatives of Congress who are beginning to share the sense of new economic opportunities. Some of these legislators who are now reappraising India are not necessarily those with a significant constituency of Indian Americans in their home states.

It might be too early to call this process a corrective, but the unease with the policy course of the administration in relation to India has manifested in the formation of an India caucus in Congress and also surfaced in a sharply critical interrogation of administration policy in hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on South Asia last January. The critical line of questioning of the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms. Robin Raphel was led by Senators Daniel Moynihan and Hank Brown who expressed concern at the direction of U.S. policy towards South Asia. There was little doubt in the minds of observers of policy here that the intervention of sorts that was spearheaded by Senators Moynihan and Brown constituted a positive input in the decision to take a second look at relations with India. That second look culminated in the visit last May of the Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao.

"I was shocked that we had seemed to have achieved the impossible," Senator Hank Brown said here last week in an interview to this newspaper, "we had managed to win the enmity of both India and Pakistan!" He said that he had been "personally shocked by the Clinton administration's failure to appoint an ambassador there... and the inappropriate remarks of the Assistant Secretary of State (Ms. Robin Raphel) with regard to India."

In a significant and pointed critique of the Clinton administration's human rights and non-proliferation interventions in the South Asian region, Senator Brown who is a Republican representing the State of Colorado said: "In dealing with another country's conduct on human rights, I think it should be handled the same way personal relationships are, that is, you lead by example, not by criticism. If the United States has something to offer in terms of human

rights, that should be done first of all by setting an example inside our own country, more authority comes from setting an example."

On the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, he said that his sense was that "Indians have felt that we've lectured them, that's not our role, our role should be to help where invited... it's very much in the interest of India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir. They have the most to gain by having the conflict resolved. Our efforts ought to be focussed on helping India and Pakistan to work together but not on telling you how to resolve it. It will get resolved."

The Kashmir problem, he observed, was "first and foremost a problem of those living in Kashmir and then the Indians as well as everybody living in the subcontinent." American policy ought to be "of help if asked" but "not beyond that."

Mr. Brown was sharply critical of the administration's approach to nonproliferation issues in South Asia. "We need a new framework to think about the control of nuclear weapons, it has got to be based on a recognition that countries other than the big powers have nuclear weapons, we may not like it but it is a reality. I think for us to expect that China, India or even Pakistan are going to do away with their weapons is not realistic. We have got to develop a programme that includes every one, we have got to go beyond the NPT. The tragedy of North Korea makes clear that the NPT is not working... it seems to me that we have got to develop a framework that provides incentives to participate in real controls of nuclear weapons."

Asked whether the U.S. Congress could make a significant contribution to an alternative view of the South Asia policy course, Mr. Brown said: "I think so, I think you will see a broader vision develop." The Clinton administration, in his view, had "failed to grasp the new relationships that would characterise the 21st century, the new relationships are not going to be based on East-West confrontation but on an expanded world market."

Mr. Brown who has visited India earlier this year noted that Indo-U.S. relations were now in "entirely new circumstances" and that he had come away from India "with the sense that there was an enormous opportunity for a relationship with India, very excited about the remarkable (economic) growth..."

The formation of an India Caucus in Congress is another indication of the increasing interest in India. Although its role at this point is not overtly political, it has now provided an opportunity for mobilisation of opinion, if not necessarily in India's favour, at least countering a hostile presentation of facts. Congressman Jim McDermott who has played an active role in the formation of the India Caucus explained that it could "articulate the other side of the issue." It was also intended to foster more understanding in Congress of the "Indian reality." If that was understood, it would "bring about a change in the thinking here." Mr. McDermott said, "understanding the complexities of a situation makes it more possible to be supportive of their (the Indian Government's) efforts."

According to Mr. McDermott, the India Caucus was already beginning to have an impact on Congressional deliberations. He pointed out that at the last Foreign Act Appropriations Committee hearing, the customary attempts to introduce amendments critical of India on the "Khalistan" issue were not there. Mr. McDermott is an example of a legislator drawn to an interest in India because of the changes in its economic policies. He recalled that he had hosted in Seattle an interaction of American business with companies from Maharashtra who were interested in environmental technology. Interest on the part of American business in investing in India had been kindled and all it would take to generate further business interest in India would be the signing of one significant contract or the making of one deal. Americans had now realised that the future "is in trading worldwide," Mr. McDermott observed.

Improvement in U.S. Views on Kashmir Seen

94AS0449A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 3 Aug 94
p 14

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 2—Reflecting the improved ties between this country and the United States since the visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, to Washington last May, India today made a measured response to the views of the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, on Kashmir expressed in letters written to individuals of Indian origin in America.

Asked by newsmen to react to Mr. Clinton's observations, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Srinivasan, said, "It is a more realistic approach from our point of view, and indicates improvements on messages sent earlier."

Replying to a February letter of a Mr. Sunil Aghi of California, which had strongly criticised the U.S. articulations on Kashmir in that period, the U.S. President wrote on July 25: "We believe a lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute will require direct negotiations between India and Pakistan as envisaged in the Simla accord, taking into account the views of the people of Jammu and Kashmir."

Reference to Simla Pact Again

For about four years now, the U.S. has been speaking of the Simla accord, as against its earlier preference for settling the Kashmir issue in line with U.N. resolutions (plebiscite). However, in recent months the reference to the Simla agreement had been sought to be soft-pedalled with the rider that India and Pakistan had not been able to enter into meaningful bilateral talks on Kashmir in spite of the Simla accord. The reply to Mr. Aghi suggests that a direct reference to Simla has been restored.

Mr. Clinton has also noted that he urged Mr. Rao in the course of their White House talks "to do everything possible to improve the performance of Indian security forces in Kashmir and to find ways to attract Kashmiri leaders back into the political process".

The President had further observed, "We also continue to urge the Government of Pakistan to do all it can to stop material support for the militants from its territory."

Replying on the same day to a letter from another Indian American, Ms. Girja Kaul, president of Kashmiri Women for Communal Harmony (KWCH) based in California, the U.S. leader used identical language in respect of some parts of his letter, but there were also key differences. Unlike for Mr. Aghi, he did not tell Ms. Kaul that the views of the Kashmiri people should be taken into account in resolving the Kashmir dispute.

Replying to Ms. Kaul's letter written in January this year, the President also wanted India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute through "pragmatic, good faith negotiations".

When the Foreign Secretary noted in Mr. Clinton's observations on "improvement" on the past, he no doubt had in mind the President's replies to letters to supporters of Khalistan and Kashmiri secessionists that reflected a very sympathetic tone. These had been written toward the end of last year.

Kaul Visit to Russia Ends, Press Conference Held

94AS0459A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 31 Jul 94
p 1

[Article by Vladimir Radyuhin: "Russian Arms for Pak. Ruled Out"; names as published]

[Text] Moscow, July 30—Russia is ready to sell India MiG-29 and SU-30 fighter plan [as published] and any other advanced weapon systems it may want to buy, and will not supply arms to Pakistan, according to Russia's chief arms exporter.

"India is our long-standing and most trusted defence partner and we are ready to offer it our most advanced military hardware," said Gen. Viktor Samoilov, general director of "Rosvooruzhenie", Russia's arms exporting state company.

At the same time Gen. Samoilov described reports of possible Russian arms sales to Pakistan as "pure speculation" aimed at creating a misunderstanding between Russia and India and bringing pressure to bear on the United States. "We will not sell any arms to Pakistan without consulting India first," he said.

Speaking to reporters at the end of Air Marshal S. K. Kaul's visit to Russia, Gen. Samoilov said the Indian air chief's talks in Moscow concentrated on product support and modernisation of Russian combat planes sold to India or manufactured under Russian licence locally.

Air Marshal Kaul left Moscow today after a six-day visit during which he had met the Russian Co-Chairman of the Indo-Russian Joint Commission, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Yuri Yarov, the chief of the Russian Army General Staff, Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, designers of Russian combat planes in the MiG and SU series and visited aircraft building factories and air pilot training centres.

Gen. Samoilov said the main outcome of the visit, which he described as "successful and productive", was an agreement that Russia will help HAL [Hindustan Aeronautics, Limited] resume production of MiG-27 fighter planes at Nasik which was halted last year for lack of some accessories. Russia agreed to make up for the shortage and supply the necessary plant to organise a full production cycle at HAL. Gen. Samoilov said the problem with MiG-27 had arisen because HAL had failed to make full use of the production licence purchased from Russia.

But the Indian side tends to blame Russia for the problem. An Indian embassy communique on the visit took note of the IAF [Indian Air Force] concern over continuing low serviceability of some of the newer Russian-originated aircraft.

Both sides noted however an overall improvement in the supply of spares to the IAF. The Indian embassy said the talks proceeded in a warm and friendly atmosphere and it was agreed that "the service-to-service interaction between the two air forces should be intensified and take place at all levels."

"The mutual desire was expressed of maintaining the momentum of cooperation and place it in a long-term perspective on the basis of reliability, stability and predictability," the embassy communique said.

For its part, the "Rosvooruzhenie", in its press release said the Indian side was willing to consider purchasing "advanced types of aircraft and airborne weapons" from Russia.

Gen. Samoilov confirmed that Air Marshal Kaul had discussed the possibility of buying MiG-29 and SU-30 fighter planes. He said the Indian air chief had personally flown a SU-30 at an airbase near Moscow and was pleased with its performance.

However, the main task today is not the purchase of new hardware but modernisation of the Indian fleet of Russian-built planes, said Gen. Samoilov. Russia will prepare its proposals for upgrading Indian aircraft and their armaments in September and then India will decide how much money it is prepared to spend on the programme.

Russia will also help India improve pilot training, although neither country has a good training plane. Gen. Samoilov expressed the hope that Russian and Indian experts would be able to pick up a suitable trainer at the 1995 air fair in France.

The "Rosvooruzhenie" chief said military aviation was a priority area of bilateral defence cooperation.

Indo-Russian Joint Commission Meets in Moscow

94AS04484 Madras THE HINDU in English 28 Jul 94 p 19

[Article by Vladimir Radyuhin: "India, Russia Review Economic Ties"; names as published]

[Text] Moscow, July 24—The Indo-Russian Joint Commission went to work in Moscow last week with a meeting of the working group on trade and economic cooperation.

The session, presided by the working group co-chairmen—the Finance Secretary, Mr. Tajinder Khanna, and the Russian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister, Mr. Mikhail Fradkov, was timed to coincide with the Indian trade exhibition being held in Moscow from July 18 to 28.

The Joint Commission was set up over two years ago, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but it is only after the visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, earlier this month that most working groups were set up and the commission got to work.

Apart from trade and economic cooperation, the six working groups cover such areas as power and non-conventional energy sources, mining and metallurgy, oil, coal, as well as science and technology.

At its first session last week the working group on trade and economic cooperation got down to giving concrete shape to agreements reached during Mr. Rao's visit to Russia. Diplomatic sources said no disagreement cropped up at the meeting.

The working group reviewed the mechanism for India's debt utilisation by Russia, which will include rupee auctions, import contract tenders, and reinvestment of rupees in India. According to diplomatic sources, the Indian side was satisfied that the mechanism met the essential conditions of being transparent and predictable.

The two sides discussed plans to build an aircraft service centre in India, which will provide maintenance and spare parts for Russian-built military planes, and agreed to draw up proposals for setting up more joint ventures in India to be partly financed from the debt rupee funds.

The same source of financing was proposed for the planned modernisation of the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk which is to handle the bulk of commodities traffic between the two countries. Private companies on both sides are expected to be involved in the reconstruction of the port.

The Russian side promised to submit a three-year rolling plan for the import from India of sensitive plantation crops, such as tea, tobacco and soya beans next month.

According to Russia's new co-chairman of the Joint Commission, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Yuri Yarov, the other five working groups are to meet before September 1, to be followed by a full session of the commission in Moscow in mid-September.

Mr. Rao's visit to Moscow has given a boost to Indo-Russian relations which is being translated in hectic bilateral exchanges.

Following the opening of India's major trade fair in Moscow by the Minister of State for Commerce, Mr. Kamaluddin Ahmed, last week, Arafat, Moscow 5 E.

Kaul arrived in Moscow on Sunday for a week-long visit. The Naval chief, Admiral Shekhawat, was also expected to come in autumn.

For their part, Russia's First Deputy Defence Ministry [as published], Mr. Andrei Kokoshin, and the Chairman of Russia's State Committee for Defence Industry, Mr. Viktor Glukhikh, will pay separate visits to India in the next few months.

There are also plans for visits by the Home Minister, Mr. S. B. Chavan, to Moscow and the Russian Space Agency chief to India. The year will be rounded off with a Delhi visit by Russia's Prime Minister, Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Paper Reports Visit of German Foreign Minister

29 Jul Press Conference

94AS0455A Madras THE HINDU in English 30 Jul 94
p 1

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 29—The visiting German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Dr. Klaus Kinkel, today categorically stated that his country would like India to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in any scheme for expanding the Council in a restructured U.N.

Addressing a press conference before returning home today after a three-day visit, Dr. Kinkel referred to his talks with Indian leaders and said, "We agreed to cooperate in shaping reforms of the Security Council."

Replying to questions, Dr. Kinkel said the composition of the crucial five-member Council, as constituted since the end of the Second World War, did not reflect the present-day international reality.

Making out Germany's case for permanent membership of the body, he said his country contributed nine percent to the U.N. budget, and also nearly one third (28.16 percent) of the budget of the European Union (EU). Dr. Kinkel added that after its unification, Germany had become the biggest country in Europe, and in that capacity had international obligations to match.

Germany was the first major power to come out openly in support of India's membership of the most pivotal body in the U.N. system. It was to be seen if the German view turned out to be the same as that of all Europe. If it did, India's case would get a big boost when the matter was finally decided, possibly in the 50th session of the U.N. General Assembly next year.

Greater Transparency Hailed

Answering a question on Indo-Pak relations in the context of Kashmir, the visiting dignitary said his country welcomed "the greater transparency introduced by India", but

noted that the issue could only be resolved through bilateral dialogue between the two countries on the basis of Security Council resolutions and the Shimla Agreement.

Dr. Kinkel was asked specifically if Germany opposed the internationalising of the Kashmir dispute, and if it agreed with the Indian perception that it was Pakistan which was blocking solution through bilateral talks.

He said the Kashmir question had come up in his discussions with Indian leaders. He appealed to the "parties to the conflict" to re-open dialogue. The same advice was tendered by Germany to the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, when she visited Bonn some time ago, the Minister added.

In an opening statement, he said "intensification" of economic relations between his country and India was the "centre of his visit and talks here." He said German foreign policy had "quite deliberately decided" to focus considerable attention on the Asia-Pacific region in which India's role was a "major" one, and openly suggested in reply to a direct question that a much larger volume of German investment than hitherto could be expected in India in the future.

This, he said, was clear from the fact that 24 top German businessmen had accompanied him on his visit, and in the recent past both the German Economics Minister as well as the Minister for Economic Cooperation had visited India. The assessment of India's economic potential and capabilities by the business delegation that had come with him was a favourable one, he observed.

Germany desired "real economic partnership" with India, as it had "respect and esteem" for the "progress" of this country's programme of economic liberalisation "which has attracted the attention of the world", Dr. Kinkel noted.

He said Germany was aware that India would be the "mega market" of the future, but this consideration alone did not shape its philosophical approach towards this country. In this context he said, Germany took into account the capability of India's entrepreneurs and "highly qualified" workers, and especially the "mathematical intelligence" available in the country which was important for developing software.

Bright Outlook

94AS0455B Madras THE HINDU in English 2 Aug 94
p 12

[Editorial: "Relations With Germany"; names as published]

[Text] Though the focus of the talks between Dr. Klaus Kinkel, visiting German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, and the Indian leaders was very much on the strengthening of economic relationship between India and Germany and the stepping up of German investments in this country, other important matters also received enough attention during the discussions. The assurance of German support to India's candidacy for permanent membership

of the United Nations Security Council given by Dr. Kinkel is of some significance not merely because it comes from a powerful member-nation of the European Union. It could reflect growing German awareness of the gains to the United Nations from having India on the Security Council because of the fresh look which this country could give to international emergencies erupting very often without notice. There has been far too much Great Power orientation to the perceptions of such emergencies and the handling of the same is very often dictated by considerations of the geopolitical interests.

Dr. Kinkel's advocacy of a running dialogue between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is very much on the lines of the stand taken by many other countries. German interest in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute within the framework of the Shimla Agreement could well have been influenced by its firm belief that territorial claims and disputes are best settled through negotiations though it has also been balanced by a reference to the U.N. resolutions. The stirrings for preserving peace in Europe after the traumatic Great War of 1914-18 were indeed very pronounced and they did find expression in the promising 1925 Treaties of Locarno providing guarantees for the territorial inviolability of the principal European countries. But they could not save Germany from the heavy price it had to pay thanks to Hitler, for having started the Second World War. It is not surprising, therefore, that it wants India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir dispute peacefully. The reunification of the divided Germany after an euphoria without a shot having to be fired is being seen as the triumph for the forces of peace and goodwill.

The outlook for the strengthening of economic cooperation between India and Germany should indeed be considered as very bright under the present policy of liberalisation and globalisation. There is already a German presence in India, dating back to the Rourkela Steel Plant and the German contribution by Dr. Kurt Tank and his team to the design of HF-24, India's first supersonic aircraft in the Fifties. This wrote the brighter chapters of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Since then, there have been fresh German inputs into the crucial defence sector for the making of submarines. The visit by a large number of top executives from the corporate sector who had come to India for participating in the economic dialogue is an indication of the importance which German industry has given to the expansion of investments in and trade with India. The increase in German investments from Rs. 418 crores in 1991 to Rs. 603.70 crores during the first four months of 1994 shows that the interest which German industry has taken in India has led to some results though it is much less than the size of German investments in the other countries. The 15 per cent increase in the volume of trade between the two countries in the first two months of 1994-95 also shows that some headway has been made in expanding the volume of trade between the two countries. The signing of the Indo-German Agreement on Financial Cooperation implying a commitment of Rs. 920 crores in 1994-95 encourages hopes that German interest in investing in India will be sustained in the years ahead.

Dhaka Talks With Pakistan Foreign Minister Reported

94AS0451A Madras THE HINDU in English 4 Aug 94
p 14

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 3—The latest high-level interaction between India and Pakistan indicates continuing deadlock as far as meaningful bilateral discussions are concerned, and little real hope of seriously intended talks, though theoretically Pakistan "does not rule out dialogue", as a senior official source put it today.

However bleak the landscape may be, India extended an invitation to the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Assef Ali, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Najmuddin Shah, to visit this country.

The invitations were given out a few days ago when Mr. Ali met India's Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. R. L. Bhatia, at the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Foreign Ministers meeting in Dacca. They had two rounds of discussions.

The Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Srinivasan, who accompanied Mr. Bhatia to Dacca, also had a round of talks with his Pakistani counterpart. These discussions were held in a "civilised" atmosphere.

Pakistan insisted that the agenda in any future talks must include the two Pakistani non-papers (proposals) sent earlier this year. These relate to holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, and release of militants as well as reducing the Indian security contingent in the valley. Through these non-papers Islamabad had sought to convey that further talks would be pointless unless these two conditions were met—in effect, making them pre-conditions.

India's reply was that it was not asking Islamabad to remove its two non-papers from the table. It also agreed with Pakistan that the two sides should create conditions to resume dialogue (effectively broken by Pakistan since the last round of Foreign Secretary level talks of January held in Islamabad), but underlined that this did not mean setting conditions. The non-papers are seen as virtual conditions here.

While not asking Islamabad to withdraw its non-papers, India also reiterated its views on the two proposals, saying these were well known. The Indian delegation also drew attention to this country's six non-papers, despatched after the Pakistan non-papers were received. These dealt with confidence-building measures. The Pakistani delegation was told in Dacca the proposals outlined in these dealt with a "range of issues of direct benefit to both our peoples."

The Indian side conveyed to Pakistan that internationalising the Kashmir dispute, and by implication all bilateral matters, "won't serve any purpose at all."

The reiteration of this sentiment is a clear sign that India does not expect Pakistan to get back to the bilateral track

in the near future. On the contrary, there is a strong feeling here that Islamabad is preparing to raise Kashmir at the U.N. General Assembly session commencing in September.

Taking note of recent Pakistani press reports that Islamabad was planning to close down the Indian consulate in Karachi, the Indian delegation told its Pakistani interlocutors that such reports, which tended to appear in Pakistan from time to time, "were lacking in taste and diplomatic propriety."

The Indian side also told Pakistan that it was well known that Islamabad was facing acute political trouble in Karachi, and urged it not to make India a "scapegoat" for the problems it encountered in Sind.

The issue of Code of Conduct was taken up "very strongly" by India in the aftermath of expulsion of each other's diplomats on spying charges, and the recent torture of an Indian diplomat in Islamabad. Both sides are believed to have expressed the view that the bilateral code, signed two years ago, was a "good document" which the two Governments would continue discussing in the hope that the outcome would be positive.

Findings of Panel on Security Scam Rejected

Action Taken Report

94AS0463A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 27 Jul 94 p 1

[Text] Press Trust of India, New Delhi, July 26—The government today rejected most of the crucial findings of the Joint Parliamentary Commission [JPC] on the finance minister and his ministry in the securities scam. It further said that the criticism against Mr B. Shankaranand was not borne out by records but said that those found guilty in the scandal would be punished.

In its 80-page Action Taken Report on the JPC recommendations, the government termed as "unwarranted" and "unjustified" the JPC conclusions that the ministry of finance had failed to anticipate the problem and apply the needed correctives.

The finance ministry and the Reserve Bank of India [RBI] the report claimed, had unearthed the scam and had taken all possible steps to correct the deficiencies in the system.

While conceding that the scam was due to the "failure to check irregularities", the report observed that "this failure was not due to inaction by the present government".

Admitting that there had been inadequacies in the supervising machinery of the RBI, the government regretted that the premier institution had not conducted a close scrutiny of the portfolio management scheme and investment transactions by all the players.

On the allegations that the Oil Industry Development Board [OIDB], then headed by Mr Shankaranand, had

given preferential treatment to some institutions in parking its funds, the report said these were not substantiated.

The RBI, it said, is in the process of finalising further action against foreign banks indulging in serious irregularities in the scam.

In all, the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation] has registered 48 cases. Action has also been instituted against 97 officers in public sector banks and their subsidiaries and against 61 officials engaged by foreign banks and private institutions.

The government in its report said it did not share the JPC's assessment that the scam was due to "liberalisation without adequate safeguards".

It pointed out that the JPC itself had established that the irregularities in the securities trading had occurred as early as 1986 and had increased over the years. All this was well before the current liberalisation of policies, it observed.

Referring to JPC's observations on the questionable investment deals of the Oil Industry Development Board, then headed by Mr B. Shankaranand, the government said the investment procedure had since been revised.

The allegation that the OIDB gave preferential treatment to some institutions was not borne out by the records and the CBI was inquiring into the OIDB transactions with the Syndicate Bank.

On the controversial Rs 2 crore deal involving the Goldstar Steel and Alloys Limited, the government said the investigations were still on. Reports in this regard were being scrutinised.

Commenting on the alleged nexus between prominent industrial houses, banks and brokers, the government said the income tax department has brought out prima facie evidence of such a nexus.

The report said a special cell has been constituted with representatives from the CBI, RBI, department of company affairs and the income tax to further investigate the issue which involved huge losses through ready forward deals and benami transactions.

The report said available evidence indicated that the money, illegally siphoned out of the banks and financial institutions, was recycled in the stock and security markets in order to multiply it. However, there was no evidence of large scale transfer of scam money abroad through the hawala circuit, it said.

The government has instituted an inter-disciplinary group, as recommended by the JPC, to trace out the end-use of the scam money.

The report also contains extracts from the Lok Sabha proceedings of Mr Shankaranand's explanations on the OIDB transactions as also personal explanation of Mr Rameshwar Thakur. The two ministers had contested the adverse remarks made against them by the JPC.

Conceding that the State Bank of India's reputation had suffered as a result of its involvement in the securities scam, the government report said the bank has initiated action against 14 officials.

Opposition Boycott Plans

94AS0463B Madras *THE HINDU* in English 3 Aug 94
p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 2—Stepping up their campaign for withdrawal of the controversial Action Taken Report on the securities' scandal, the Opposition parties, barring the AIADMK [All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam] and the Muslim League, today resigned from all parliamentary committees and also decided to boycott the rest of the current session of Parliament.

The decision was announced by party leaders in the two Houses even as the Government expressed its willingness to revise the report in the light of the objections raised by the Opposition. So implacable was the Opposition mood that nothing short of a total "surrender" by the Government was acceptable to it; and the greater the panic displayed by the ruling party the harder the Opposition slammed the door on a compromise.

On a day which clearly belonged to the "hawks" in the Opposition, there was no hope for peacemakers; and the man who was perhaps the most embarrassed was the CPI [Communist Party of India] leader, Mr. Indrajit Gupta, whose initiative to break the impasse was scuttled by his own Opposition colleagues, forcing him to withdraw a proposal he had made on Monday and which the Government was willing to accept unconditionally.

The proposal was that the Government should come forward "at an appropriate stage" with an "amended and augmented" report and in the meanwhile the existing document could be treated as an "interim" measure. The Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mr. V. C. Shukla, said in the Lok Sabha today, while responding to a nearly three-hour discussion, that the Government was "willing to bring a supplementary report covering the deficiencies" pointed out by members.

However, the Opposition was not satisfied and even as the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] leader, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, was preparing to lead his party out of the House after announcing a boycott, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, rose to protest against Mr. Shukla's version of the proposal. Speaking as though the proposal was acceptable to his party, he said that Mr. Gupta had tried to find a way out but the Government was playing difficult. Arguing that the version given by Mr. Shukla did not correctly reflect the spirit of Mr. Gupta's proposal, he said the Government was not interested in a settlement.

Barely had Mr. Vajpayee finished than Mr. Shukla intervened to say that the Government was willing to accept "every word" of Mr. Gupta's proposal as read out by the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leader. The Opposition, not

expecting the Government to respond with such alacrity, found itself into some confusion, with senior leaders trying desperately to hide their discomfiture. The BJP leader, Mr. L. K. Advani, without referring directly to the proposal, rejected it insisting that the report should be withdrawn; and so did the Janata Dal leader, Mr. Sharad Yadav, claiming that he was not aware of the proposal.

Mr. Gupta, obviously uncomfortable over the fuss being made over his proposal, rose to clarify that it was his "personal" proposal and was subject to approval by other parties. Since it did not seem to find favour with others, he was withdrawing it, he said. The Speaker, Mr. Shivraj Patil, while confirming that Mr. Gupta had made the proposal in his individual capacity, said it was expected that it would be accepted by others.

Shukla "Surprised"

Mr. Shukla, speaking after the Opposition parties had walked out as a prelude to their boycott, said he was surprised by their action and was at a loss to understand their strategy. The Government had made every possible concession, and was willing to "do much more", he added appealing to them to reconsider their decision to resign from parliamentary committees and boycott Parliament.

After a four-day forced "recess", it was the first full working day for Parliament and while in the Rajya Sabha the Opposition took barely a few minutes to announce its plans and leave the House, the Lower House spent several hours debating why the report should be withdrawn. The Opposition, pursuing the familiar track, criticised the Government for its "casual" approach to the JPC's [Joint Parliamentary Commission's] unanimous report on the securities' scam; for using "objectionable" language while commenting on the report; for making a "mockery" of the committee system; and for not doing enough to fight corruption.

The Opposition, cutting across party lines, repeatedly charged the Government with shielding the "guilty", especially the Ministers named in the JPC report. The point made again and again by the Opposition leaders was that by "rejecting" the JPC's unanimous report the Government was trying to "sabotage" the committee system and therefore they had no use for it.

Mr. Chatterjee said that his party had decided to dissociate itself from the committees because it felt that not doing so would amount to condoning the Government's "contempt" for them. Mr. Chandrajit Yadav (JD-G) [expansion not given] said the Government's approach had shaken the people's faith in the parliamentary system, pointing out that his party members did not want to waste their time sitting on committees whose reports were treated with such scant regard by the Government.

Mr. Gupta accused the Government of "sabotaging and scuttling" the committee system and said that it was most reluctantly that his party had decided to dissociate itself from parliamentary committees.

A relentless attack on the Government marked the discussion, which saw several heated exchanges between the Opposition and the ruling party. Even the AIADMK and the Muslim League which thought that no purpose would be served by resigning from the parliamentary committees or by boycotting Parliament did not spare the Government for its handling of the JPC recommendations.

Cabinet Panel To Settle Foreign Newspaper Question

94AS0471A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 22 Jul 94
p 13

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "Foreign Papers Issue for Cabinet Panel"; names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 21—A major policy issue, whether foreign newspapers and magazines should be allowed to be published from India, has been entrusted to a committee of the Union Cabinet, raising hopes of an early decision. It has been asked to give its report in a month.

The committee comprises five Ministers—Dr. Manmohan Singh, Finance, Mr. Arjun Singh, Human Resource Development, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Commerce and Mr. K. P. Singh Deo, Information and Broadcasting. Mr. N. K. P. Salve, former Information and Broadcasting, has been added to it later.

Apart from reviewing the September 1955 decision of the Government prohibiting publication of foreign newspapers in the country, the committee is required to report on the desirability of Doordarshan's collaboration with the CNN. If the urgency shown by the short deadline for the committee is reflected at subsequent stages, the decision on the issue pending with the Cabinet for nearly two years should be expected soon.

The delay was caused because of the sharp divergence of views in the country—among media organisations, individual journalists and newspapers—with words of caution alternating with the pleas against any delay. In June 1992 the Press Council advised the Government to defer the review of the 1955 decision. A detailed memorandum on the subject had been with the Cabinet for a long time, but, apart from brief desultory discussions on three or four occasions, there was no attempt to come to grips with the problem.

The arguments from the two sides are, by now, well known. Those favouring the entry of foreign publications cite the liberalisation of economic policies and the consequent exposure of indigenous industries to international competition. Why should there be walls of protection for the newspaper industry, they ask.

According to the opponents of the proposal, newspapers and magazines could not be bracketed with other industries. Foreigners' entry into this field could expose the domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making to outside pressures, according to this argument. Attention is particularly drawn to the danger of foreign influences during periods of crisis.

The proposal envisages joint ventures of Indian and foreign media publication companies, with equity participation. Several foreign newspapers have already shown interest in collaboration with Indian counterparts. Among the specific proposals submitted to the Government are those involving a tie-up between FINANCIAL TIMES and Ananda Bazar Patrika group, and between TIME magazine and INDIA TODAY.

The Information and Broadcasting Ministry, at one stage, made a case against the publication of foreign newspapers in India. Later, it reversed its stand completely. While discussing the various aspects of the problem, the Cabinet Committee may consider whether foreign publications could be allowed, with effective foolproof safeguards against external influences in domestic politics.

Burkina Faso President Meets With Rao

94AS0470A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 24 Jul 94
p 6

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "Burkina Faso Shares India's View on Kashmir"; names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 23—India has given up its earlier inhibitions in approaching the Muslim countries for support on the Kashmir issue. It no longer writes off most of these nations, individually, or the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.) collectively, as a gone case because of their religious affinity with Pakistan.

This was evident during today's discussions between Mr. Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso, now here, and the Prime Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, along with their delegations. The visiting President fully shared India's stand both on Kashmir and terrorism—that the Kashmir issue was to be sorted out bilaterally by India and Pakistan and that there was no case for internationalising it.

Burkina Faso, a Central African country, which was Chairman of the O.I.C. around 1990, would, it was clear, oppose any move by Pakistan to use the Organisation's forum for its bilateral problems with India. Likewise, India could be sure of Burkina Faso's support, should Pakistan take the Kashmir issue to the U.N.

The visiting President's attitude was doubly important, for it could promote a trend in the O.I.C. against involving itself in India-Pakistan problems. In the past, Islamabad had had a free run in this field, with the result that it was able to influence its members by one-sided accounts.

Geneva was a watershed in regard to India's approach to the O.I.C. New Delhi found, to its pleasant surprise, a good measure of support for it among the Muslim nations when Pakistan sought to use the U.N. Commission for Human Rights for an anti-India move. Iran, as was known, was instrumental in persuading Pakistan not to proceed with its resolution. It was primarily the opposition by a sizeable number of Muslim nations that weighed with Pakistan in giving up the move.

The President, Dr. S. D. Sharma, hosted a lunch in honour of the visiting dignitary.

Rao Addresses Congress(I) Parliamentary Party

94AS0466A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 27 Jul 94 p 13

[Text] United News of India, New Delhi, July 26—The Lok Sabha elections, due in June, 1996, are likely to be advanced by about four months.

This was indicated by the Prime Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, while addressing the general body of the Congress party in parliament this morning.

Congress sources said that the Prime Minister told the members that he would recommend the advancement of the polls as the months of May and June were not convenient for holding elections.

The Congress would begin a massive enrolment drive from August 9 to raise an army of workers in every village, Mr Rao said and added that the enrolment drive would be taken to every revenue village by the end of December.

As parliament was in session, the MPs [members of Parliament] should involve themselves in the drive from September 1 and there should be no bogus membership, he said.

Mr Rao strongly defended the actions being taken by the election commission to check electoral malpractices, like booth capturing and providing vehicles to voters and declared that the government was ready for electoral reforms. Mr Rao wanted that money and muscle power in elections should end and candidates from poorer and middle classes be provided an opportunity to contest.

The Prime Minister said electoral malpractices should be stopped even if it meant deployment of additional forces. "I am entirely in agreement with the proposals of the election commission to stop malpractices," he said, adding this would benefit the Congress candidates.

Mr Rao said the Congress was not afraid of electoral reforms and would bring forward bills in this regard whenever there was a consensus among all parties. While the ruling party was not lagging on electoral reforms, it was the opposition which was changing its stand on the issue.

Mr Rao told the members that he had advised the parliamentary affairs minister Mr V. C. Shukla to push through the electoral reforms bill by including in it the points on which there was a consensus.

The Prime Minister was happy that the Congress had completed three years in power and was now in a position to face the future with "enormous self-confidence". The programmes and the performance of the party and the government would help the Congress to face the coming elections.

"Congressmen, however, cannot afford to be complacent as unfortunately the overall performance and achievements of the party would not figure in the minds of the

people in the elections." He said, some emotional issues might be raked up by the opposition on the eve of the elections and they would be uppermost in the minds of the people.

"This danger can be averted by Congressmen by keeping close contact with the people and educating them properly," he added.

The Congressmen, Mr Rao said, could not build up a wave. "If any wave comes, it would be against them and not in its favour." The Congress had to stand by its overall performance, service to the people and the benefits that accrued to the people. "They (Congressmen) have to find areas of deficiency and rectify them."

Mr Rao said the opposition always had some advantage as it could divert the attention of the people from real issues. "To overcome this, there is no substitute to being constantly in touch with the people and telling them facts in their own languages."

The Congress president said the era of freedom fighters was coming to an end and a new generation with full vigour and new ideas and values was coming up. Because of this, the situation was going to be entirely different and methods to implant the old values in the new generation have to be found.

In this context, he stressed the need for involving the youth in nation-building and to motivate the younger generation in favour of the Congress.

He said young MPs should visit villages in their respective states, study the village structure and broaden their mental horizon. "There is much to be learnt by observations at the field level and study the problems of farmers, artisans and other sections."

Rao Plans To Visit Central Asian Republics

94AS0473A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 12 Aug 94 p 13

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 11—The economic and politico-strategic significance for India of the Central Asian republics of the former USSR is underlined by the consideration that the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, is planning a quick second visit to the region, though dates have not yet been fixed. He was there only last year.

Since then India has upgraded its diplomatic presence in the region comprising the five newly created States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the massive tract beyond the romantic Pamirs with which only historical and cultural ties were emphasised till these lands were part of a wider Soviet Union.

The whole region is rich in natural resources, including strategic minerals, and is keen to do business with India, for which the scope is seen as very wide on both sides. The largest of the five republics, Kazakhstan, which is not

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much smaller than India in size, is even making efforts to establish a land route to this country.

Another of the five Muslim CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states, Turkmenistan, is oil-rich is seen by many as a Kuwait in the making. The region as a whole has lately become a happy hunting ground for Japanese, Korean and western multinationals.

Barring Tajikistan, which for reasons of contiguity and ethnic affinity has got drawn into the Afghanistan imbroglio and is being sought to be subverted by fundamentalism, the Central Asia region is politically stable. Perhaps more importantly for India, these Muslim societies are also secular, and, as such, can potentially play a key moderating role in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in the future. Kazakhstan has already gained observer status in the OIC.

The strategic and political significance of these factors is self-evident in the context of Kashmir, given the nature of the immediate neighbourhood defined by Pakistan and Iran. Another consideration of significance is the nuclear weapons status of Kazakhstan, which has come down from its Soviet past.

For India it is a happy chance that the Central Asian states are generally very well disposed toward it, given the historical and cultural ties, and the political proximity in the recent past. Also, India provides opportunities for expanding economic and science and technology ties that other neighbours of the Muslim republics do not.

Impetus has lately been provided to the reinforcing of relations between India and the Central Asian republics with the visit to the region by Mr. Salman Haidar—one of the Secretaries in the Ministry of External Affairs. Mr. Haidar visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the three of the five republics that have come together in a regional sub-grouping to establish a joint political and economic space, and had very productive bilateral discussions.

The Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan is expected to make a stop-over here within a fortnight. This would help to maintain contacts at a high political level.

Congress(I) Panel To Study Election Strategy

94AS0472A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
21 Jul 94 p 1

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 20—The Congress(I) Working Committee [CWC(I)], traditionally the highest decision-making body in the party, was pushed to the sidelines today when the party president, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, constituted a 12-member task force of senior leaders independent of the CWC(I).

This task force has been asked to chalk out the party's strategy at the national and regional levels.

None of its members belongs to the CWC(I). And most of them are known to be close associates of Mr Rao.

They are: Mr Shyama Charan Shukla, Mr Madhavsingh Solanki, Mr S. B. Chavan, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, Mr B. Shankaranand, Mr G. K. Moopanar, Mr Jagannath Mishra, Mrs Mohsina Kidwai, Mr S. S. Randhawa, Mr Hokishe Sema, Mr Ajit Singh and Mr D. P. Yadav.

Significantly, the power given to this task force is almost synonymous with that of the CWC(I), if not more.

According to an announcement made this evening by the Mr Jitendra Prasad, political advisor to the party president, the task force will:

- Chalk out short-term and long-term strategy for the party both at the national level and the Pradesh levels for various States;

- Plan and formulate the strategy regarding the functioning of the party during elections and otherwise.

Today's announcement is being viewed in party circles as yet another move by Mr Rao to reinforce his image as the "supreme leader" of the party and legitimize his team of loyalists.

The CWC(I), which was formed through elections during the Tirupati session of AICC(I) [All India Congress Committee-I], has some members who have—time and again—criticized the policies of Mr Rao.

For example, Mr Arjun Singh and Mr Sharad Pawar, in recent meetings of the CWC(I), made their dissatisfaction clear regarding postponement of organizational elections.

Incidentally, the sporadic nature of CWC(I) meetings has diminished the importance of the body within the party.

Also, during the last few meetings, the CWC(I) has been getting bogged down in routine organizational matters rather than in formulating policy.

The party spokesman, Mr V. N. Gadgil, claimed that the task force was not going to curtail the functioning of the CWC(I). "On the other hand, it will complement it", he said.

Cabinet meeting: Meanwhile, in another move, which has sparked off speculation in Congress(I) circles, the Prime Minister has convened a dinner meeting of the Union Council of Ministers tomorrow at his residence.

Sources said that the Cabinet Secretary, Mr Zafar Saifulla, today called up all members of the council and asked them to be present in New Delhi to attend the meeting.

Incidentally, the last time such a meeting was called by Mr Rao was after the demolition of the Babari Masjid.

Then the P.M. had invited all the Ministers to a dinner and asked them to resign en masse. This was followed by a reshuffle.

Akali Dal (Badal) Opens Membership to Non-Sikhs*94AS0469A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
25 Jul 94 p 1*

[Names as published]

[Text] Chandigarh, July 24—In a significant decision, expected to alter the contours of State politics, the Akali Dal (Badal) has thrown open the membership of its party to non-Sikhs.

The decision, taken today at a meeting in Ludhiana of the party's executive council and district leaders, will enable the party to broad-base its membership during the ongoing enlistment drive.

Today's announcement did not come as a surprise. The first signals of such a move were visible more than a month ago when the Akali Dal (Longowal) had merged with the Akali Dal (Badal).

Incidentally, the Akali Dal (Longowal) had thrown open the membership of the party to non-Sikhs several months ago.

The decision to include non-Sikhs comes at a time when the party perceives it has a chance to wean away Hindu—especially Dalit—votes from the Congress(I).

With the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] defunct and the BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party] registering a muted presence in the State, the Akali Dal (Badal) can cash in on the growing disenchantment with the ruling party.

Also, the inability of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) to make any significant headway to organizing itself has left the coast clear for the Akali Dal (Badal).

The party's image as a representative force of the Sikh community is in any case under attack from the Shiromani Akali Dal, which has been questioning Mr Badal's bona-fides to represent the community on the grounds that he defied the Akal Takht.

Anyway, Mr Badal stands to lose little even if the more fundamental sections are alienated by the party's decision to include non-Sikhs.

Interestingly, the Shiromani Akali Dal has also made an effort to cash in on the card of Punjabi unity. A senior party leader and also the SGPC [Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (Sikh Temple Management Committee)] chief, Mr G. S. Tohra, issued a statement yesterday saying that his own party was for the unity of Punjabis.

UNI [United News of India] adds from Amritsar: The Akali Dal (Badal) would oppose Mr Tohra in the annual presidential elections of the SGPC to be held in November, the party president, Mr Prakash Singh Badal, said here today.

The party is putting up its own candidate against Mr Tohra as well as for the posts of other office-bearers such as the

senior vice-president, junior vice-president and general secretary, Mr Badal told reporters here.

The party has started preparing for this and contact is being established with SGPC members individually, he added.

Mr Tohra has already served as the SGPC president for 20 terms since 1973.

Mr Badal was doubtful about holding of fresh elections of the SGPC within a year as was directed by Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Opposition Deemed Serious About Early Elections*94AS0460A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Aug 94 pp 1, 15*

[Article by M. D. Nalapat: "Opposition Serious About Early Polls"; names as published]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, New Delhi, July 31—As the events in Parliament after last Tuesday's tabling of the action taken report show, it is the opposition rather than the Congress party that has taken seriously the Prime Minister's hint to be ready for elections earlier than scheduled.

A dominant strand of the attack on the Rao government will be its "softness" to foreign interests. While the ostensible target of the current opposition onslaught is the action taken—or lack of it—to bring to book the perpetrators of the securities scam, the hidden one is the liberalisation policy pursued by the finance ministry and the Prime Minister's Office [PMO].

In a government whose head is uncommonly media-shy, preferring to deal with the Fourth Estate in monosyllables, it is not surprising that no serving official wishes to go on record about the goings-on in South and North blocks. However, off the record top officials indicate that it is going to be "difficult for the government to disown the action taken report".

According to these officials, this is because the report "was prepared by the finance ministry in close consultation with senior officials of the PMO, who provided crucial inputs in deciding the line to be adopted".

There had been much media comment on the going scot-free of the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Mr Venkitaramanan, with stories linking this to his alleged links to a large industrial house. While such ties "may have helped, the fact remains that all Venkitaramanan did was to faithfully implement the finance ministry's desire to go soft on foreign banks".

The same source within the ministry claims that this approach "had been cleared by the PMO", which wanted foreign banks to act as "engines for foreign investment" in India. It was therefore "no accident that the top echelons of the Reserve Bank and the finance ministry have got off with a light tag on the wrists, while for an offence involving one-thousandth of the securities scam amount, a former

chief minister and a former chief secretary of Karnataka have been charge-sheeted by the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation]"

The opposition's expected attack on the "globalist" policies of the Narasimha Rao government may lend force to those members of the Union cabinet who are uneasy not just at the "pro-multinational" liberalisation policies, but at the "total absence of political input" in framing policies on taxation.

According to this group, the absence of any significant concessions to the middle class and the small business sector in Mr Manmohan Singh's budgets "may cost the Congress party its majority in the next Lok Sabha poll". Ever since the Prime Minister's speech at Davos in February, this group—which includes Mr A. K. Antony, Mr S. B. Chavan and Mr Arjun Singh—has been optimistic that the "worst excesses" of the globalists (read Mr Manmohan Singh, Mr N. K. P. Salve and Mr Pranab Mukherjee) will be curbed, and that the next budget will, in the words of a senior cabinet minister, "reflect the fact that we are not a banana republic but a democracy".

It is again no secret that top officials of the planning commission and most of the economic ministries are uneasy at the unilateral trade concessions being made by India to the developed world, "almost all of which themselves follow protectionist policies". In particular, many top officials (including some dealing with energy) are privately dismayed at the concessions given by the government to foreign power companies notably Enron.

They point to the contradiction between the U.S. administration's official stance that government should not get involved in private business with its demand that the government assure Enron an "extremely favourable" rate of return on an "overpriced" project. They say that it is "no accident that six of the seven projects for which state guarantees are planned are American".

Despite the nationalist campaign begun by the opposition parties, observers feel that there will be no letup in liberalisation, and that the Prime Minister will continue to give the finance minister and other liberalisers his "full backing". Circles close to the two key officials connected with globalisation—principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr A. N. Verma, and finance secretary, Mr Montek Singh Ahluwalia—reiterate that both are merely "implementing the policy of the Prime Minister, who favours increased liberalisation and foreign investment".

They are dismayed at the "vilification campaign" against the globalisers, pointing to the increase in foreign investment, revival of business confidence and sharp increase in exchange reserves "as but three of the many benefits" (of the current policies).

DMK General Council Meets in Madurai

94AS0457A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 2 Aug 94 p 4

[Names as published]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, Madras, August 1—The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam's (DMK) three-day conclave in Madurai, which ended yesterday, expressed confidence that the reservation issue would keep the party afloat and hoped to strike a more strident note on the subject.

This was evident from the party's ultimatum to the centre to include the Tamil Nadu Act to continue 69 per cent reservation in the ninth schedule of the constitution before August 15 or else face an agitation.

However, it is doubtful whether it would be successful in its agitations especially when at least for the current academic year 69 per cent reservation has been maintained in educational institutions. The party's demand for removing the "creamy layer" concept in reservation would also be a disincentive for the oppressed sections to take part in the proposed agitations. By pitching for the removal of the "creamy layer" the DMK has exposed itself to the charge that it was not fully interested in their welfare.

Significantly, one of the resolutions at the general council on the first day of the conclave while demanding the abolition of "creamy layer" said "a few" of the current beneficiaries would be affected if the concept was to continue. And it is these few, studies over the years have proved, who have been primarily enjoying the fruits of reservation. In such a context it is difficult to fathom why the party should, like many others, be championing the cause of a few at the expense of those who were really oppressed. This lends itself to the accusation that the party was espousing the cause of the vested interests among the backward classes.

But then the DMK cannot afford to be seen supporting the "creamy layer" concept after having opposed economic criterion for being eligible to get the benefits of reservation announced by the late M. G. Ramachandran in 1980.

The DMK, probably as a contingency plan, is also preparing the ground for demanding a steep hike in the quantum of reservation. The reasoning is that the BCs [expansion not given], the MBCs [expansion not given] and the SC/ST [expansion not given] population exceeded 80 per cent of the population and the present quantum of reservation was only 69 per cent. The demand for hiking the present quantum of reservation would probably be the next phase of the agitation after securing constitutional guarantee for the Tamil Nadu Act aimed at protecting 69 reservation. That demand would be directly aimed at the state government. The idea is clearly to keep the cauldron of reservation boiling.

In the context of reservation Brahmin baiting was indulged by the DMK and some of its allies. The attack was obviously directed at the chief minister, Ms J. Jayalalitha, who happens to be a Brahmin. What was surprising was that these parties were apparently trying to put the blame on the doorstep of the Brahmins for the plight of the oppressed sections when Brahmin domination was no

longer an issue. It is, therefore, probably a crude attempt to divert attention from basic issues.

Reservation issue apart, the conference seemed to unabashedly pay obeisance to the DMK chief, Mr M. Karunanidhi. He was everywhere—in multi-coloured posters, cut-outs, wall writings and on the lips of die-hard loyalists. The attempt was to show that he was the boss of the party and that the exit of the likes of Mr V. Gopalasamy or Mr K. Kalimuthu did not matter a wee bit.

After having accused Ms Jayalalitha of perpetuating a cut-out culture, the DMK seemed to have been bitten by the same bug. The cut-outs of Mr Karunanidhi and a few other Dravidian leaders that dotted the temple city were ample proof of that.

Minister Meets Calcutta Press on Dhaka Conference

94AS0456A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
2 Aug 94 p 4

[Text] India and Pakistan have "agreed to create an atmosphere conducive to holding discussions" to sort out irritants in bilateral relations. Mr R. L. Bhatia, Union Minister of State for External Affairs, said at Calcutta airport on Monday.

Mr Bhatia, who came to Calcutta from Dhaka, on his way to New Delhi, after having attended the two-day ministerial conference of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] countries, said he had held a 30-minute talk with the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, in Dhaka. Both of them agreed that proper atmosphere would have to be created for talks to resolve bilateral issues, including the problem of Jammu and Kashmir.

The problem of the treatment to the diplomats of the two countries and to fishermen, who strayed out of the territorial waters in the Kutch area, also needed to be sorted out.

Asked to comment on Pakistan's support to extremists, who were fomenting trouble in Jammu and Kashmir, Mr Bhatia said the problem was there. Diplomats and officials of both the countries were meeting, from time to time, and holding talks. He hoped there would be "no further deterioration in the situation".

He said the SAARC conference in Dhaka had gone off very well and some important decisions had been taken unanimously.

Decisions on economic co-operation between the seven member-countries and on the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) were among them.

Asked to comment on the possibility of success of the SAARC programmes, in view of the strained India-Pakistan relations, which had been pointed out by the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr Ali, who had been quoted by some Pakistani newspapers as having said, prior to his departure for Dhaka, that the SAARC could not be a success because of India's "negative" attitude towards the

member-countries, Mr Bhatia said the unanimous decisions at the Dhaka conference was indicative of the success of the SAARC movement.

To a question on the U.S. attitude towards India's nuclear policy, Mr Bhatia said the policy had been clearly explained by Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao during his visit to the USA. India had wanted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be global, comprehensive, verifiable and non-discriminatory. He reiterated that India's nuclear programmes were for peaceful purposes.

To a question on relations with China, Mr Bhatia said those were improving.

On the border issue, he said there were joint groups of officials and expert teams which, from time to time, were meeting and examining the issues of withdrawal of troops and other aspects of the matter. There would be more meetings and these matters would be sorted out.

Mr Bhatia said he had discussed with the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Mr Mustafizur Rahman, bilateral issues, including the problems of infiltration, Chakma refugees, sharing of Ganga waters and tariff on Bangladeshi goods.

The talks were encouraging, he added.

Mr Bhatia, who called on Mr Jyoti Basu at Writers' Buildings during the day, said, in reply to a question, that the controversy, involving Taslima Nasreen, was Dhaka's internal matter.

He declined to say whether India would offer her asylum.

Tripura Tribal Force Meets, Decisions Told

94AS0453A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
3 Aug 94 p 6

[Names as published]

[Text] Agartala, Aug. 2—The All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF), a former insurgent group which laid down arms last year, would soon emerge as a new political party in the State, reports PTI.

Stating this, Mr Rabindra Debbarma, general secretary of the outfit, told reporters that a decision was taken at the two-day executive meeting of the ATTF held here on July 29 and 30. The meeting discussed in detail problems of the former insurgents of the ATTF, he added.

Expressing concern over non-implementation of the bilateral accord, signed by the ATTF with the Government, Mr Debbarma said a conference of all the surrendered ATTF members would be convened soon where the decision to form a political party would be finalized.

Though all the executive members were unanimous on the Government's sincerity about implementing the accord, they felt that the fate of 200 surrendered insurgents was currently hanging in the balance, Mr Debbarma added.

The former insurgent leader also expressed the hope that the new party would be ready in time for election to the

Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council, expected to be held in September.

When asked what prompted them to form a new party, Mr Debbarma said, "it is very much needed". However, he did not announce any programme. The general secretary, however, reiterated that the ATTF wanted full implementation of the accord.

Another insurgent outfit, Tripura National Volunteers, had also turned into a political party after laying down arms in 1988.

Gorkha Leader Agrees to Panchayat Polls

94AS0452A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 4 Aug 94 p 7

[Names as published]

[Text] Times of India News Service, Calcutta, August 3—Unless fresh obstacles arise, the panchayat polls in the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) area will be held in November this year. The general council of DGHC which met in Darjeeling today seems to have bowed to the inevitability of fulfilling the constitutional requirement of allowing the installation of a two tier panchayat structure.

The DGHC supremo, Mr Subash Ghising has consented to the panchayat elections, after weeks of procrastination and sabre rattling. The capitulation came after a series of consultations between him and the West Bengal government. Mr Ghising's initial resistance to the idea had given rise to fears that he was heading for a confrontation.

Till this week-end, it was not clear whether Mr Ghising was indulging in his usual game of dangerous brinkmanship or whether he was hellbent on creating mischief. His statements caused nervousness as he toyed with the idea of reviving—Gorkhaland—call for a separate state. In a recent speech he had mentioned that the sacrifice of martyr's of the Gorkhaland movement should not go to waste, which was interpreted here as a sign to prepare for some sort of action.

Mr Ghising had also raised the demand that instead of the two tier panchayat structure prescribed by the constitution, the DGHC should supervise and monitor the functioning of a three-tier panchayat structure, with a zilla parishad at its head.

Papers Publish Election Commission Pronouncements

State Commission Powers

94AS0474A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 9 Aug 94
p 4

[Text] Madras, Aug. 8—The State Election Commissions can recognise "under the very same name" the national and State political parties recognised by the Election Commission of India. And, the recognised parties should be allowed to use only those very symbols reserved for them by the Election Commission of India.

According to an official clarification, the facsimile of the symbols approved by the Election Commission of India should not be changed by the State Election Commissions under any circumstances.

The Election Commission of India has issued the clarification in order to "prevent certain administrative confusion" consequent on the setting up of State Election Commissions.

An official press release said that the two constitutional authorities were distinctly different. The Election Commission of India was empowered to conduct elections to the office of the President, Vice-President, Rajya Sabha, Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly.

The State Election Commissions, set up pursuant to the Constitution (73rd and 74th) Amendment Act, 1993, will conduct elections to municipalities and panchayats.

"The Chief Electoral Officers of the States coming under the control of the Election Commission of India are in no way connected with the conduct of elections to the local bodies."

The electoral rolls prepared under the superintendence, direction and control of the Election Commission of India are available for use by any person. "They are available to the Election Commissions of the States and Union Territories also. But under no circumstances will the Election Commission of India be responsible for any errors, omissions, etc., found in the copies of these electoral rolls used by the Election Commissions of the States and Union Territories. Nor will the Election Commission of India or any statutory officer working under its control be responsible for safe custody, periodical correction, updating, etc., of the copies of electoral rolls used by the Election Commissions of States and Union Territories."

The State Election Commissions will make their own arrangements for indelible ink, symbol blocks, etc., the press release said.

Need for ID Cards

94AS0474B Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
10 Aug 94 p 6

[Names as published]

[Text] Patna, Aug 9—The Chief Election Commissioner, Mr T.N. Seshan, today made it clear that the States, where Assembly elections were due next year, will have to issue identity cards to voters even if the elections were preponed to this year, reports PTI.

Addressing a crowded press conference at the Raj Bhavan here, Mr Seshan said that he would not allow elections unless and until identity cards were issued to voters even if it created a constitutional impasse.

"After the expiry of the term of the State Assembly there would be a constitutional impasse but I should not be held responsible for that," he said.

Mr Seshan said that he had already appraised the President of the matter and had quoted the provisions of Rule 28 of the Representation of the People's Act.

Asked if the use of identity cards could halt the rampant use of unfair means in elections, Mr Seshan said that it would not be so but this was in fact, just a step in that direction.

Asked how the commission was identifying foreign nationals before issuing the identity cards, Mr Seshan said that the authorities entrusted with the task took the opinions of several people in the neighbourhood before arriving at any conclusion.

Replying to a question whether the process of issuing identity cards would clash with the summary revision of electoral rolls, now underway in some States, Mr Seshan said it was not so.

He also said that a national voters' awareness campaign would begin on August 15 to make the people aware of the polling process and their importance in making of a Government.

Earlier, Mr. Seshan arrived here this morning on a three-day visit to Bihar.

Voter Awareness Drive

94AS0474C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 11 Aug 94 p 7

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Agartala, August 10—The election commission (EC) has decided to launch a countrywide national voter awareness campaign from August 15 on the right to vote and its free and faithful exercise.

Stating this, a senior official of the election commission said yesterday that a set of guidelines, formulated by the commission, had been sent to all states and union territories for implementation. Funds required for the campaign would be debited to the election commission.

The chief electoral officer of each state and union territory would be responsible for faithful and cost-effective implementation of the scheme, the official said adding a state-level implementation committee (SLIC) comprising not more than nine members under the chairmanship of the chief electoral officer (CEO), was being set up with the approval of each state and union territory.

The SLIC would consist of four to five officers at the state-level who would have a background in mass communications, public relations, rural and urban development. Four to five officers of non-official rank, actively associated with existing awareness programmes of the government will also be on the committee, the official stated.

Electronic and print media would largely be used in the campaign, which would continue for an indefinite period, and non-government organisations with a proven record of being non-political and non-biased would be given the

responsibility of conducting the campaign in all the polling areas, specially in far-flung tribal areas, he said.

The guidelines would also improve general awareness about the provisions of the constitution, the Representation of The People Acts 1950 and 1951, and all other relevant laws and rules. The campaign would make the agents and workers of the parties aware about the legal and statutory requirements of electoral law and the fundamentals of electoral rectitude.

The official said the priority of the campaign would be on the unorganised sector of rural, landless, agricultural labourers, pavement dwellers, construction labourers, rickshaw pullers, nomadic tribes, rural and urban housewives, industrial workers, college and university students above the age of eighteen and school students between the age group of 16 to 18.

The election commission has asked the CECs not to consult or take the approval or direction of the state government and the political executives of the state and union territories or make reference to any political party, including the party in power in the state or at the Centre, the official added.

Meanwhile the chief election commissioner, Mr T.N. Seshan, yesterday said the single latest factor responsible for corruption in all spheres of life was corruption related to the electoral process.

Delivering a lecture on 'purity in elections' organised by the Lok Swaraj Andolan, Mr Seshan said "the Indian polity is caught in the *chakravyuh* of a faulty and corrupt election system and no amount of electoral reforms can save it until the electorate fight for their democratic right to disagree with the present system."

Underscoring the need for drastic electoral reforms, Mr Seshan said, "I wonder if anything is right with the system as it exists.

Mr Seshan said several chief election commissioners before him had suggested enactment of more effective electoral laws, but successive governments had failed to bring about any legislation that could rid the Indian polity of electoral malpractices.

In his inimitable sardonic style Mr Seshan said "leave alone teeth, the CEC does not have even the gums to check electoral malpractices."

Asserting that he would do everything possible under the existing laws to ensure free and fair elections during his tenure as CEC, he said, "some forces want to get rid of me by impeaching me, but sorry, I do not fear them."

Later mediapersons had Mr Seshan entertaining them with his wit and banter when he addressed them at the Raj Bhavan yesterday.

Asked what he proposed to do after retirement, Mr Seshan said "I have a small house in Madras. After my retirement I will dig up a pit in the garden one day and fill it up the next day."

On whether he intended to join politics, Mr Seshan quipped "are you my enemy? Would you have come in such large number had I been only a Member of the Parliament?"

Asked what transpired during his recent meeting with the Prime Minister in Delhi, Mr Seshan said it was not binding on "either the husband or the wife to divulge contents of their discussions."

Warning to States

94AS0474D Madras *THE HINDU* in English
13 Aug 94 p 1

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 12—The Election Commission today warned the political parties, particularly the ruling parties in the States where Assembly elections are due either later this year or early next year, against vitiating the atmosphere for holding peaceful, free and fair elections.

It has directed the States to keep in abeyance announcement of all such concessions that could sully the purity of the election process and launch special drive for preventive action against criminal elements and ensure its non-partisan implementation in each and every constituency.

In an order issued here today the Commission is believed to have pointed out that under section 15 of the PR Act of 1951 (43 to 51) notification calling elections to constitute a new assembly of a State could be issued any time during six months before the expiration of the term of the existing Assembly.

As such elections in Sikkim, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa and Arunachal Pradesh are imminent and would be notified at the appropriate time on fulfilment of all constitutional and statutory requirements.

But the Commission has already started receiving complaints that 'inconvenient' district and police officials occupying key positions in the conduct of elections are being replaced on political considerations. It has also come to the notice of the Commission that concessions are being announced by some States in matters of taxation, licencing and employment with the covert intention of mustering electoral support.

The commission seems to have taken objection to criminal cases against known bad characters and musclemen being deliberately underplayed at the stage of investigation with a view to using their services during electioneering.

The order said that the Commission would scrutinise in detail the antecedents of each and every statutory and election-related officer and seek replacement, of officers suspected of having political leanings and found to be working under partisan pressure and temptation.

Ministry Predicts Increase in Grain Production

94AS0458A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 1 Aug 94
p 13

[Text] New Delhi, July 31—The rate of growth of the production of foodgrains during 1993-94 is expected to be

1.3 percent over 1992-93 as against a growth of 6.9 percent during 1992-93 over 1991-92.

The overall food production during 1993-94 is estimated to reach 182.04 million tonnes.

The targets for various foodgrain crops are: 78.5 million tonnes of rice, 58.5 million tonnes of wheat and 36.5 million tonnes of coarse grain. According to the Union Agriculture Ministry sources, it is too early to indicate if the targets would be achieved as it would depend upon the weather conditions in the coming months. The final estimates of foodgrain production are yet to be received from some of the major States.

The Government plans to construct additional covered storage capacities of 6.62 lakh tonnes for storage of foodgrains during the Eighth Plan. It also proposes to go in for extensive hiring of covered storage capacities all over the country to accommodate stocks received due to higher production, as well as lower off-take.

Sources said additional temporary open storages had been arranged under Cover and Plinth (CAP) to store the procured foodgrains.

At present, the hired covered storage capacity available with the Food Ministry is 95.01 lakh tonnes and the current capacity under CAP is 37.96 lakh tonnes.

Next Remote Sensing Satellite Launch in 1995

94AS0468Z Madras *THE HINDU* in English 24 Jul 94
p 4

[Names as published]

[Text] Hyderabad, July 23—The IRS-1C [Indian Remote Sensing Satellite], the next of the series of India's remote sensing satellites, the fabrication of which is in an "advanced stage" of completion, has been slated for launch "in the middle" of next year. The launch will be done by a Russian life-off vehicle, Molnia, from the Baikanur cosmodrome.

The IRS-1C is an improved version of the IRS series being fitted with a 10-metre high resolution camera which can "see sideways" and take imageries of even small places measuring 100 square metres; another of 20-metre resolution which can "snap" a 400-square metre base while keeping a "spectral balance"; and a "wide field sensor" which can "view" 700 sq. km of expanse down on earth as the satellite moves at an altitude of about 800 km. The maximum width covered earlier by such a camera was 150 sq. km.

According to the Chairman, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Dr. K. Kasturirangan, the IRS-1A and the IRS-1B, which have been relentlessly moving around the globe for the past six and three years respectively, are using relatively lesser resolution cameras and, therefore, they are able to cover big items such as forests, groundwater, mineral resources, oceanography, snow-melting, agriculture etc. The capacity of even Landsat satellite sent by the US revolves around 30 metres. On the contrary, the

IRS-1C is being equipped with the two high-resolution cameras with a view to bringing in even town planning and vegetation (horticulture) under the satellite coverage.

At a press conference here on Saturday, Mr. Kasturirangan spoke of cryogenic engines which was a "non-issue now", stating that Russia was very much willing to honour its commitment to India by supplying the "upper stages" for seven pieces of rockets but without transferring its technology. Pressed for details on the programme for geo-stationary satellites and on defence applications, he, however, did not elaborate.

Forecasting Farm Yield

On the gains of the remote sensing technology so far, the ISRO Chairman said they had developed such a satellite data-based system that the country was in a position today to predict agricultural yield one month in advance, covering about 80 per cent of land. Survey of forests which proved to be too difficult a task under conventional methods, became an easy job now. The success rate of the borewells sunk in 1,60,000 [as published] villages based on satellite data was 85 to 90 per cent compared to 40 per cent under conventional methods. Geologists were required to go up to a depth of 100 metres at times to identify mineral resources and even this was rendered "simple" now.

About the drought district of Anantapur in Andhra Pradesh which, according to the State Government, is fast becoming a desert like Jaisalmer in Rajasthan, Mr. Kasturirangan gave the specific case of Wajjevagu, a 8,000 sq. km watershed area in the district with an annual rainfall of 300 mm only compared to the district's 500 mm, where the Government pushed up the water table by undertaking check-dams and percolation tanks as a follow-up of remote sensing analysis.

Following this, the water table went up by 6 to 20 ft in some locations and the tanks in the watershed got filled up six times. Farmers who migrated from the place, had come back and raised two crops, getting good yield. Water harvesting, therefore, could serve the district as a panacea, he said, adding that five districts were identified for a similar action in the country—Ahmednagar (Gujarat), Jabua (Madhya Pradesh), Kalahati (Orissa), Dharmapuri (Tamil Nadu) and Bhiwani (Haryana).

The Chairman said that as many as 157 districts, including 14 in Andhra Pradesh (all in Rayalaseema and Telanagana and East Godavari), were identified for a package development and an "action plan" was readily approved for 17 blocks. Under the "Vasundhara", a programme launched by the Department of Space Technology, geo-technological maps were being prepared with the help of linemates.

Air Force Dependence on Russian Equipment Reviewed

94AS0465A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 27 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by Pushpinder Singh: "Fighters in the Sky"; names as published]

[Text] An Indian Air Force [IAF] team led by an Air Vice-Marshal was at Irkutsk in the Soviet Union recently to test-fly and evaluate the top of the line Sukhoi Su-30 long-range interceptor aircraft, a fact announced to the world by Itar-Tass which further stated that talks for signing a contract for 20 Su-30s, to be followed by licence-production in India, were entering a "decisive phase". Earlier, Mr Rostislav Belyakov, head of the MiG-MAPO (Moscow aircraft production organisation), had announced the sale of an additional ten MiG-29s to the IAF even as his team had been entrusted with the responsibility for upgrading the IAF's fleet of MiG-21bis fighters.

End of June saw the Indian Prime Minister on a visit to Russia, the highlight of which was an agreement on the formation of the Indo-Russian Aviation Private Limited, a joint venture to ensure spares supply and services support for all aircraft of Russian origin in India and, significantly, "in the third world". Various industrial and business delegations from India have been touring Russia and the Chief of Air Staff is now in Moscow on an official invitation from his Russian counterpart which can be seen as reaffirming the three-decade-old special relationship between the two air arms. The fact that he was air attache with the Indian embassy in Moscow during the early eighties, a period which witnessed a major re-equipment of the IAF with Russian aircraft and weapon systems, is indicative enough of a return to the prime source of India's defence equipment.

Quick Review

A quick review of the extent to which India's defence forces, primarily the air force, have been dependent on Russia since the early sixties is pertinent. From the handful of tactical transport aircraft and utility helicopters procured from the USSR in 1961 (paid for from the Border Roads budget), the IAF went on, in 1962-63, to receive the first combat aircraft of non-Western origin. The service wrestled with unfamiliar systems and limitations of the early model MiG-21 to eventually harness this bisonic fighter's potential in full even as later variants were selected for licence production in India.

The Soviets were initially sceptical after the brief shooting match of September 1965 which had proved nothing as the IAF had only a handful of MiG-21PFs in a half-formed unit which played virtually no part in that air war. But in December 1971, with the IAF fielding half a dozen air defence squadrons flying the MiG-21FL version, with just a handful having a strap-on cannon with improvised gun sight to boost air combat capability, the world witnessed what a first-class air force flying first-class fighters could achieve. The MiG-21s outflow and outclassed the F-104 Starfighters in each encounter, notching a 4:0 kill ratio in their favour.

The Russians and Mikoyan OKB Design Bureau were delighted but it was the IAF that had exploited the MiG-21's potential to the maximum and even exceeded it in areas that the designers themselves were wary to tread. The

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follow-on-MiG-21MF and MiG-21bis variants incorporated most of the advances in technology available and a fruitful relationship between the IAF and MiG OKB emerged. It would be no exaggeration to state that but for the IAF, the MiG-21 would never have been developed the way it was and but for the MiG-21, the IAF would never have expanded the way it did. By the mid-80s the IAF's combat strength had reached an all-time high, but over 50 percent of the force comprised MiG-21s of various marks.

Obvious Solution

The government of India and the IAF have long been concerned with identifying a replacement for the MiG-21 in IAF service. An indigenously developed Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was the obvious solution and logical in terms of self-sufficiency and affordability. The specially-established Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), entrusted with this onerous responsibility, has struggled to develop the LCA, but even after over ten years and inputs from a number of foreign aerospace companies, has yet to satisfy the confidence of the nation that the IAF will eventually get the replacement fighter it wants.

The first critical crossroads have been reached but no solution yet found. Thus eight squadrons of MiG-21FL/M fighters have to be phased out within the next year or so and there is still no identified replacement. The most optimistic estimates have the LCA entering Squadron service in 2004-5 or ten years from now. The government's move to finally get on and upgrade the MiG-21bis has not come about a day too soon and this will hopefully result in some 100-150 of these reliable fighters continuing in front-line service for another decade or so, giving the IAF some breathing space.

The United States remains "off-limits" as far as the IAF's needs are concerned (even the clearance of transport aircraft and attack helicopters is uncertain); the British have nothing to offer at present (the Hawk advanced jet trainer would, of course, have a secondary combat role) and the French would dearly love to see many more Mirage 2000s in the IAF's inventory if India could get them on reasonable terms. Inevitably then, the Russians remain the only practical source at present for supplying new fighters to the Indian Air Force. Three IAF squadrons already operate the MiG-29 and, if Mr Belyakov's statement is correct, additional aircraft to make up for attrition are on their way. India must, however, derive some benefit following the epoch-marking success in the MiG-29's sale to Malaysia.

Pact Signed

In early June 1994, after protracted evaluation and negotiation, the Malaysian government signed an agreement with the Russian state corporation, Rosvoorouzhnie, for the purchase of 18 MiG-29s, the first such sale in south-east Asia. Both the Malaysians and Russians freely acknowledge that the IAF has played a major part in the successful conclusion of this contract, with the RMAF [Royal Malaysian Air Force] having earlier signed an

MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] for technical support, manpower training and further development of the MiG-29. The Indian Air Force has not just been the Russian aviation industry's biggest customer but certainly its best advertisement for the efficacy of its wares.

The Indian government and the IAF must be sensitive to the internal "marketing wars" between the MiG and Sukhoi Bureaux, promoting their products not only to the Russian air force but also worldwide. The legendary General, designer academician, Mr Belyakov, is well known to the IAF and the government as a serious and benign technocrat whose products have long served this country and whose latest variant, the MiG-29M, is as much of an advance over the earlier models as the MiG-21MF was over the MiG-21F 30 years ago. Standardisation of equipment is a major factor in an air force's effectiveness and one must not forget that the IAF has been burdened by a rash of non-standard, competitive acquisitions in the past. The Sukhoi Su-7 of the late sixties is an apt example of limitations, both in role and longevity of service. The new generation Sukhoi Su-30 is undoubtedly a superlative performer, its long-endurance, long range, wide-seeking radar and missile combination making it a most formidable combat aircraft.

Mr Simonov, the director-general of the Sukhoi OKB, reportedly wields enviable influence in the Kremlin and is certainly aware of marketing ploys, exemplified by the recent Itar-Tass announcement noted earlier. But the IAF has to decide for itself whether it is the MiG-29M, or the Su-30BK or indeed the advanced version, the Su-35, which best meets its requirements, not just for the interim but in the long term, well into the first decades of the 21st century.

Low Temperature Superconductor-Based Generator Developed

94AS0464Z Madras THE HINDU in English 27 Jul 94 p 25

[Article by P. Sekar: "Low T_c Superconductor-Based Power Generator"]

[Text] Technology for an electric power generator using superconducting wires has been developed by researchers at the Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), Hyderabad. They have made a compact 200-kVA generator using niobium titanium (Nb Ti) alloy wires and tested it by connecting it to their mains supply for 30 hours. For India, this achievement is an important milestone as it can be used in applications such as in defence where cost is not a constraint.

Many metals and alloys become superconductors, that is, they lose their electrical resistivity almost completely, below a certain temperature called the critical temperature, T_c. Depending on the nature of the material, the T_c can vary with materials. For example, the Nb Ti alloy becomes a superconductor below liquid helium temperature (4 Kelvin or -269°C). Because of the low temperature

involved these alloys are classified as low T_c superconductors. Certain oxides of yttrium—barium—copper behave as superconductors at temperatures below 120 K. These have been classified as high T_c materials.

Since the technology for drawing long thin wires of superconducting alloys is not available in India, BHEL imported Nb Ti wires of 30 microns diameter (one micron is one-thousandth of a millimetre). Because of their zero resistivity at the critical temperatures, even these thin wires can carry a very high electric current, up to say 600 amperes, without getting heated up or burnt. Conventional metal wires of such small diameters will not be able to carry even a fraction of an ampere.

"Conventional design of stators and rotors is not valid for superconductor based generators as the current, magnetic field and rotating speed are very high. So we made a suitable design taking hints from published literature," says Dr. T. Suryanarayana, additional general manager of BHEL and leader of a team of researchers working in this project.

They have embedded about 500 Nb Ti wires in a copper matrix and wound them into pancake shaped coils. Six such coils are arranged in the form of a spiral, one partially overlapping the other. Because of this modularity, servicing becomes easy, say the scientists.

Whereas the rotor is maintained at 4.2 K using a stream of liquid helium, the stator is maintained at room temperature (about 300 K). This large temperature difference can cause unwanted heat transfer between them, which can vaporise more of liquid helium and put undue load on the cooling system. So they maintain high vacuum in between the stator and the rotor to reduce this loss. "Special care has been taken to avoid leakages occurring due to the difference in shrinkage of materials," they say.

Because of the high current carrying capacity, the rotor size has been reduced considerably and consequently the efficiency has improved by one per cent. The scientists have connected the 200 kVA generator in parallel with the grid supply to their own campus and tested it for about 30 hours.

"The superconductor generator's output is more stable when compared to that from conventional ones. The improvement in efficiency of one per cent looks very small, but it can repay the cost of the generator in 25 years," he says, and adds, "As of now, the generator is not economical and so it can be used only in applications where cost is not a consideration. Only when we develop high T_c superconductors which can be drawn into long thin wires, can we think of lowering the costs. With the technology available now, it is estimated the cost of a 500 MVA plant will break even."

The development of this technology is a classic example of inter institutional collaboration between BHEL, IIT [Indian Institute of Technology]-Madras, IIT-Kharagpur, National Physical Laboratory (New Delhi) and ISSC [expansion not given] (Bangalore). For instance, BHEL

along with IIT-Madras and IIT-Kharagpur [as published], has studied the radiation heat loss across the generator and redesigned it to keep the losses to a minimum. Similarly, the IISc [Indian Institute of Science] has helped in the development of a vacuum jacket transfer line for liquid helium which helps to keep the rotor at 4 K.

The project which was launched three years ago, was funded by the Department of Science and Technology, New Delhi, under the National Superconductivity Programme, to the tune of Rs. [Rupees] 5 crores.

Navy's First Acoustic Research Ship Completed

94AS0461A Bombay THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA in English 31 Jul 94 p 9

[Names as published]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, New Delhi, July 30—The Indian navy will get its first Marine Acoustic Research vessel today, which will help in gathering relevant data to develop a submarine detection system, among other systems, for strategic applications.

The vessel, christened INS [Indian Navy Ship] Sagardhwani, will be manned by the Indian navy. Scientists from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will carry out various studies. The vessel is to be commissioned by the Vice-President, Mr K. R. Narayanan.

Built at the Garden Reach Research Shipbuilders, and Engineers, the 2,000 ton Marine Acoustic Research Ship, INS Sagardhwani, is equipped with eight sophisticated laboratories covering disciplines of marine acoustics, marine geology, meteorology, physical and chemical oceanography and geological research.

Announcing this here yesterday, an Indian navy spokesman said that the ship would also be capable of carrying out Magnetic mapping of Indian waters for strategic applications. Data acquisition, processing and distribution is totally microprocessor-based and controlled with up-to-date communication facilities for data transfer between different laboratories on board and on shore.

The 85-metre long ship has a 6,000-nautical mile endurance and will comprise a crew of eight naval officers and 70 sailors and will carry 16 scientists of the DRDO including women.

Amnesty Reports on Deaths, Torture in Custody

94AS0467A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 25 Jul 94 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, July 24—Amnesty International has listed 36 deaths in police custody due to torture and medical neglect in 1993 in India with Delhi topping with an alarming figure of ten, reports PTI.

In its latest report on deaths in custody in India, the London-based organization said although officials repeatedly condemned custodial violence, reports suggest that torture remains a pervasive and daily reality in every State.

Seeking mandatory judicial inquiry into custodial deaths, the report said: "In India, there is a lack of prompt redress in cases where the right to life and the right not to be tortured are violated."

In most cases of custodial deaths resulting from torture or medical neglect by the police or other officials listed in the report, there has been no decisive action to investigate the allegations, promptly and properly to bring the perpetrators to justice, it said.

Of the 36 cases listed in the report, which does not include the deaths reported from Jammu and Kashmir, magisterial inquiries were reported to have been ordered in more than 12 cases.

"Moreover, such inquiries are usually carried out by an executive magistrate and not by independent judicial officials," it said, adding that an inquiry by the Criminal Investigation Department was ordered in one further case, a Central Bureau of Investigation inquiry in another and one criminal investigation agency inquiry in another.

On the setting up of the National Human Rights Commission, the Amnesty International said its powers are limited because of the lack of their own investigative machinery.

They have to rely on investigative staff provided by the Central or State Government who operate under the supervision of the Director General of Police, it said, adding that the commission's powers to investigate alleged human rights violations by the Army and paramilitary forces are also limited.

The report further said that the commission's mandate is limited to asking for a report from the Centre on the allegations and there is no obligation on the part of the Government to proceed with or publish any recommendations which the commission may make.

The effectiveness of the commission would depend on a number of factors including resources and the determination with which the newly-appointed members and the commission's staff would be performing their task, it said.

Welcoming the initial interest which the commission has shown in custodial violence, Amnesty International said the NHRC [National Human Rights Commission] has requested reports on recent deaths in custody from the authorities in Delhi, Meghalaya and Pondicherry.

Besides issuing directives to the District Magistrates and the Superintendent of Police in various States to report all cases of custodial deaths and rape involving the police to the NHRC within 24 hours of their occurrence or of the case having to come to their knowledge, the commission has also chosen to visit States where serious human rights violations have been alleged, it said.

Underscoring the necessity of speedy legal reforms to strengthen the protection of detainees in custody, the Amnesty International report said: "Very few policemen are ever convicted for torturing detainees in custody, and legal proceedings take many years to complete."

Giving an example of the lengthy legal process, the report said that in January this year, a court in New Delhi sentenced five policemen to five years' hard labour for torturing a suspect who later died in custody. These convictions, it said, came 15 years after his death.

Kashmir Issues Interim Report on Human Rights

94AS0454A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 3 Aug 94 p 7

[Names as published]

[Text] United News of India, Jammu, Aug 2—The Jammu and Kashmir government today made public the interim investigation report into the various allegations of human rights in the state and termed these as "incorrect, distorted and with an objective to tarnish the image of the security forces".

An official spokesman said here that investigations had been carried out in a series of cases by the government where it had been alleged that the security forces had indulged in human rights abuses in the months of June and July.

The spokesman said that keeping in tune with the policy of transparency, the government had been submitting and refuting allegations levelled by the militants, their sympathisers and locals on a monthly basis so as to dispel the impression that no action was being taken on the various complaints.

He said the government had an open mind on the issue and had the highest regard for human rights. "Our record in human rights is unimpeachable and we have given out exemplary punishment in cases where people have been found guilty of misconduct", he added.

He said the state government had also constituted a "human rights cell" in the home department to deal with the various complaints by the local population regarding the excesses by the security forces.

He said Pakistan-sponsored militants and other dubious political outfits had been carrying out a vicious campaign against the Indian security forces at the behest of their mentors.

Giving details of the investigations, the spokesman said four militants were killed in an encounter at Kralpura, Kupwara on June 30 and one AK 47 rifle, three magazines, 88 rounds and two AP mines were recovered from the spot.

A section of the local press had alleged that these four people were innocent civilians, which was later found untrue.

In the case of the alleged custodial death of one Ghulam Hussain Lone at Varpora Putocha, the spokesman said the investigation revealed that he was killed in an exchange of fire between the security forces and militants on June 29.

The spokesman said the alleged custodial death of Mansoor Ahmed Bhat was also found to be incorrect as he was

killed in an encounter during search operations at Batmaloo while another militant was apprehended. Two hand grenades and one detonator were recovered from him.

He said one Abdul Latif of a village in Doda was picked up by the security forces on July 1 for questioning. Some incriminating documents, threatening letters to migrants and some country-made bombs were recovered from him. He took the security forces to a forest area for effecting more recoveries, but there he tried to escape and was fired at.

Regarding the alleged custodial deaths of Nissar Ahmed, Nasir Ahmed and Shokat Ahmed in Sopore, the spokesman said the militants had fired on the BSF [Border Security Force] during search operations at Nigli Sopur on July 3 and the fire was returned.

In the encounter, the three militants, including one self-styled platoon commander, were killed and two security personnel injured. The security forces recovered a large quantity of arms and ammunition from them.

He said while investigating the killing of one Abdul Rehman of Awantipora allegedly by the security forces, it was found that the militant who had given up militancy was abducted by some unidentified militants on July 2 to force him to rejoin their ranks. He declined and was killed by the militants.

The spokesman denied the custodial death of one Mohd Azad of Urinand and said the latter had agreed to lead the security forces to a hideout for effecting more recoveries. While proceeding towards the hideout, he escaped and jumped into a river and drowned.

Refuting the reports of alleged custodial deaths of Ghulam Hassan and Syed Altaf in Muran Pulwama, the investigation report revealed that both the militants were killed in an encounter on July 12 and two AK-56 rifles and 22 rounds were recovered from them.

A boy, Mustaq Ahmed, was killed in cross-firing in Bhardarwah and not in custody as was alleged, the spokesman said.

Human Rights Panel Cautions Center on Punjab

94AS0450A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 4 Aug 94 p 13

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 3—The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has said that delay in tackling issues raised by terrorists may revive militancy and terrorism in Punjab and consequent recurrence of human rights violations.

In a report submitted to the Government after a visit to the State, the Commission said the Centre should be aware of these issues raised by terrorists during the initial years of the movement. The NHRC, possibly, is referring to the issues of river waters and Chandigarh.

The panel asked the Government to examine seriously the feeling in the public mind that the police was above the law, working on their own steam and answerable to none;

there were even allegations from people that subordinate police officers were not carrying out the instructions of superiors.

"The Commission recommends that the Government examine this matter seriously and ensure that normalcy is restored in the functioning of the police accountability of the police to the magistracy is re-established effectively at the district level and the police is cleansed of its image as a law unto itself," the Punjab report said.

"The Commission further recommends that the State Government should take most stringent action against erring police personnel guilty of violation of human rights so that accountability and transparency are established in the conduct of police personnel," the NHRC held.

"There was near unanimity in the views expressed by the people at large that terrorism has been contained. People had tolerated the methods adopted by the police to contain terrorism as long as the situation had so warranted... While there was need for continued vigilance, a feeling was now growing and was repeatedly expressed that it was time for the police to cease operating under the cover of special laws. There were very strong demands made for normalising the role and functioning of the police and for re-establishing the authority of the district magistrates over the police," the Commission said.

During the April visit, the NHRC received 171 complaints, largely alleging human rights violations by the police forces on the one hand and by the terrorists on the other. A core group of senior officers has been set up at the State level to facilitate the disposal of these complaints.

The complaints, according to the Commission, fall into three categories—against the police—of arbitrary arrests, disappearances, custodial deaths and fake encounters resulting in killings; there were also complaints of detention by the police, non-production of detained persons before magistrates, abuse of preventive detention and TADA [Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act] and the illegal seizure of properties by the police.

Second, there were complaints of killings, torture, kidnapping, extortion and rape by terrorists and disruption of normal life through the enforcement of a ruthless code of conduct by them. Third, the panel received complaints of inadequate payment of compensation to the families of terrorists' victims and inadequate support by way of educational facilities to the families of policemen killed by the terrorists.

"The Commission cannot accept the view that the use of unnumbered vehicles is an essential part of police operations in Punjab today and would recommend that the practice be dispensed with," the report said, adding that the Motor Vehicle Act did not permit plying of vehicles without registration numbers. Family members of persons who are picked up by the police in unnumbered vehicles were at a loss as to how to identify and report such abuses and offences to higher authorities," the report said.

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The Commission, in the interests of transparency, suggested that the State Government should make public the names of persons continuing in detention under TADA in each district every month.

Detentions under TADA came in for severe criticism from the public for their arbitrariness. "A demand was made that the State Government should make public names of all the TADA detainees. The Commission is seized of the operation of TADA at the national level and has sought

information on detentions under this Act by the various State Governments and Union Territory administrations," the report said.

Apart from taking note of the recent Supreme Court judgments on TADA, the panel said the Home Ministry had initiated certain steps to review detentions under the law.

The Commission has, in recent months, visited the disturbed States of Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and Assam.

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